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ABSTRACT

Consumer Protection in the Hong Kong Telecommunications Sector:
Implications for Competition Policy
by

CHEUNG Ching Yi Cherry

Master of Philosophy

Competition policy is meant to ensure a level-playing in the market, but its ultimate goal
is to enhance consumer interests. The telecommunications sector is one of the two
sectors that have set up a competition policy in Hong Kong. This paper examines the
current competition policy framework in the telecommunications sector by analyzing the
level of consumer protection using the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. It
examines in detail the consumer related complaint cases received by the Office of the
Telecommunications Authority in four markets: fixed line telephone services, mobile
phone services, International Direct Dialing services, and Internet services. Regression
analysis results reveal that more competition in a market has a positive and significant
effect on the frequency of complaints about misleading or deceptive conduct on the part
of operators in the period from 1999 to 2006. Also, smaller and newer operators tend to
receive more complaints. From the lessons we have drawn from the telecommunications
sector, a more comprehensive policy coped with consumer protection regulation is
needed in order to better promote consumer interests in Hong Kong.

Keywords: Consumer Protection, Competition Policy, Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm,
Telecommunications Sector, Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

As early as 1889, Canada enacted its Competition legislation while United Kingdom and
United States adopted theirs in 1890 as well. Nowadays, there are more than 100 nations
which have enacted Competition Law or are about to enact it with the general purpose of
promoting competition to stimulate economic efficiency. Some countries have even
attempted to bring competition policy and consumer protection policy under an
integrated framework, such as Australia, Hungary, Poland and France. Their competition
laws contain a chapter devoted to consumer protection. Undoubtedly, competition issues
are closely related to protection of consumers’ interest. In Canada, the Competition Act
contains provisions relating to misleading advertising and deceptive marketing practices
that are designed to provide consumers with basic uniform and accurate information on
certain consumer products and to avoid deceptive and false representation.1

In Hong Kong, the Government’s competition policy is set out in the statement issued by
the Competition Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG) in May 1998, with an objective “to
enhance economic efficiency and free flow of trade, thereby also benefiting consumer
welfare. The Government is committed to competition as a means to achieving the said
objective, and not as an end in itself.” 2 Eight years went by; has the policy been
achieving its goal to benefit consumer welfare during all these years? This becomes the
interest of my paper.

Since 1980s, the Consumer Council, under the chairmanship of Professor Edward Chen,
developed a keen interest in studying the anti-competitive behaviors of firms in different
service sectors in Hong Kong. With the lead of Professor Chen, the Council has carried
1

Model Law on Competition “Substantive Possible Elements for a competition law, commentaries and
alternative approached in existing legislations”, United Nations conference on Trade and Development,
New York and Geneva, 2004
2
“Report on the Review of Hong Kong’s Competition Policy” issued by Competition Policy Review
Committee June 2006
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out numerous competition studies since then. But due to the limited resources and
wavering support of the government, the ongoing studies are slow in progress. In
November 1996, the Consumer Council completed a comprehensive report on the
competition policy for Hong Kong.3 The report, entitled “Competition Policy: The Key
to Hong Kong’s Future Economic Success”, strongly recommends that Hong Kong
should adopt a comprehensive competition law and establish a competition authority and
an appeal body to enforce the law.

However, in 1997, the new Hong Kong government responded to the report from the
Consumer Council and rejected the push towards establishing a comprehensive
competition law and an independent agency to administer it.4 The Government claimed
that, under the philosophy of positive non-intervention policy, there was no need to
enact such an all-embracing law in the highly competitive market of Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the Government issued a formal policy statement of competition policy on
the objectives of promoting fairly competition in the market place and thereby,
enhancing consumer interest. Nevertheless, the policy statement was not law and could
not be used to require disclosure of information, investigative purposes, or as a remedy
in a court of law against public sector or private business.

In 2000, the Hong Kong Government passed two industry-specific ordinances for
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors under two enforcement bodies, the
Telecommunications Authority (TA) and Broadcasting Authority (BA) respectively.
With the enactment of Telecommunication (Amendment) Ordinance, it provides the first
sector-specific competition legislative safeguards in Hong Kong. It prohibits against
anti-competition practices and abuse of dominant position, and is applicable to all
telecommunications licensees.

The argument for introducing a general competition law has gone on for more than 10
years, and has become increasingly important in Hong Kong. In 2006, the need for a
3 Consumer Council (1996), “Competition Policy: The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Economic Success”
4 Trade & Industry Bureau (1997) “ Government Response to Consumer Council’s Report Entitled
“Competition Policy: The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Economic Success””
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general competition law received significant press in the first Policy Address of Chief
Executive, Mr. Donald Tsang. The debate is still raging today as most of Asia-Pacific
countries have now enacted competition laws, as early as Australia in 1906, New
Zealand in 1908, Japan in 1947, India in 1969, Thailand 1979, Republic of Korea 1980,
Taiwan Province of China 1991, China 1993, Indonesia 1999, and Singapore 2005, etc.5

After six years of this sectoral approach working in telecommunications sector, has the
policy really achieve its goal of enhancing consumer interests? It is crucial to evaluate
the effectiveness of the policy. A competition policy would not be effective by itself if it
cannot ensure that consumer interests are being served. If we are to seriously consider
adopting a comprehensive competition policy in Hong Kong, it is important to learn
from the experience of the existing policy adopted in the telecommunications sector,
especially in the consumers’ perspective. This is to ensure that when we promote a
general competition policy in Hong Kong, we would have more experience on how to
make the enforcement mechanism more effective allowing both the business community
and consumers to enjoy optimal benefits.

1.2 Rationales and Significance of the Study

Every policy needs serious, thoughtful and comprehensive consideration beforehand to
effectively achieve its policy goals. It is very crucial to review a policy on a regular basis,
to identify the pros and cons of it after adoption. The main purpose of which is to ensure
that the policy is always heading towards its goal effectively and efficiently under the
fast-changing community. If the policy’s goal is to enhance the consumer interest and
benefit, we should review and evaluate that policy from the view of consumers. Does the
competition policy take sufficient account of consumer interest and behavior?

The goal of competition policy, despite the sectoral or general approach, is to protect
consumers by keeping prices competitive, encouraging innovation, and upgrading
5

“Competition Policy in Developing countries: An Asia-pacific perspective” by Pradeep S. Mehta,
Bulletin on Asia-Pacific Perspectives 2002/2003, Asia-Pacific Economies: Sustaining Growth Amidst
Uncertainties
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quality and increasing choices. The principles of competition policy and consumer
protection should be mutually supportive, and their administration equally so. 6 With
such goal, consumers are expected to be protected and their interests fulfilled. However,
despite current law, complaint cases within the telecommunications sector from
consumers to the Consumer Council have always surpassed those of other sectors,
contributing roughly 25% to 35% of all complaints from 2000 to 2005.7 Compared to
other sectors, such as the broadcasting sector, another sector which has adopted the
sectoral approach of competition policy has been contributing less than 6% of all the
complaints throughout these years. With reference to the complaint cases handled by
Office of Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) about misleading or deceptive
conducts, fixed line telephone service market and Internet service market contribute the
majority of all complaint cases, which are around 32% and 38% respectively in the
entire sector of telecommunications.8

Consumer complaint is an indicator of consumer satisfaction level. Low frequency of
complaints is indicative of a properly working system, whereas high frequency of
complaints is indicative of some problems within the sector. Therefore, it is very
important to analyze the cases in details to pinpoint the problems and figure out practical
solutions to ensure that consumers continue to be protected under the existing
framework.

Telecommunications service is crucial to almost all of us since it is closely connected to
us and becomes part of our lives nowadays; it is highly inconvenient for us without any
supply of telecommunications services. The business world, in particular consumes the
services from the four main markets, including fixed line telephone, mobile phone,
International Direct Dialing (IDD) and Internet; while most of the consumers consume

6

“Competition Policy and Consumer Protection Policy” Nitya Nanda, CUTS Centre for Competition,
Investment & Economic Regulation, India 2004
7
Complaint Cases from the Consumer Council
8
Complaint Cases from OFTA
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at least one or even all services in these four main markets.9 Due to the large consumer
involvement in purchasing this sector’ services, it is important and valuable to assess the
level of consumer protection within this particular sector-telecommunications.

Also the services provided within the telecommunications sector are different from those
in other sectors. It is unique because of its rapid development and fast-paced
technological innovation, which brings benefits as well as inherent complications.10 This
uniqueness generates sophisticated professional and technical information, which is
often beyond the ordinary consumers’ ability to digest. From a consumer’s viewpoint,
protection begins when he or she receives any information from the service providers. In
order to protect the consumers under the asymmetric information situation, the operators
in the telecommunications sector should disclose the material information in the
marketing and sales process. This would affect consumers’ decision-making before any
formal transaction.

Most consumers basically concern only the price and quality of the service they
consume; they would not know or are even not interested to know what competition
policy could benefit them or how it is related to them in the daily life. They are not quite
aware of how competition law protects their interests. The misconception among some
consumers is that competition law is a system for protecting business. They may hold
the belief that competition law provides business with business advantages, which would
hurt the consumers in the end. However, the consumers’ awareness is all the more
important- consumers is the group of people who need to understand how the
competition policy brings benefits to them. Since once they know about the nature and
function of the competition policy, they know what kinds of business practices they are
protected against from. And since consumers are the “best detectors” of those unfair
business practices so they could give a great hand on reporting those cases to OFTA. In
order to have a strong enforcement mechanism, consumer is a vital component in the
9

With reference to the key telecommunications statistics from OFTA website, until July 2006, the
household fixed line penetration rate is 92%, mobile subscriber penetration rate is 128.9%, and the
household broadband penetration rate is 66.9%
10
For example, for Internet service, it used to be the dial-up access and now is the broadband access, also
for Mobile Phone Service, it was from 2G service to now 3G service.
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whole process. And that is what my study focuses on. If we consider enacting a more
comprehensive competition law in the future, we must also attach great importance to
the consumers’ perspective, by concretely explaining its benefits for consumers.
Consumers need to be educated in various ways that they can be protected or benefited
from the competition policy in an easy-to-understand manner. If we could garner enough
support from the general public, it would make the prompting process of a general
competition law smoother, easier and better. The birth of a general competitive policy
would then be speeded up.

Most of the literature review from other scholars or political parties would highlight the
general situation and drawbacks of the existing sectoral approach of competition policy
in Hong Kong or how it would benefit the small and medium sized enterprises (SME).
However, not many studies did shed light on the consumer’s perspective. This includes
the question of whether or not the consumers are benefiting from the existing policy or
they are suffering from it. It is important to have such an evaluation in the
telecommunications sector to help consumers understand how the competition policy
works in the sector and how they could be protected and benefited from it. Therefore,
this study is valuable with the fact that there is lack of comprehensive analysis and
systematic study of consumer protection in the telecommunications sector of Hong Kong,
especially with connection to competition policy.

As reviewed earlier, many countries have already enacted competition policy laws.
Competition policy has become an increasingly important issue in Hong Kong. More
and more people are interested in this topic and show serious concern on how it works in
Hong Kong. After the sectoral approach of competition policy adopted in the
telecommunications sector, it is important to review and assess the effectiveness in light
of consumer protection, especially when there is such strong momentum to fight for
competition policy in other sectors as well. In order to have better understanding of the
existing competition policy from the consumers’ standpoint and to show the consumers
to what extent they could be protected under existing framework, the pros and cons of
the existing framework in the telecommunications sector will be laid out in my study, as

6
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well as their implications for other sectors. An effective policy is one that protects both
the consumer and business sides – “a win-win situation”. We should balance both sides
and try to achieve the optimal level of economic efficiency and highlight the effects of
consumer protection and the benefits it provides from the existing sectoral approach in a
practical way.

To summarize, a competition policy would not be effective by itself if it could not
ensure that consumer interests are being served. If consumers have a better
understanding of the objective or function of competition policy, they would show more
support or even would help urge the Government to enact such a law. Also, if we are to
seriously consider adopting competition policy in all industries, it is crucial to learn from
the experience of the existing policy adopted in the telecommunications sector,
especially at the consumer perspective. This is to ensure that when we promote a general
competition policy in Hong Kong within other sectors, we would have more experience
on how to make the enforcement mechanism more effective and allow both the business
community and consumers to enjoy the optimal benefits.

1.3 Research Questions

There are three main research questions in my study.

1) Review the current competition policy framework in Hong Kong and analyze the
level of consumer protection that current competition policy in the
telecommunications industry provides by looking at the development of
competition policy, its historical development in the telecommunications sector
and other literature on the subject.

2) Assess whether the framework provides adequate consumer protection and
whether or not it actually achieves the objectives declared by the government by
using the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm, to see how a structure of a
market could affect the conduct of an operator and with government policy and

7
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enforcement mechanism, assess whether the level of consumers protection is
adequate by examining the consumer behaviors in particular market. The
complaint cases from the Consumer Council and OFTA will be examined as well
in order to see whether the consumers are well-satisfied or not, based on the most
crucial attributes that would affect the consumer satisfaction on different criteria,
including consistency, efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. Detailed elements
of each attribute will be discussed in methodology part in Chapter 4.

3) Base on a regression study conducted to examine how competition affects the
frequency of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints received and handled
by OFTA in the telecommunications sector. I also analyze the effects of operator
size, number of service subscribers, market power, and operator age on the
likelihood of the complaints.

4) Draw the experience from the existing sectoral approach and provide suggestions
and recommendations to the existing policy to address the problems I have
revealed from my study. Together with other countries’ experiences, Hong Kong
will be better equipped to prepare for the possibility of enacting a more
comprehensive competition law in other sectors in the future.

1.4 Outline of the Study

In Chapter 2, I will review the general competition policy in Hong Kong particularly in
the telecommunications sector. Also, I will look at the historical development in the
telecommunications sector and how the sectoral approach competition policy first came
about and how exactly this sectoral approach worked in the telecommunications sector. I
will also assess how the consumers are protected in the telecommunications sector under
the existing framework.

In Chapter 3, I will review the different literature on competition policy, compare the
pros and cons, and evaluate current scholars’ and public opinion on the existing sectoral

8

Chapter 1 Introduction
approach. Also, I will make reference to the literature of consumer protection in other
countries. In Chapter 4, the conceptual framework as well as the connections between
my study and economic principles will be explained. I will link the idea of consumer
protection with the competition policy. I will also show how I assess the level the
consumer protection with by using the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. The
whole methodology part would be explained in details at this chapter as well.

In Chapter 5, analysis of the complaint cases from the Consumer Council and OFTA and
as well as the findings projected will be presented. Different dimensions, including type
of complainants, nature and outcome of the consumer protection cases, with the focus on
misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, will be analyzed in this chapter. In Chapter
6, selected case studies will be discussed, with the analysis of different complaint cases
by different telecommunications operators. Key messages will be revealed from
analyzing the selected case studies.

Chapter 7 assesses the level of consumer protection will be assessed in four markets in
the telecommunications sector, including fixed line telephone services, mobile phone
services, IDD services, and Internet services. Significant problems in the
telecommunications after analyzing the complaints will also be summarized at the end of
this chapter. In Chapter 8, regression study will be conducted, to analyze the effects of
competition, the firm size, market power, and firm age on the likelihood of misleading
or deceptive conduct complaints. Its methodology and results will also be discussed in
this chapter.

In Chapter 9, I will provide policy implications and recommendations to address the
problems revealed from my study and discuss possible solutions to promote a more
effective competition policy. I will also draw experience from other countries and
suggest the best practices for enforcement mechanism to apply in the system of Hong
Kong. Chapter 10 is a conclusion of my study after a detailed analysis of the above
chapters. I will answer my research questions after I have reviewed the existing sectoral
approach. Also I will be able to tell the general effectiveness of this piece-meal

9

Chapter 1 Introduction
framework of policy in the telecommunications sector. Besides, the limitation of my
study and what the future works could be done from the extension of my study are
highlighted at the end.
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Chapter 2
Competition Policy and Consumer Protection in the Telecommunications Sector

2.1 Historical Development in the Telecommunications Sector

Prior to 1995, there was only one telecommunications operator in Hong Kong providing
local and international telephone services. In June 1995, with the expiry of the local
telephone franchise, the Office of Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) decided to
open up the market and introduce competition. Three new operators were licensed to
provide local fixed telecommunications services on a competitive basis. In September
1996, six licenses were issued for provision of personal communication services. In
January 1997, full portability of telephone number was achieved for fixed telephone
services and mobile number portability was subsequently implemented in March 1999.
Effective on January 1, 1999, the external telecommunications services market was
liberalized, with full liberalization in January 2000 after the liberalization of the external
facility-based market.1

2.2 The Birth of the Competition Policy in Hong Kong

The previous Hong Kong Government did not consider Competition Policy to be a high
priority on its legislative agenda. In response to the Consumer Council’s 1996 report
advocating the adoption of a general competition law, the government created the
Competition Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG) in December 1997 to deal with
competition issues on an ad hoc basis.2 In May 1998, the Government’s objective (as
stated in its Statement on Competition Policy) was “to enhance economic efficiency and
free flow of trade, thereby also benefiting consumer welfare. 3 The Government
committed to competition as a means to achieving the said objective, and not as an end

1

“Telecom Milestones” on OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
The Competition Policy Advisory Group (COMPAG) chaired by the Financial Secretary directs all
government entitles (including all statutory bodies) to adhere to the policy statement and guidelines; and
calls upon all businesses to abide by the policy statement and guidelines.
3‘
Competition Policy: The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Economic Success’, Consumer Council, 1996
2
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in itself.” 4 The government introduced sector-specific competition policy in 2000,
establishing unique rules for various sectors, and is enforced by corresponding
regulatory agencies. The Sectoral approach of competition policy was put in place for
the telecommunications sector with two objectives: (1) providing a level playing field in
the telecommunications market and (2) ensuring that consumers get the best services in
terms of capacity, speed, and price.

2.3 An Overview of Prohibitive Provisions of the Competition Policy in the
Telecommunications Sector

The Telecommunications Ordinance was amended in 1998 to enhance competition
safeguards, improve interconnection and access arrangements to telecommunications
services, streamline licensing procedures and provide the Telecommunications Authority
with powers over certain technical areas. With the enactment of Telecommunications
(Amendment) Ordinance 2000 in June 2000, the sectoral approach of competition
legislative has established safeguard which prohibits anti-competition practices and the
abuse of dominant market position. It is applicable to all telecommunications licensees
including mobile operators and internet service providers on top of fixed network
carriers.

Anti-Competitive Practices

The Anti-Competitive Practices Provision prohibits telecommunication operators from
engaging in conduct, which has the purpose or effect of eliminating, or substantially
restricting competition in the telecommunications market. An exhaustive list of
prohibited conduct has been made. These prohibited practices include, but not limited to,
collusive agreements to price-fix any apparatus or service, boycotting the supply of
goods or services to competitors, entering into exclusive arrangements which prevent
competitors from having access to supplies or outlets, entering into agreements between

4

Statement of Competition Policy , COMPAG, 1998 http://www.compag.gov.hk/policy/
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licensees to share available market between them along agreed geographic or customer
lines.5

Abuse of Dominance

Other than outlawing allegedly anti-competitive practices, another provision under the
sectoral approach of competition policy in the telecommunications sector is to prevent
licensees from abusing dominant market position. An exhaustive list of prohibited
conduct includes, but not limited to, predatory pricing, price discrimination, the
imposition of contractual terms which are harsh or unrelated to the subject of the
contract, tying agreement, discrimination in supply of services to competitors,
discounting, and preferential treatment to and/or the receipt of an unfair advantage from
associates. OFTA will determine whether a licensee is in a dominant position and
whether that position is being abused. If there is no dominant carrier, for example in
mobile services, licensees and customers can all react to offers presented by any
operator. An operator will become a dominant carrier, and be obliged to comply with
dominant carrier restrictions, if its behavior is deemed capable of affecting the market.
Any operator having a 75% market share will be viewed as a dominant carrier. The
observation point would begin from a 25% market share and upwards.6

Mergers and Acquisitions

New provisions on mergers have been inserted into the Telecommunications Ordinance
by virtue of the Telecommunications (Amendment) Ordinance 2003, which came into
effect on July 9, 2004. The ordinance provides a comprehensive legislative framework to
regulate mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications market by providing a post
merger review control regime on the telecommunication operators. The review is
supplemented by a voluntary pre-notification system and the utilization of the
“substantially lessening of competition” test. If the merger is found to be anti-

5
6

Section 7K of Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106), OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
Section 7L of Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106), OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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competitive, the Telecommunication Authority can order the licensee to eliminate the
anti-competitive effect of the merger.7

In September 2003, COMPAG promulgated a set of guidelines to supplement the
Statement on Competition Policy. These guidelines provide objective benchmarks and
principles to assess Hong Kong’s overall competition environment. These guidelines
aim to define and tackle anti-competitive practices and ensure consistent application of
competition policy across entire sectors. These guidelines’ underlying philosophy is the
rule of reason with no practice as illegal, per se.

2.4 The Enforcement Mechanism of the Sectoral Approach in the
Telecommunications Sector

(A) Enforcement Agency

The

Telecommunications

Authority

(TA)

implements

the

government’s

telecommunications polices, which is supported by the Office of Telecommunications
Authority (OFTA). TA oversees the regulation of telecommunications industry in Hong
Kong and administers the ordinances governing the establishment and operation of
telecommunications services. OFTA was established as a separate government
department on July 1, 1993. OFTA serves as the executive arm of the TA, and is
appointed under the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106) as the statutory body to
oversee the regulation of the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong.8

7
8

Section 7P of Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106), OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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(B) Complaint Mechanism

OFTA has established the Guide, which details the procedure for complaints related to
competition provisions of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap.106) or any licensee
condition relating to these sections.9

Preliminary Investigation

The preliminary investigation will be conducted upon the receipt of a detailed complaint.
It is intended to establish whether or not there is prima facie evidence, which is required
for the case to receive a full investigation. When the case merits a full investigation
within the scope of the provisions and there is reasonable grounds for TA to believe that
there may be an infringement of the Ordinance and/or the license conditions, the OFTA
will examine the information provided by the complainant along with any relevant
information within the OFTA and/or available from the public domain. It may also be
necessary to directly approach the plaintiff and/or defendant to seek information and
clarification. Standard OFTA procedure is to complete the preliminary investigation
within four weeks from its initiation. If the complaint is not substantiated in the
preliminary investigation stage, the plaintiff will be notified in writing for the outcome.

Full Investigation

At the stage of full investigation, OFTA will advise both the plaintiff and the defendant
in writing about the commencement of the investigation. OFTA will invite the defendant
to comment on the case and to provide any information that is relevant and required for
the investigation. In addition, OFTA will also consider whether any information or
comments are required from third parties, such as other market participants. OFTA will
conduct a full analysis covering aspects of economic, legal and accounting issues etc.
when responses have been received from the defendant and/or any third parties.

9

“How Complaints Related to Sections 7K to 7N of the Telecommunications Ordinance are Handled by
OFTA, December 28, 2005, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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On the completion of the investigation, the TA will decide whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a breach of the Ordinance and/ or the license conditions. TA strives
to complete 80% of investigations within 4 months from the initiation of the full
investigation.

Outcome

If a breach is not established after consideration of all relevant information available, the
TA will set out her findings in a draft case summary and invite the subject of the
complaint to provide comments within 7 days. Subject to any further information or
comments received, the TA will finalize the case summary and close the case.

If a breach is concluded from the investigation, the TA will draft its preliminary findings
with proposed actions or penalties. If appropriate, TA will invite the defendant to make
representations, usually within 10 working days. Possible remedies will be considered in
parallel for less complex cases or at a later stage for complex cases.

Urgent or exceptional Cases

When the complaint of a plaintiff against a defendant is an on-going matter and alleged
violation is causing real-time damage to consumers or competitors, the TA may consider
taking urgent action within such time-scale as the circumstances warrant to deal with the
complaint.

(C) Remedies and Penalty

The sectoral-approach of competition policy has spelled out remedies for violation of the
provisions. Depending on the severity and nature of a violation, the TA can issue either a
warning or a direction, which require a licensee to cease and desist from the action
prohibited by the rules. A financial penalty can be imposed for “very serious” cases. For
extremely serious cases, the license of the operator may be suspended. Initially, the

16

Chapter 2 Competition Policy and Consumer Protection in the Telecommunications Sector

financial penalties that could be imposed were small. Prior to 2000, the maximum fine
the TA could impose for violations of the competition provisions or breaches of a
license contract was HK$20, 000 for the first offense; HK$50, 000 for the second
offense; and HK$100, 000 for any subsequent offenses which a penalty is imposed.
These figures were raised to HK$200, 000, HK$500, 000 and K$1,000,000 respectively
in early 2000 when the Telecommunications Ordinance was amended. The amended
Ordinance provided also includes a clause for extremely serious violation where the TA
can appeal the case to a Court of Law for a higher penalty of up to HK$10 million
and/or revoke the defendant’s license.10

(D) Appeal Mechanism

Authorized

by

the

Telecommunications

Ordinance,

the

Telecommunications

(Competition Provisions) Appeal Board11 was established to hear appeals against that
TA’s decisions. This is the first ever sector-specific appeal board on competition matters
in Hong Kong. The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR Government appoints the
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Appeal Board for a term not exceeding two years.
In appeal hearing, two additional panel members will be appointed by the Chairman.
The Appeal Board’s decision is final. An appeal from an opinion, determination,
direction or decision of the TA relating to the competition provisions of the
Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106), or any sanction or remedy imposed by the
TA as a consequence of a breach of such provision, Telecommunication (Competition
Provisions) Appeal Board may refer any question of law to the Court of Appeal at is
discretion although there is no right of determination by the Appeal Board on any matter
including a question of law. Any person aggrieved by a decision, opinion, direction,
decision of the TA relating to the competition related provisions, or any sanction or

10

Section 36Cof Telecommunications(Amended) Ordinance 2000, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
Telecommunications (Competition Provisions) Appeal Board is an independent statutory body
constituted under section 32L-U of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106) to determine appeals
against the Telecommunications Authority in enforcing fair competition in the telecommunications market
in Hong Kong, Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau website
http://www.citb.gov.hk/ctb/eng/telecom/relevant2.htm
11
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remedy imposed by TA, may appeal to board. A subsequent ruling will be ready within
14 days.12

2.5 Consumer Interests Related Provisions in the Telecommunications Sector

Two competition-related consumer-interest provisions provide protections against
misleading or deceptive conduct and non-discrimination practices.13 These provisions
complement those guarding against anti-competitive practices, abuse of dominance, and
merge and acquisitions under the competition policy regime in the telecommunications
sector. In the interest of consumers, a licensee cannot offer products, which, in the
opinion of OFTA, prevents competition. The conduct of licensees is regulated so as to
ensure no discriminatory or deceptive behavior. The licensee’s power to make sublicensee arrangements, entry barriers, degree of product substitutability, for example, are
all factors OFTA will consider. In order to ensure consistency of judgment, industry and
consumers are consulted and OFTA undertakes reviews and issues guidelines from time
to time.

2.6 Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Provision in the Telecommunications Sector

(A) Provision

Section 7M of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106) states:

“A licensee shall not engage in conduct which, in the opinion of the
(Telecommunications) Authority, is misleading or deceptive in providing or acquiring
telecommunications networks, systems, installations, customer equipment or services
including (but not limited to) promoting, marketing or advertising the network, system,
installation, customer equipment or service.”

12

Section 32L to 32R of Telecommunications Ordinance, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
Section 7M Misleading and Deceptive Conduct & Section 7N Non-discrimination, Telecommunications
Ordinance (Cap. 106), OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
13
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(B) Guidelines
Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Guideline, 21st May 200314

On May 21, 2003, the Telecommunications Authority issued guidelines under the
Provision of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct of the Telecommunications Ordinance.
These guidelines explain how the TA will apply and enforce the provisions and outline
the approach with which the TA will take when forming its opinion. However, the
guidelines cannot and do not aim to provide a definitive response to any particular
conduct, rather the guidelines serve as a guide to determine when corporate behavior has
fallen outside legal boundaries. Determining whether any particular conduct is
misleading or deceptive requires consideration on a case-by-case basis. The Guidelines
are merely intended for use by participants in the telecommunications industry and
consumers to ensure parties know their rights and obligations under the Ordinance.
Following industry consultation in 1996, the TA issued a voluntary Advertising Code of
Practice.15 The Advertising Code laid down basic guiding principles in relation to the
promotion of telecommunications services. However, the enactment of the current
Provisions and the published guidelines now supersede the Advertising Code. In future,
the TA will address complaints about advertising in reference only to the current
Provision in accordance with these Guidelines.

The Misleading and Deceptive Provision refers specifically to promoting, marketing and
advertising as particular types of industry conduct. However, it should be noted that the
scion is not limited to this type of conduct. Selling, promotions, and advertising
generally have been the focus of many complaints to the TA, with the bulk of
complaints relating to popular press advertising. However, any type of conduct which is
misleading or deceptive is prohibited by the Provision.

14

“Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications
Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
15
Advertising Code, January 1996, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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In determining whether promoting, marketing or advertising telecommunications
products or services is misleading or deceptive, the TA will take into account all
information provided by both the licensee and the plaintiff. This includes information
concerning the characteristics of the products or services, the target audience, the price
or the manner in which the price is calculated, the terms and conditions under which the
products are supplied or service provided, and if relevant, the nature, attributes and
rights of the licensee (including, for example, its identity and ownership of intellectual
property rights). A licensee may breach the provision if it is found to be misleading or
deceptive. It is not necessary for the TA to form an opinion on conduct that is both
misleading and deceptive, although conduct which is deceptive is also likely to be
misleading. Also, a licensee’s conduct need not be proven to have actually misled or
deceived anyone for that licensee to be in breach of the Provision. The TA does not
require evidence that someone has actually been misled or deceived to find a licensee in
breach of the Provision; although such evidence will often be a persuasive factor in
considering whether a “reasonable person” would have been misled.

When TA forms an opinion as to whether a licensee has engaged or is engaging in
misleading or deceptive conduct, the TA will assess the circumstances surrounding the
conduct. The TA will examine the facts and assess whether a “reasonable person” would
be misled or deceived by the licensee’s conduct. A “reasonable person” is an ordinary
member of the target audience; that is a person at whom the conduct is directed. For
example, the target audience differs when a licensee runs an advertisement in the
newspaper from an advertising campaign in corporate newsletters. It is the responsibility
of the licensee to identify the target audience and ensure that a “reasonable person” from
this audience is not misled or deceived. In other words, the level of comprehension
expected, and therefore the standard of care required by the licensee will differ
depending on the target audience.

With ordinary consumers, it can usually be assumed that they have some knowledge of
the product or service they are buying and capable enough to read simple terms and
conditions. However, if products are new and/or complex, general working knowledge
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cannot be assumed and consumers will most likely require additional as well as clearer
information about the product or service. It is the responsibility of the licensee to
identify its own product and determine the level of consumer education necessary to
avoid misconduct.

Promoting, marketing and advertising are, by no means, the only types of conduct with
which the TA may be concerned. Oral representations, product labeling, packaging,
guarantees and the content of internet sites, for example, are other areas of conduct
covered by the Provision.

Conducts of Concern

(1) Advertising Puff

There are several conducts of concern listed in the guidelines. Puffery, or boasting about
a product or service, is common in commerce and consumers can be expected not to take
advertising “puff” too seriously. For the advertising puff, it will be misleading where
facts are wrong or distorted. In determining whether conduct is mere puffery or is
actually misleading or deceptive, the TA will assess the conduct through the eyes of a
reasonable person, taking into account the nature of the target audience.

(2) Misrepresentations

Misrepresentations are oral and/or written statements which contain incorrect or false
information. Such misrepresentations typically are statements or information which is
wrong or inaccurate, leaving out important facts or creating a false impression. For
example, a service provider in the UK was found to have misrepresented information
provided to customers. The operator led her customers to believe that existing telephone
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numbers were at risk of compulsory changes due to regulatory changes, when in fact, the
“compulsory” changes were merely proposals and was not yet compulsory.16

It may also be misleading or deceptive conduct to falsely imply that certain statutorily
terms have been excluded when such terms cannot, in fact, be excluded as a matter of
law.17 For example, under the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 71), it is
not possible to exclude or limit liability for breach of the seller’s obligations under the
Sale of Goods Ordinance (Cap. 26). The TA considers licensees purporting to limit their
own liability as having engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of the
Provision.

(3) Silence or Deception by Omission

Silence is regarded as a form of conduct (or misconduct) under section 7M of the
provision. A licensee’s silence or non-disclosure breaches the Provision when failure to
disclose relevant facts results in consumers being misled or deceived. Licensees who
half-truths or remain silent in situations where consumers have a reasonable expectation
to receive full disclosure are considered to have engaged in inappropriate conduct. A
licensee is expected to fully disclose all material terms and condition, including price.
This is especially relevant when a term or condition is particularly stringent or in the
situation where the consumer might have made a different choice had he or she
previously known about the terms or condition. Failure to mention an extra cost or
condition will be of serious concern to the TA in circumstances where a reasonable
consumer would expect there be “no more to pay” only to find the service or product
does not work or is not available without further payment for “add-ons”

16

“UK Office of Telecommunications complaint against Cable and Wireless, case reference BX/879/017
(September 1997) stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications
Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA website
http://www.ofta.gov.hk
17
For example, the Sales of Goods Ordinance (Cap.26), the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance
(Cap.71) and the Supply of Services (Implied Term) Ordinance (Cap. 457)
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Silence or deception by omission was illustrated by a New Zealand service provider who
failed to disclose the fact that its phones for sale were second-hand phones. The provider
was successfully prosecuted by the New Zealand Commerce Commission for misleading
or deceptive conduct.18

(4) Predictions

Licensees are allowed to make predictions. Failure of predictions to come true is not
enough ground to make the prediction (conduct) misleading or deceptive. However, if a
licensee makes a prediction knowing ahead of time that it will prove to be false, or
makes a prediction without regard to whether or not it will be true or false is cause for
investigation by the TA. Such disregard may be viewed as misleading or deceptive
conduct.

(5) Fine print disclaimers and qualifications

With reference to conduct under fine print disclaimers and qualifications, all significant
terms and conditions must be immediately and easily accessible to consumers. It is not
acceptable to expect consumers to conduct exhaustive searches for terms and conditions.
The Provision requires all significant terms and conditions to be provided to the
consumers in hard or soft copy along with a copy of the contract, which confirms the
transaction. The terms and conditions should also be available in a language (English or
Chinese) which the customer is familiar with.

Terms and conditions which dictate consumer purchasing decisions must be clearly
spelled out. Such terms include total contract fees or the minimum contract period for a
mobile phone service contract. The more significant or onerous the terms or conditions
of an offer, the more likely it is that their omission from the main text of a promotion or
18

NZ Commerce Commission, “Old phones for new? Retailer admits cordless phones were second-hand”,
Media Release 1999/3, http://www.comcom.govt.nz stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong
Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA
website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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advertisement would be regarded as misleading or deceptive. Such an omission was
documented in the case of a Hong Kong external telecommunications service licensee.
The operator advertised in a promotional leaflet that its prepaid calling card would
provide a specified number of minutes to a particular destination. However the specified
usable minutes could only be achieved if each call was less than certain duration,
otherwise a connection charge would apply. Although the leaflet’s small print stated that
the service is subject to the licensee’s terms and conditions available upon request and
provided a customer service hotline number, the TA decided that this disclosure was
insufficient to alert customers to the fact that the usable minutes may be less than the
figure stated in the leaflet, and the licensee was therefore in breach of the Provision.19

Another example occurred in Australia where a telecommunications provider offered a
specified value of free calls on weekends. The promotional material included a small
print disclaimer stating “some exclusion applies”. However, the disclaimer did not
explicitly state that the free call value did not include calls to other mobiles. The Federal
Court held that the disclaimer was inadequate to avoid a misleading or deceptive
effect.20

(6) Unsolicited goods or services and opt out clauses

Licensees should not rely on a consumer’s failure to act to make a sale, especially when
the product offered is new or has been offered on a trial basis. To avoid potentially
misleading conduct associated with “passive” acceptance of offers, the TA recommends
that licensees require consumers to actively elect to subscribe for a product or service. If
a service is offered at a discounted price for a limited promotional period whose terms
will change after the promotional period, the licensee should specifically and clearly
inform the customer at the time of service rendered of such changes. If there is an opt19

Complaint against Pacific 1636, May 2002 (case reference T2/02),
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/ca_bd/case_closed/T2.02.pdf stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in
Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003,
OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
20
Trade Practices Commission v Optus Communications Pty Ltd & Anor (1996) ATPR 41-478 stated in
“Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications
Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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out option after the trial or promotional period, licensees should exercise particular care
to ensure consumers are not misled about the difficulty of opting out of the service.

(7) Comparative advertising

Comparative advertising involves a comparison between the products and services that a
licensee is advertising versus the products and services of others. Comparison should
only be made between products or services that meet the same needs or are intended for
the same purpose. Any claims in the comparative advertising should only be made when
such differences can be verified with reference to independent studies or surveys.

Inappropriate comparative advertising was demonstrated by a Hong Kong external
telecommunications services licensee. In an advertisement, the licensee claimed that its
calling card offered the lowest market price by including a table comparing its rates with
several other operators. However, the table excluded the rates of a major competitor
whose rates were lower during off-peak hours. The TA considered the omission in the
advertisement was misleading; the operator had breached the Provision.21

(8) Bait advertising

Bait advertising is where an attractive offer for a product or service is used by a licensee
to lure a consumer into a retail outlet or initiate contact with some other means. Once
contact is established, the consumer will be informed that the product or service has sold
out, or is only available from selected retail outlets or locations or is no longer available.
The licenses then uses the opportunity to sell higher priced products or services to the
consumer, while never having the intention of providing the cheaper advertised products
or services. TA considers such actions as misleading or deceptive conduct when a
licensee did not, or will not, possess the advertised products or services at the time of the
21

Complaint against ZONE Ltd, September 2002 (case reference T141/02),
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/ca_bd/case_closed/t141_02.pdf stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in
Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003,
OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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promotion. In circumstances where the advertised product or service is limited by
capacity, the licensee is required to inform consumers of such limitations or else such an
omission may constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.

For example, an Australia mobile phone operator was engaged in bait advertising by
offering mobile phones at a special low price. This was found to be misleading or
deceptive conduct because even though customers were required to purchase the mobile
phones from the service provider’s retail outlets, not all of the service provider’s retail
outlets offered the special low price. And those retail outlets that did offer the special
low price only carried a limited number of mobile phones at the price advertised. This
was considered misconduct because not any of the information was contained in the
original advertisement.22

(9) Use of words such as “Free”, “Unlimited”, or “No more to pay” etc

Use of words such as “free” is a popular means of promoting a product or service and is
often used when trying to establish a product or service in the market. A licensee should
ensure that all the significant terms and conditions are spelled out. Also, products and
services advertised as free are, in fact, free. Products and services are not free when the
consumer has to pay for them in some other, undisclosed way.

In Australia, the Federal Court found a newspaper to be guilty of misleading or
deceptive conduct in relation to a “free” mobile phone promotion. The front page of the
newspaper promised free mobile phones to readers with a paid subscription to the
newspaper. However, only on receipt of the mobile phones were consumers made aware

22

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Mobile promotion: misleading, bait advertising,
Media Release 147/05.08.1998, http://www.accc.gov.au stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in
Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003,
OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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the significant minimum access charges they would be required to pay to use the phone.
This fact negated the purported “free” phone.23

In New Zealand, an internet service provider was also found to have engaged in
misleading or deceptive conduct when it advertised a free internet service offer while
failing to disclose that consumer in some areas would be required to make toll calls to
connect to the provider or pay extra telephone line charges after 10 hours of usage per
month. 24

(10) Prizes

If a sales promotion involves a prize, licensees should ensure that it includes no
misleading or deceptive terms relating to the prize or has any material omissions, such as
entry requirements or restrictions on the number of entries.

(11) Unlawful churn and slamming

Churn in telecommunications sector means the time when consumers switch their
service providers. The ability of consumers to switch from one network to another helps
ensure that licensees remain sensitive to consumer demands in respect to quality and
price. Consumer however can become confused or misled by the very nature of churn. It
is misleading or deceptive to misrepresent the nature of a particular transaction, i.e.
leading consumers to believe a switch is temporary when, in reality, the switch is
permanent. A suggestion by a salesperson that a signature is required to “prove” the
salesperson’s attendance is misleading or deceptive when in fact the signature authorizes
the transfer of services. It is also necessary for licensees to accurately disclose to
consumers the full facts pertaining to their current provider and the identity the licensee.
23

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v nationwide News Pty ltd (1996) ATPR 41-519
stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets”,
Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
24
NZ Commerce Commissions, Not so “free” internet services costs Clear Communicants $15,000, Media
Release 2001/110, http://www.comcom.govt.nz stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong
Kong Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA
website http://www.ofta.gov.hk

27

Chapter 2 Competition Policy and Consumer Protection in the Telecommunications Sector

In UK, a service provider seeking to persuade customers to switch telephone providers
was found to have made misleading statements about its relationship with another
service provider, causing customers to switch providers under false premises.25

Slamming is the practice of changing a consumer’s telephone service without permission.
Licensees who do not inform consumers they are being switched to another network are
engaging in slamming, conduct which the TA considers to be misleading or deceptive
under the Provision. In circumstances where a customer agrees to a change of service
provider following misleading representations from the new service provider, the TA
will assume, in the absence of any contrary evidence, that there has been a breach of the
Provisions.

(12) Cramming

“Cramming” describes the practice of placing misleading or deceptive charges on
consumers’ telephone bills. Examples of cramming include, but are not limited to
charges for services not requested or authorized by the consumer, charges for services
that are only explained on the telephone bill in general terms (such as “service charge”
or “other fees”) and charges that are added to consumers’ telephone bills without clear
explanation of the services provided, (such as “monthly fee”).

(13) Telemarketing

Telemarketing refers to the practice of calling potential consumers on the telephone and
asking them to purchase products or services. The aim of a telemarketer is to get the
consumer excited about a product or service so that they make an immediate decision to
purchase or, at the very least, agree to hear the details of the product or service sent to

25

UK Office of Telecommunications, complaint against Reach Telecom Ltd, case reference
CW/00496/01/02 (10.05.2002) stated in “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong
Telecommunications Markets”, Telecommunications Authority Guidelines, May 21, 2003, OFTA website
http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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them. The failure to inform the consumer of material terms and conditions is regarded
misleading or deceptive conduct.

The obligations of licensees under the Provision are in additional to obligations under
the Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance (Cap. 458) and other applicable laws,
including the Sales of Goods Ordinance (Cap. 26), the Control of Exemption Clauses
Ordinance (Cap. 71) and the Supply of Services (Implied Terms) Ordinance (Cap. 457).

(C) Complaint Mechanism

Anyone who believes a licensee has engaged in conduct which is misleading or
deceptive may complain to the OFTA. The TA may also initiate an investigation on its
own initiative when relevant matters come to its attention (rather than in the form of a
consumer complaint). Further information about how to make a complaint can be found
on the OFTA web site.

Upon the receipt of a complaint, OFTA will decide whether the complaint merits a
formal investigation and, and will follow the normal procedure for complaints. Details
of each complaint received by OFTA will be sent to the relevant licensee, who will be
asked to respond to the allegations. This will enable the licensee to defend its actions
and submit any additional information to OFTA. This process also provides the licensee
an opportunity to voluntarily remedy any outstanding issues of concern.

The materials gathered during an investigation, including any responses from the
licensee, are all directed to and considered by the TA. The TA’s opinion will be
provided to the licensee, giving the licensee an opportunity to comment on the TA’s
reasoning before the final decision is made. Where the TA considers that there has been
a breach of the provision, a licensee will also be given an opportunity to comment and
put forward submissions in relation to the penalty the TA is considering.
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(D) Remedies and Penalty

There are various penalties which the TA may impose on a licensee following a finding
that the licensee has breached the provision, including financial penalties, disclosure to
the public and corrective advertising and warnings.26 For the financial penalties, TA may
impose a financial penalty on the licensee for failure to comply with the provision. On
the first occasion the penalty is imposed, the penalty may be up to and including
$200,000, on the second occasion, up to and including $500,000 and, on any subsequent
occasions, the penalty may be up to and including $1,000,000.

(E) Appeal Mechanism

Decisions of the TA in relation to the provision may be appealed to the
Telecommunications (Competition Provisions) Appeal Board. The detailed procedure is
the same as the other competition-related provisions which was discussed in section 2.4.

2.7 Consumer Interests Related Code of Practice in the Telecommunications Sector

Besides the Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Guideline that the OFTA issued on May
21, 2003, there are other consumer-related codes of practice. All the Codes are voluntary
in nature and the operators are to police themselves in compliance to the Codes. They
have the responsibility to maintain both the integrity and goodwill of the
telecommunications industry. The following are the main Code of Practices related to
my study.

26

Guidelines on the Imposition of Financial Penalty under Section 36C of the Telecommunications
Ordinance, April 15 2002 OFTA Website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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Code of Practice on Protection of Customer Information for Fixed and Mobile Service
Operators, June 17, 2002 27

This Voluntary Code of Practice lays out the best practices for preventing unauthorized
disclosure of consumer information by staff. In the course of business and provision of
services, operators also collect a large volume of customer personal data. Data such as
telephone numbers, residential address and call history details may be sensitive in
certain circumstances and of value if used for illicit purposes. The code therefore sets the
standards that fixed and mobile service operators are required to protect customer
information.

The best practices suggested are not exhaustive, but they provide guidelines in the areas
of customer personal data protection, technical measures for protection of customer
personal data, location security, staff security, and transfer of customer personal data.
Fixed and mobile service operators may adopt other standards and measures which can
provide reasonably sufficient protection to customer information. In addition, fixed and
mobile service operators are reminded to observe the requirements of the legal
provisions related to privacy of personal data and prevention of bribery.

The Code is based on the Legislation of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486)
which requires all personnel privy to consumer-data not engaging in a practice that
contravenes the data protection guidelines listed in the Ordinance. Exceptions to this rule
are also outlined under the Ordinance. The Code is also based on the Legislation of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201), which, states that any agent who uses
consumer data for personal gain or discloses consumer data without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse, may be in breach of the Provision.

27

“Code of Practice on Protection of Customer Information for Fixed and Mobile Service Operators”,
June 17, 2002 OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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Code of Practice of the Service Contracts for the Provision of Public
Telecommunications Services, November 12, 2004 28

Code

of

Practice

of the

Service

Contracts for the Provision of Public

Telecommunications Services became effective on November 12, 2004. This voluntary
code

recommended

basic

standards

and

guiding

principles

for

public

telecommunications service contracts. Service Providers contracts should be balanced,
fair and reasonable. Service contracts should not be written with preferential treatment to
the service provider. Contracts should be written in plain and legible Chinese or English
requested by the consumer. Service providers should not specify that the Chinese or
English version of the contract would prevail the other.

Code of Practice of the Service Contracts for the Provision of Public Mobile
Radiocommunications Services, November 12, 2004 29

The Service Contracts for the Provision of Public Mobile Radiocommunications
Services code became effective on November 12, 2004.

This voluntary code

recommended

for

basic

standards

and

guiding

principles

public

mobile

radiocommunications service (PMRS) operators service contracts. This Code is similar
to the Code for the Provision of Public Telecommunications Services.

Since this Code is voluntary in nature, PMRS operators are to police themselves and self
ensure adherence to the code. Each operator has the responsibility to maintain both the
integrity and goodwill of the telecommunications industry. The TA will monitor the
industry response to the Code. If the Code and the associated self-disciplinary
mechanism are ineffective, the TA will review further options, including inserting
special conditions for the licensees or enacting new legislation to regulate business
practice of the PMRS operators in relation to the preparation of the service contracts.
28

“Code of Practice of the Service Contracts for the Provision of Public Telecommunications Services”,
November 12, 2004 OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
29
“Code of Practice of the Service Contracts for the Provision of Public Mobile Radiocommunications
Services”, November 12, 2004 OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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2.8 Conclusion

The competition-related provisions and guidelines provide detailed description of
specific prohibited or disallowed conducts. With such, consumers’ benefits seem to be
well protected literally. However, whether there is adequate consumer protection in
practice, we need to analyze the consumer behavior in the sector and examine the
complaint cases in greater details. Detailed discussion will be in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
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3.1 Related Studies on the Competition Policy in Hong Kong

There are only few studies exist which focus on consumer protection in the Hong Kong
telecommunications sectors. Even fewer studies have been done since the establishment
of new regulations under the sectoral approach of Competition Policy. Despite their
small number, the studies on the Competition Policy in Hong Kong represent crucial and
significant discussions on the efficacy of the current policy in Hong Kong. The
following remarkable studies review the pros and cons of the existing approach.

(A) Drawbacks of the Existing Mechanism

Chen & Lin (2002) have highlighted the fact that the existing sectoral approach distorts
resource allocation in long run due to different rules set for different sectors. Another
credibility problem is that the same agency acts as both the traditional industry regulator
and competition policy enforcer, where full impartiality of their decisions may not be
credibly conveyed to the general public. They also discussed other specific problems
associated with the sectoral approach, such as the exclusion of structural issues, narrow
coverage of sectors, and the lack of public enforcement. 1

Williams (2005) (2006) critically analyzes the current competition policy stance of the
government and argues that the sectoral approach to competition issues is likely to prove
insufficient. The sectoral approach may effectively address the issues in specific sectors;
however, the absence of a general competition law means that a range of anticompetitive practice in other important sectors could remain, with great cost to the
consumer-at-large and other competitors. Since there is dominance of the economy by a
small number of family-controlled conglomerates (who supply everything from

1

“Competition Policy under Laissez-faireism: Market Power and Its Treatment in Hong Kong” Professor
Edward K.Y. Chen and Profess Ping Lin, Review of Industrial Organization, 21, 2002, 145-166
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electricity to telecommunications services, port services, groceries, estate management
and other retail services, etc.), anti-competitive behavior is simply a function of rational
decision making by profit maximizing entrepreneurs. Theses firms dominate the
domestic economy and operate a substantial number of monopolies and cartels,
exacerbating high concentration ratios and a lack of competition by bundling products
within conglomerate structures. The nexus of concentrated economic and political power
held by these conglomerates may explain the historical reluctance of government to
tackle anti-competitive behavior effectively. Only with the installation of new political
leadership might there be hope for a change of policy. With regards to the
telecommunications sector, he states that the limited and ineffective nature of the piecemeal approach has been demonstrated by the outcome of the Banyan Garden Case.2 This
complaint concerned the bundling of telecommunication services as part of the
management fee for a residential housing estate.3 The obvious problem in disposing of
this case is the limited ambit of the competition provisions in the Telecommunications
Ordinance, which is sector specific and only prima facie applies to telecommunication
licensees and not to other economic actors. Hong Kong has no provision for statutory
economic investigations of sectors that appear to have structural impediments to
competition. The concern of OFTA is that even an isolated sectoral regime, as in the
telecommunications, maybe prohibited from successful operation by the artificial
limitations placed on the scope of OFTA competition enquiries by the legislation. He
claims that the current policy is lacking credibility and is weak in the long term and that
Hong Kong’s overall best interests lie in another course. 4

Cheng and Wu (1998) point out that the existing mechanism has no effective power to
investigate, prevent, or stop anti-competitive practices without legal sanction. They

2

Case T 261/03, see OFTA website for the full decision
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/c_bd/completed-cases/t261_03.pdf
3
Banyan Garden is a large residential housing estate developed by the Cheung Kong Group, who
appointed their subsidiary company Citybase as property manager. In September 2003, Citybase
contracted with Hutchinson Multimedia and PowerComto supply broadband internet and with Hutchinson
Global Communications to provide residential landline telephone services to all the residential units in the
development
4
“Seeds of its own Destruction: Hong Kong’s Dysfunctional Competition Policy” Mark Williams, 2006,
The Journal of Business Law, page 52-73.
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believe that Hong Kong’s free trade policy is a necessary, but not sufficient, spur to
competition in the territory because many goods and services are not traded. They have
listed real estate, retailing, transportation and utilities as major problem areas where the
government’s dismissal of competition policy has been an error. It is vital to have full
legal investigatory powers to uncover the facts, given that business typically does not
voluntarily disclose internal information or co-operate with fact-finding investigations.
This observation reflects the difficulties encountered by the Consumer Council and
COMPAG sectoral competition investigations.

(B) Need for a Comprehensive Competition Policy

Due to the drawbacks of the existing sectoral approach, Chen and Lin (2002) (2007)
propose that a blanket competition law can better promote competition and economic
efficiency in Hong Kong. They state that Hong Kong economy is highly competitive in
international markets but not in domestic markets. The public also holds various
misconceptions about the role of competition law, in particular the confusion of free
competition (laissez-faire) with fair or perfect competition, and international
competitiveness with competition among domestic firms. Some regard competition law
as a means to protect certain groups of players, rather than to protect competition. Both
the government and the public believe that the competition law is necessary government
intervention, but such intervention results in distortion of the functions of a free market
system. They argue that what Hong Kong really needs for a competition policy system
to be effective, is to educate the public, correct the various misconceptions regarding the
competition policy and develop a culture for fair competition. Also, an independent
enforcement body unrelated to any traditional regulatory duties is required to close the
information gap inherent in the sectoral approach.

5

Williams (2005) (2006) also highlights that enacting a comprehensive law is urgently
needed to ensure that all sectors of industry are subject to congruent rules. He suggests

5

“Promoting Competition- Maintaining our Economic Drive” Edward K.Y. Chen and Profess Ping Lin,
Response to Public Discussion Document, 2007
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mobilizing of political pressure to convince the administration that the existing measures
are illogical and ineffective in enhancing Hong Kong’s economic prosperity. Besides,
the Consumer Council should continue to investigate and publish its findings on
competition complaints to ensure compliance. Academia should highlight the
inconsistencies and illogicalities of government policies, and non-governmental
organizations should take up the cudgels. Finally, a new campaign should be launched to
increase public pressure on the government to legislate a comprehensive competition
statute.

Cheng & Wu (1998) advocate that comprehensive competition policy applicable across
industries (including the telecommunications sector) and continued market liberalization
is necessary to secure adequate competition, protect consumer interests, and prevent
anti-competitive behavior by incumbent merger and acquisitions. 6 Without such law,
there will be no consolidated legal basis to prevents, investigate, and stop anticompetitive practices. Favoritism or perception of favoritism will persist as a symptom
associated with “crony capitalism”. They also suggest that a competition law for Hong
Kong should aim to prohibit horizontal agreement such as those involved in price-fixing
cartels, bid rigging, territorial restraints, and market division. Such a law should also aim
to prohibit any abuse of a dominant position, including monopoly pricing and vertical
restraints such as tie-in sales. Adequate guidelines in regard to mergers and acquisitions
and the abuse of power by corporations owned by the SAR and other governments in
China should also be included to make such a law comprehensive.

(C) Official Study by Competition Policy Review Committee

The Competition Policy Review Committee (CPRC) has been appointed by COMPAG
in June 2005 to review the effectiveness of Hong Kong’s competition Policy and report
its findings to COMPAG. The CPRC has looked at competition policy and law in
overseas jurisdictions as well as the current sector-specific approach in Hong Kong.

6

In Hong Kong Economic Policy Studies Series, Leonard K. CHENG and Chanqi WU “Competition
Policy and the Relation of Business”, 1998, City University Press
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Whilst formal public consultation on completion will be conducted by the Government
in due course, for the purpose of gathering initial views, the CPRC has also written to
over 300 trade and industry organizations inviting their views on Hong Kong’s
competition policy and in response has received submissions from individuals and
organizations. The report summarizes the CPRC’s deliberations on the future approach
to competition in Hong Kong. The report also gives a brief overview of the
characteristics of the local economy, and describes how competition is regulated in
foreign economies. It outlines the key issues CPRC members consider when forming
recommendations on Hong Kong’s future competition policy.

CPRC suggests that new legislation which guards against anti-competitive conduct
would have an adverse effect on economic efficiency and free trade in Hong Kong. The
new law should also encompass all sectors rather than be sector specific. Provisions
should be included in the legislation to allow the Government to grant exemptions to the
application of the law in defined circumstances on public policy or economic grounds.
The regulatory authority should have the discretion to disregard inappropriate
complaints, so as to guard against the new law being used to stifle legitimate competitive
business activities. The new law would not target market structures, nor seek to regulate
“natural” monopolies or mergers and acquisitions.

A regulatory authority, known as the Competition Commission, should be established
under the new law. The Commission should have a two-tier structure, comprised of a
governing board underpinned by an executive arm that would include staff with relevant
expertise. The Commission should have an advocacy role tasked with keeping the scope
and application of the new law under review. The commission should also have
sufficient powers to thoroughly investigate any suspected anti-competitive conduct
prohibited by the new legislation. The Government should seriously consider the merits
of establishing a Competition Tribunal to hear cases brought by the Competition
Commission and to hand down sanctions. With regard to sanctions, civil penalties
should apply in cases where anti-competitive conduct is found to have occurred. And
while a case is pending a decision, the Competition Commission should be allowed to
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apply for an order from the Competition Tribunal to require an offender to cease and
desist from anti-competitive conduct.

The Government should engage the community in setting the parameters of the new
competition law and regulatory structure before finalizing the new legislation, and it
should be planned and made available relevant resources for the establishment of a
regulatory structure. The new regulatory authority would effectively take over the work
currently done by COMPAG. 7

(D) Official Report by Office of Telecommunications Authority about Effectiveness
of Competition

In

the

“Report

on

the

Effectiveness

of

Competition

in

Hong

Kong’s

Telecommunications Market in 2005: An International Comparison” conducted by
OFTA, the Hong Kong telecommunications sector has been found to have largely
maintained its competitiveness in the past two years. This is achieved through a strong
pro-competitive framework adopted by the regulator and the consequent market trends
and dynamics. In particular, Hong Kong consumers and businesses have benefited
significantly from the high levels of competition in the reviewed the telecommunications
sectors with subsequent benefits to the wider economy.

However, the analysis has highlighted two areas in which Hong Kong has performed
relatively weaker as benchmarked against the other review markets, including Singapore
and Taiwan. First, Hong Kong has one of the lowest mobile data revenues amongst other
review markets. Second, the emergence of new technologies such as fixed-mobile
convergence and the union of telecommunications and broadcasting will continue to
pose challenges to existing regulatory frameworks. In light of these challenges, OFTA
will continue to examine and update existing regulatory regimes to facilitate

7

“Report on the review of Hong Kong’s competition Policy”, Competition Policy Review Committee,
June 2006
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technological applications, infrastructure investment, market development and
enhancement of consumer benefits.

The Hong Kong government continues to only have indirect involvement in the
telecommunications industry via its regulatory duties. In contrast to many other markets,
it has no ownership in the incumbent or any other operator and has no foreign ownership
restrictions for any operator (Governments of other markets have only recently relaxed
foreign ownership restrictions.). This has allowed the regulator to objectively adopt
policies which it considers most beneficial for Hong Kong and for end-users. The local
loop unbundling (LLU or Type II Interconnection in Hong Kong) is more advanced in
Hong Kong than in most other markets and Hong Kong has made significant progress in
furthering the LLU process in recent years. LLU has facilitated market entry and helped
to increase the level of competition in the local fixed market in Hong Kong. Given that
the policy objectives of increasing market competition have been met, mandatory type II
interconnection at telephone exchange level will be fully withdrawn by 30 June 2008 to
promote investment and consumer choice in high bandwidth customer access networks.

For the development and effectiveness of competition, the report claims that Hong Kong
is still considered one of the leading markets in terms of effectiveness of competition.
This reflects the regulator’s strong and continued emphasis on the promotion of
competition. It scores consistently high on all variables reflecting sustained
competitiveness in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. The effectiveness and
intensity of competition in Hong Kong’s local fixed voice sector is significant as
evidenced by rapid erosion in the market share of the incumbent in the last two years.
The deployment of six additional local wire lined-based fixed networks after January
2003 has increased the level of competition. Hong Kong’s continued emphasis on the
promotion of competition in the mobile sector has resulted in very effective competition
in the sector. Hong Kong continues to record the lowest mobile market concentration in
the sample. The impact of competition is less significant in the data access sector, with
the incumbent’s share of the broadband access market decreasing only slightly from
2002 to 2004. Competitive pressure has been maintained in Hong Kong’s international
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services sector. IDD market concentration has remained stable between 2002 and 2004.
Hong Kong recorded one of the largest increases in international bandwidth (from 13,
712Mbps to 53, 058Mbps) and bandwidth per capita (from 2.0kbps/captia to
7.6kbps/capita) in the sample from 2002 to 2004.

As for consumer benefits, the analysis of consumer benefits focuses on service
innovation and development, take-up of services and the associated costs of
consumption. The analysis indicates that Hong Kong has performed well relative to
comparable markets. In terms of service innovation and development, Hong Kong is one
of the leading markets amongst the eight review markets, as measured by the fact that
Hong Kong has the largest number of IPTV (i.e. television services over broadband
telecommunications network) subscribers in the world. Hong Kong remains one of the
most affordable markets for local fixed voice calls. Hong Kong has by far the highest
mobile penetration rate at the end of 2004. The decline in mobile prices between 1997
and 2002 has been the highest in Hong Kong, compared to the other review markets.
Hong Kong is also the most affordable market in the sample for mobile calls in 2004.
The broadband penetration rate in Hong Kong in 2004 is second only to South Korea.
The use of IDD services in Hong Kong has grown rapidly. On a per capita basis, Hong
Kong has generated the largest amount of IDD traffic in the world in 2004, with the
largest increase in IDD traffic from 1998 to 2004.

For the Industry Investment Section, generally, the capital expenditure to revenue ratio
of individual operators in the review markets has decreased in recent years. This is likely
to be a function of more cautious investment strategies, particularly after the post-2000
burst of the IT bubble. Another possible reason is that most operators are now focusing
on upgrading and enhancing their existing networks, instead of deploying entire new
infrastructures. Recent network investments by operators in Hong Kong and in other
review markets have enhanced coverage and capacity of existing networks as well as
upgrade their network to keep abreast of new technological developments. 8

8

“Report on the effectiveness of competition in Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market in 2005: An
International Comparison”, OFTA, Spectrum Strategy Consultants, 2005
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3.2 Related Studies on Consumer Protection in Hong Kong and United Kingdom

Ho (2006) examines the current system in protecting consumers in Hong Kong and there
is generally inadequate level of consumer protection under the existing mechanism by
focusing on three fundamental asymmetries between consumers and business. This puts
consumers at a disadvantage, including market power asymmetry, information
asymmetry (price, non-price, advertising, business-drafted contracts) and access to
justice asymmetry, from which consumers need protection because of the unequal
bargaining power in real society with imperfect information. His analysis on the effects
of these asymmetries provides a framework and criterion for the assessment of consumer
protection polices and mechanism. He suggests that removing these asymmetries and
leveling the playing field could benefit not only could consumers, but also the business
as well, and it may be the only way to maintain a strong economy in Hong Kong. 9

Office of Communications (Ofcom) in UK has published a consultation paper in 2006
with the purpose of laying down Ofcom’s approach to the promotion of consumer
interests and eliciting stakeholder views on a number of issues related to consumer
policy.10 Consumer policy should work together with other organizations and industry to
ensure that consumers benefit from competitive communications markets, and that they
are protected from financial and physical harm, unreasonable annoyance and anxiety,
and have the information and tools necessary to make informed choices. The paper lists
four key elements of an effective consumer protection regime: (1) the rights of
consumers and the obligations of suppliers should be clearly defined and simple enough
to be readily understood; (2) information and advice should be readily available to
consumers; (3) an effective process must be in place for handling consumer complaints
with appropriate redress measures; (4) and regulations governing supplier behavior
should be actively monitored and effectively enforced.

9

“In Search of the Level Playing Field: Asymmetries and Consumer Protection in Hong Kong” John
D.Ho, Hong Kong Law Journal, Volume 36, Part 1, 2006
10
“Ofcom’s Consumer Policy” A consultation paper from Ofcom, February 8 2006, UK
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In order for Ofcom to strengthen consumer policy in UK, the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) in UK laid out the Government’s goal of creating a world-class consumer
regime. Features of such a regime include: consumers are equipped with the skills,
knowledge, information and confidence to exercise their rights to get a good deal; strong
consumer advocacy at the general policy making level; consumers access to appropriate
and convenient sources of advice and redress, including effective alternative dispute
resolution (ADR); Consumer rights are proportionate and balanced as well as clear and
simple enough to be well understood; and, consumers are able to understand the impacts
of their own consumption decisions. Such a regime will also protect vulnerable
consumers without placing undue restraints on markets overall. Enforcement should be
fair, consistent, effective and proportionate in the eyes of both consumers and businesses.

3.3 Related Empirical Studies on Consumer Protection in United States and
Competition in the Telecommunications Sectors around the World

There is a lack of empirical studies about competition policy and consumer protection in
Hong Kong, even though Li and Xu (2004) do study the impact of privatization and
competition in the telecommunications sector around the world by examining the
country-level panel data set covering the period from 1990 to 2001. Results revealed that
full privatization has contributed substantially to improving the allocation of labor and
capital, expanding service output and network penetration, and improving labor and total
factor productivities. However, partial privatization shows no significant impact. The
increase in competitive pressure has contributed substantially to growth in the sector by
raising both factor inputs and total factor productivity. Also, there is a complementarity
between privatization and competition in deepening network penetration and in
restraining the rise of service pricing among privatized operators.

11

Although there has

been much theoretical and empirical research on the effects of privatization and
competition in infrastructure in general, relatively little empirical work has been done on

11 “The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the Telecommunications sector around the world”,
Wei Li and Lixin Colin Xu, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLVII (October 2004)
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how the degree of privatization and competition affects performance and how
components of the policies interact in shaping the reform outcomes. 12

Federal Trade Commission staff has conducted a study about consumers’ fraud in the
United States in 2004. The study examines both the extent of the consumer fraud
problem and the degree to which certain groups of consumers may be more or less likely
to become victims of fraud. The underlying data is drawn from an FTC-commissioned
survey which was conducted in 2003, and asked consumers whether they had been a
victim of any of ten specific types of fraud in the previous twelve months. Based on the
survey results, they conducted a regression study on the likelihood of being a victim of
one of the types of fraud investigated in the study varies with the consumers’
demographic characteristics. They suggested that American Indians or Alaska Natives
faced the greatest risk. Hispanics and African Americans are also significantly more
likely to have been victims than were non-Hispanic whites.13

3.4 Conclusion

Different studies have already highlighted the drawbacks of existing sectoral approach
of competition policy, as well as the urging need of enacting a competition law in Hong
Kong. However, there is lack of empirical study about how competition would affect
consumers’ benefit, especially in the Hong Kong telecommunications sector, where the
sectoral approach of competition policy has been implemented for more than six years.
It is crucial to review the shortcomings of the existing approach, while the effect of
bringing in more competition in the market on consumers is also important. This is
especially valid when we are under the consideration to introduce a more comprehensive
competition law in Hong Kong.

12 “Does Ownership or Competition Matter? The Effects of Telecommunications Reform on Network
Expansion and Efficiency”, Agustin J. Ros, Journal of Regulatory Economics; 15:65-92(1999)
13 “Consumer Fraud in the United States: An FTC Survey” Federal Trade Commission Staff Report,
August 2004
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Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology

4.1 Conceptual Framework

The relationship between competition policy and consumer protection policy is complex.
These two policy goals generally complement one another, but under some instances,
the relationship becomes contradictive. There is no doubt that these policies share the
same objective of enhancing consumer interests (which includes protecting consumers
from unfair business practices and providing consumers with adequate price and quality
information). Consumer protection and consumer policy can aim to ameliorate the risk
inherent in the market place and ensure that even the most disadvantaged and vulnerable
consumers be treated fairly. However, creating a competitive market does not
necessarily equate to a consumer-friendly market place.

Introducing competition in any market is often justified by the fact that there are
potential benefits to consumers. Competition among operators to acquire and retain
users involved the development and deployment of newer and/or higher quality products,
services, implementation of technologies, and development of new source revenue
streams to offset declining, more competitive, prices. In competitive markets, consumers
see lower prices, increased choice and more innovative products. Competition provides
substantial benefits to consumers which would have been otherwise foregone in noncompetitive markets.

On the other hand, increased competition can sometimes lead to consumer harm. This is
because more competition in the market does not necessarily mean effective competition.
A highly competitive market does not guarantee that there is adequate consumer
protection. Extremely competitive markets with limited or no barriers to entry and exit
may enhance economic efficiency, but the ferociousness of competition increases the
temptation for operators seeking an advantage to engage in fraudulent practices.
Competition may harm the consumers through misleading and deceptive conduct. An
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effective competition policy should simultaneously consider market efficiency alongside
consumer benefit and consumer protection. Therefore, the traditional framework is
flawed in suggesting that the current competition policy in the telecommunications
sector is optimal.

Failure to protect consumers means that the competition policy is ineffective. According
to Dennis Swann (1979), consumer protection is an important ingredient of an effective
overall approach to competition. Consumer protection should focus on minimizing or
eliminating consumer detriment. This can often be achieved by increasing competition
and/or increasing ability of consumers to take advantage of competition. However,
competition will not always meet the goals of minimizing or eliminating consumer
detriments, and consumer protection and consumer policy must therefore treat as priority
goal in its own right.1 Consumer protection is therefore an ingredient of an effective
overall approach to competition. Competition laws are essential to the protection of
consumers by protecting the process of competition. In the absence of effective
competition, consumer interest will be damaged.2 If the competitive system is to serve
the needs of consumers, then the system needs to protect consumers from deception or
injury and provide consumers with adequate price and performance information. In
some countries, including Japan and China, competition laws also meet these consumer
protection objectives. (Lin 2003)3

In Hong Kong, with the introduction of competition policy and aggressive market
liberalization in the telecommunications sector, the telecommunications industry has
1

“Competition and Consumer Protection”, Dennis Swann, Great Britain: Richard Clay (The Chaucer
Press) Ltd., (1979)
2
Optimal level of consumer protection cannot be easily measured or determined. However, to a certain
extent, effective competition in the market may imply consumers are well protected. One of the ways to
achieve effective competition is to ensure that there is optimal number of competitors in the market. This
concept is to balance the benefit of economies of scale (which is important in the telecommunications
sector) with having sufficient competition in the market. It implies that all firms operate at the minimum
efficient scale (assuming this can be achieved). Therefore, in my study, I attempted to estimate the optimal
number of service provider in the sector by conducting regression analysis. However, the empirical results
are insignificant due to the data limitations, which are attached in Appendix II. Hence, the optimal level of
competition or consumer protection cannot be determined empirically in this thesis.
3
“Competition Policy in East Asia: The Cases of Japan, People’s Republic of China, and Hong Kong”
Ping Lin, working paper series 133, Center for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
(2003)
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experienced a dramatic transformation over the previous five years with significant
benefits to consumers, i.e. declining prices. Even though there is effective competition in
the telecommunications sector, effective competition policy by itself is not enough to
ensure that consumer interests are protected. The rapid change in technology and the
unique asymmetric information problems in this sector raise the question of whether this
transformation equates to adequate consumers protection.

Protecting consumers is important, especially in the telecommunications sector where
technical information has high potential of creating an information gap between
consumers

and

providers.

Therefore,

special

attention

is

required

in

the

telecommunications sector due to the complexity and volume of information. Ofcom’s
consumer policy says “well-informed consumers help markets to work effectively, more
information should be provided to the consumers needs.” Therefore, with consumer
interests as an objective of competition policy, Ofcom has integrated consumer
protection policy into competition policy. This integrative law ensures that competition
policy take sufficient account of consumer interest and behavior.4

There is relatively scant literature that deals with the role of the competition law in the
protection of consumers, and even fewer studies discuss consumer protection in the
telecommunications sector in Hong Kong under the sectoral approach. However, it is
becoming increasingly important to examine the relationship between consumer
protection and competition policy. Therefore, my study focuses on consumer protection
under the existing sectoral approach of competition policy in the telecommunications
sector in Hong Kong. Due to the potentially contradictory relationship between
competition policy and consumer protection, I will first examine the actual benefits
competition policy brings to consumers. I will focus on how an effective competition
policy needs to provide both consumer benefit and consumer protection. The objective
of my study is to assess the extent to which consumers have gained protection from the

4

“Implementing Oftel’s Strategy: Effective Competition Review Guidelines”, Oftel, UK, August 2000
Oftel website http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/about_oftel/crev0800.htm
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introduction of competition in the different review markets and specifically, to assess the
protection for consumers under the existing sectoral approach.

4.2 Methodology: Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm

My model combines the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm with the
Consumer Behavior features of Effective Competitive Indicators.

(A) Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm

(1) Background

Industrial organization is the study of the structure of firms and markets and of their
interactions. It adds to the perfectly competitive model real-world frictions such as
limited information, transaction costs, costs of adjusting prices, government actions, and
barriers to entry by new firms into a market. And one of the approaches to study of
industrial organization is structure-conduct-performance (SCP), which is primarily
descriptive and provides an overview of industrial organization. This SCP approach was
developed by Professors Mason and Bain in 1950s, and it is a traditional framework
which dominated the industrial organization field during the third quarter of the 20th
century and still serves as a basic framework in many studies on market powerprofitability relationship, arguing that the performance of an industry or a firm is
determined by the behavior (conduct) of suppliers and buyers, which in turn is
determined by structural attributes of the market in which it operates.5

5

Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffery M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 4th Edition, N.Y.:
HarperCollins Publisher, 2004
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(2) Traditional SCP Paradigm (Figure 4.1)

Relationship A and B
(Structure→Conduct→Performance in the Telecommunications Sector)
Relationship C and D
(Performance→Conduct → Structure)

The traditional SCP paradigm has been modified to account for the impact of
competition on market structure. A causal relationship between structure, conduct and
performance, is assumed, such that structure determines conduct, and conduct in turn
determines performance (although backward linkages are also recognized). The relevant
market is defined, and then the conduct at issue is assessed according to whether the
structural features of the market indicate that as a result of the conduct there will be an
increase in the firms’ market power and consequently a substantial lessening of
competition. A further elaboration on the conceptual basis of these three components
will be useful. Market conduct of firms is a reflection of competitive activity in terms of
pricing strategies, policies toward product design and services, how they advertise and
promote their products like bundling, tie-ins etc. An examination of market conduct is
supposed to reveal the sources of observed conduct. The origin of an observed conduct
may be the attainment of monopoly position or superior competitive capabilities attained.
What can be regarded as anti-competitive and what pro-competitive conduct is, is
arrived only after a detailed examination of the given industry. Market performance is
the outcome of the market conduct of the participating firms.

(3) Modified SCP Paradigm (Institution) (Figure 4.1)
Relationship E, F, G (Institution → Structure & Conduct & Performance)
Relationship H (Conduct →Institution)

Besides the impact of competition on markets, the institutional impact through
government law and policy enforcement also affect the market structure, its conduct and
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performance. Appropriate regulation of industries with a high degree of market power
can complement competition policy. Regulation may prevent the excise of market power,
e.g. by the application of price control of monopolies, and thus, regulation directly
impacts performance. Regulation may conflict with competition policy, for instance,
entry regulation and minimum price regulation. Regulation may serve other legitimate
objectives, such as environmental, safety, and fairness, which may or may not conflict
with competition policy objectives. Regulation is an increasingly important part of
competition policy. As monopoly positions are deregulated and/or privatized, the
application of traditional antitrust law may be insufficient. Regulation can complement
antitrust law, especially when dominant firms exist prior to the enactment of such laws.

The competition policy will not be effective if its enforcement is not effective. One main
criticism of current policy is that it relies upon the individual consumer for its
enforcement. This is cause for concern because consumers may be ignorant of his or her
rights. And with the complexity of telecommunications services, it is particularly
difficult for consumers to know if they have been wronged. Consumers may also lack
the resources to take action, or feel it is too troublesome to take action despite being
wronged. Litigation is expensive especially to seek claims for a relatively small amount
of money. It has been previously commented that consumers often need ‘superspite’ to
take action. The failure of current policy to adequately protect consumers is due to a lack
of an enforcement body. Therefore, it is important for enforcement authorities to know,
aid, and protect consumer interests. Therefore, in order to see whether adequate
protection for consumer exist in the telecommunications sector, we must analyze the
regulatory mechanisms in this sector.

(B) Effective Competitive Indicators (Figure 4.1)

Besides the SCP Paradigm, I also refer to the effective competition indicators as part of
the model in my study. In UK, many consumer policies related studies were conducted.
Consumers are at the heart of the Oftel’s regulatory approach studies. Effective
competition is most likely to meet their needs, but consumers are also interested in the
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benefits of competition in terms of improved quality, choice and value for money, rather
than simply facilitating competition in particular markets. For competition to be
effective, consumers must be knowledgeable enough to take advantage of competition.6
The assessment of effective competition is consisted of two principle strands of market
analysis; (1) feasibility and utility of competition and (2) assessment of the outcomes for
consumers to establish benefits consistent with an effectively competitive market.
Effective competition indicators include consumer outcome, consumer behavior, market
structural and operator behavior.

Relationship I and J
(Conduct →Consumer Behavior and Consumer Behavior → Conduct)

After introducing competition into the market, its structure and conduct will be changed.
Consumer behavior is affected by operator behavior, and often operator behavior is
reciprocally affected by consumer behavior. For example, if consumers lack the
sophistication to interpret information provided by operators, operators may take
advantage of this ignorance and provide more fraudulent information.

As mentioned earlier, competition policy and consumer protection can be
complementary or contradictory. Competition can enhance efficiency, but fierce
competition may lead to misleading and deceptive information harming consumers.
Therefore, effective competition must provide consumer benefit as well as consumer
protection. To assess the effectiveness of competition, it is important to measure
consumer protection by examining consumer behavior to assess the level of consumer
protection.

By looking at consumer complaints, one can identify the problems of the sector under
fierce competition. Understanding sector-specific problems, including consumer
protection problems and the shortcomings of current law are the measurements of how
6

“Implementing Oftel’s Strategy: Effective Competition Review Guidelines”, Oftel, UK, August 2000
Oftel website http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/about_oftel/crev0800.htm
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well consumers are benefiting from competition. Such information can provide voluble
insight to improve current law and enhance consumer protection.

From the observation of the complaint cases, there is a huge number of complaints
happened in year 2004, when there was more service providers provide
telecommunications service in the sector. Increased complaints may suggest that
consumers have increased awareness of their rights, but in the case in Hong Kong, the
structural change in the sector seems to be a reason to trigger more complaint cases.
Therefore, consumer complaints could be one of the measurement of consumer
satisfaction and which is important in my study in order to find out the how does the
structural change of the sector could affect consumers. However, there are limits to
relying on consumer complaints as a measure of consumer protection. First, members of
lower socio-economic groups are less willing to complain, and generally less likely to
invoke the law. Encouraging lower status consumers to complain and providing them
with increased access to consumer advisers may or may not improve their situation.
Complaining has been successful because retailers have an incentive to resolve any
consumer issue in hopes of retaining their loyalty. Retailers may be less concerned with
retaining customers of lower income. Retailers are also less willing to accept complaints
of a judgmental nature. Yet, matters such as the durability and quality of goods,
misrepresentations and bad selling practices are the very problems which consumer
protection laws seek to redress. Finally, voluntary settlements by traders may mask
problems which continue to affect a sizeable number of consumers who take no action.
Consumer complaints play an important role in quality control. Businesses themselves
monitor consumer complaints and utilize them to improve standard. 7 However,
increasing the rate complaints will benefit some consumers; strengthening current law
will undoubtedly benefit all consumers, regardless of socioeconomic class.

7

Geraint G. Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law, Cambridge University Press
(1995)
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(C) My Research Model
Figure 4.2
Consumer Behavior
(Qualitative: Analysis of Consumer Complaints)
↑
Structure → Conduct → Performance
(Quantitative: Econometric Study of the Attributes to
Misleading or Deceptive Conducts)
↑
Institution
(Policy Implications and Recommendations)

Therefore, in order to use the modified SCP diagram to effectively assess consumer
protection in the telecommunications sector under the sectoral approach of competition
Policy, I will examine previous complaint cases of the Consumer Council and OFTA
and analyze the following: the nature of the complaint cases, how the cases were
handled, how many of them were not established and related rationale, whether it was
effectively solved with the established cases and whether the penalty was fair under the
breached cases. This strategy will provide relatively good insights to assess the
effectiveness of the current competition policy because complaint cases represent the
main source of consumer behavior and operator conduct.

My integrated framework is based on the SCP model with modified effective
competition indicators. Since the SCP model is a well known framework for normative
competitive analysis, it will be used to illustrate how the introduction of competition will
change the structure, conduct, and performance in the telecommunications sector. It will
also show how the conduct of the sector could change the consumer behavior and vice
versa. First I will analyze the consumer complaints, in order to examine the consumer
behavior. Also, econometric study of the attributes to misleading or deceptive conducts
will be done, to find out how the structure of the section affects the conduct of an
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operator, and how the conduct influence the consumers benefit. Hence, I will draw
policy implications and recommendations after both qualitative and quantitative analysis.
This framework is better suited to assess the level of consumer protection under the
existing competition policy in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong.
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Figure 4.1
Structure-ConductPerformance Paradigm
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Complaint Cases

5.1 Introduction

(A) Source of the Data

The data that I am going to analyze in this chapter is divided into two parts. One is the
data from the Consumer Council, which is classified statistically into different categories
by the Consumer Council. Another data is from the OFTA website, which basically is
some raw data without any statistically classification. All of the data I collected from the
OFTA is classified into different categories and dimensions in a more systematical and
statistical way.

(B) Meaning of the Data

The data from the Consumer Council is consumer complaints received by the Consumer
Council and they are counted by number of cases. The data from OFTA is the cases
received and handled by OFTA which is put in document files with detail description of
the cases. OFTA did not provide any numerical statistics record of the complaint cases;
instead, they posted the completed complaint cases on its website. By completed, it
means the investigation done and decisions made. For those current cases which are still
under investigation, they did not post any information on their website. Since there is
lack of systematically and statistical analysis from OFTA, I read through case by case
throughout the 8-year period and did the numerical statistic to generate and different
dimensional analysis in order to examine the problems in the sector.

First I will look at the general picture of consumer complaints in Hong Kong. Then, I
will examine the trend of the consumer complaints in the telecommunications sector and
analyze them in specific telecommunications markets and in different dimensions.
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5.2 Consumer Complaint Statistics from the Consumer Council

(A) General Picture

From the number of the consumer complaint data provided by the Consumer Council
(CC), it shows that there is a general increasing trend with some remarkable points
which are interesting to look at.
Table 5.1
Total Number of the Consumer Complaint Cases Received by the Consumer Council from 1999 to
2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total No. of Complaint Cases in
16470 18932 20798 22890 26501 26756 36614 35962
All Sectors
Total No. of Complaint Cases in
1820 3113 4684 5800 7105 7743 12029 11801
Telecom Service Sector
Source: OFTA

Table 5.1 provides a general picture of consumer complaints in Hong Kong. In the
period 1999 to 2006, there is an increasing trend of consumer complaints in Hong Kong.
There is an increase from 2002 to 2003, which is around 16%, with another remarkable
point from year 2004 to 2005, which has a huge 37% increase.

The increasing number of consumer complaints may be due to the reason of the increase
awareness to complain about what they are not satisfied with on the part of the
consumers. The increasing trend also shows that more consumers are not satisfied with
the products or services they consume. However, the remarkable change of the
complaint number is definitely worth examining since there are usually some reasons
behind sudden changes.
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(B) Telecommunications Sector

In this section, I will analyze the data from the Consumer Council statistically and
specifically in the telecommunications sector. With reference to the Table 5.1,
telecommunications service sector dominates among all other sectors in terms of the
number of consumer complaints during 2000 to 2006.

1

Table 5.1 shows the total

consumer complaints in the telecommunications service sector has been increasing
during the period 1999 to 2006. There are two remarkable increases during this ten-year
period. There are an increase of 1,571 cases from year 2000 to 2001 and 4,286 increased
cases from 2004 to 2005. Viewing the percentage share among all complaint cases as a
whole, the telecommunications sector’s percentage share is about 5% among all the
complaints in year 1999 and increases to more than 10% in year 2000 and 2001, and
thereafter it keeps increasing to more than 20% from 2002 to 2005, and it even reaches
30% in 2006.Compared to second most complaint service sector, broadcasting Service
sector is only around 1% among all complaints before 2005 and only around 5% after
2005. Also, there is around 90% increase in total number of complaints in all sectors
from 2000 to 2006, the change in the telecommunications service sector alone is almost
300% increase.

It shows that there is not only an increasing trend of the complaints in this sector, but
also the percentage share among all complaints has been increasing throughout these
years. It suggests that the seriousness of consumer complaints in this sector has been
even more noticeable. As the consumer complaints situation in the telecommunications
sector is the most serious one, I put my focus on this particular sector in my study.2

1

“Consumer Complaint Cases Statistics” on OFTA Webpage http://www.ofta.gov.hk
With reference to the Singapore Data by the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE) in 2006,
CASE received a total of 20,175 complaints; Timeshare complaints top the list with 2,363 cases and only
911 complaints about mobile phone services, which is not even on the top five of the most complaints list.

2
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Table 5.2
Breakdown of the Consumer Complaint Cases Received by the Consumer Council in the Telecom
Service Sector from 2000 to 2006
Fixed Line Service Mobile Phone Service IDD Service Internet Service
Others
2000

64

1706

293

928

122

2001

221

2003

136

2042

282

2002

546

1653

351

2851

399

2003

1479

1533

594

3018

481

2004

2037

1221

689

3464

322

2005

2269

1708

1190

4382

2480

Source: OFTA

Table 5.2 shows how the consumer complaints situation changes over the years from
2000 to 2005 among the 4 different specific telecommunications services.
If we look at the consumer complaint cases by different telecommunications markets, we
could find that there are different characteristics among different markets. In my study, I
will classify the complaint cases in four specific telecommunications markets - fixed line
services, mobile phone services, and International Direct Distance Dialing Services
(IDD) and Internet services. Those which do not belong to any of these markets would
go to the others category.

First of all, for the Internet services market, there is an increasing trend throughout the
years, with a more–than-double jump from 2000 to 2001 and another remarkable jump
from 2001 to 2002. The consumer complaints have been increasing dramatically from
2000 to 2001 and from 2004 to 2005. And it contributes the most complaints among all
other markets in the telecommunications sector, that is, 40% share of all complaint cases.

Fixed line services market has the second most consumer complaints among all markets
in the telecommunications sector. There is an increasing trend of the consumer
complaints and it is even more dramatic than in the Internet market. The most significant
one is that there is a huge jump from 2002 to 2003 and 2003 to 2004. Also it contributes
the most complaints in 2003 and 2004 among all complaints, which are respectively
21% and 26% share of all complaints.
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Compared with other markets, the changes of complaints situation in the mobile phone
service market is relatively stable, which has around 1,000-2,000 cases throughout the
years. However, its share of all the complaint has a decreasing trend, which, in year
2000, after an around 300 cases increase from 2000 to 2001, it starts to fall. Until 2005,
it has another jump, which is around 500 cases increase. Also it gets 55% among all the
complaints. However it has been decreasing to 14% share among all the complaints in
2005.

From 2000 to 2005, the complaint cases in the fixed line services market has increased
more than 3,000% (from 64 cases in 2000 to 2,269 cases in 2005), while it is more than
300% in the Internet services market and mobile phone service market has only 0.12%
increase. It shows the seriousness of consumer complaint situation in the fixed line
services market and Internet service market. Not only these two markets get the most
complaint cases, there are very obvious increasing trends observed in these two
particular sectors. This also accounts for the reason why I focus on these two markets in
my study.

The data from the Consumer Council helps generate a general picture of why examining
the complaint cases in the telecommunications sector is important and especially in
Internet and fixed line services markets. For the detailed discussion with the situation, I
will examine the data from OFTA, which facilitates a better understanding of the sector
and to dig further to a more significant problem in this sector.

5.3 Analysis of Complaints Received and Handled by OFTA

From the investigated cases (completed cases) data provided by OFTA, there are three
categories in relation to competition and consumer interests. They are the complaints
about misleading or deceptive conduct, anti-competition/abuse of dominance, and
merger and acquisitions.
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The complaint cases data in this section is different from those from the Consumer
Council; the data in this section are the completed investigated cases, which are
considered more serious, less impulsive and more representative, because OFTA
actually conducted investigation over those cases. Also, these cases are the completed
investigation cases, which means there may be still some more cases being undertaken,
and are not provided by OFTA but they are in this data file.

(A) Type of Complaint

Table 5.3
Total Competition-related Completed Cases Handled by OFTA from 1999 to 2006
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
Anti-competition Conduct/
Abuse of Dominance
Mergers and Acquisitions

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
26
15
24
67 110 101
8
3
354
23

2

4

1

149

0

0

0

186

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

1

4

Source: OFTA

As Table 5.3 shown, there is a main concentration in 2003 to 2004 of all the cases
among these three categories mentioned. Also, there is a concentration in misleading or
deceptive conduct cases, especially from 2002 to 2004.3 There has been a huge jump of
Anti-competition conduct cases in 2003.

There are not many cases in merge and

acquisition and it starts to have a few in 2005 and 2006. Misleading or deceptive
conduct cases take up more than 60% of number of cases among all, showing that the
misleading or deceptive conduct seems more serious in this sector. This also explains
why my study highlights the misleading and deceptive conduct cases as it is the
dominant category. At the same time, I would like to find out the reason why there are
many cases in year 2002 to 2004.

3

One of the reason for decreasing number of complaints received by OFTA after 2003 and 2004 is that
OFTA have streamlined the procedure for handling consumer complaints from mid 2003
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Analysis of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints

(B) Type of Complainant of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints

Table 5.4
Type of Complainants of the Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled
by OFTA from 1999 to 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Consumer
17 11 18 52 91 91
2
3
285
Operator
2
4
6
14 16
8
6
0
56
OFTA
7
0
0
1
3
2
0
0
13
Source: OFTA

The Consumers are the dominant complainants in the complaint cases. However, the
operators (competitors) and OFTA would lodge the complaints as well. With reference
to the breakdown of complainant’s data, the consumers have lodged more than 80% of
the complaints, and the operators (competitors) have lodged 16% and only 4% of the
complaints have been lodged by OFTA. Consumers have lodged the most complaints
from year 2002 to 2004 and operators have initiated more complaints around the same
time too. Not only consumers complaint about they have been unfairly treated, operators
also complaint about their competitors. The figures show that consumers have initiated
most complaints to OFTA, which again suggests there is a need to examine consumer
protection issue in the telecommunications sector.

(C) Nature of Complaint of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints

Table 5.5
Nature of the Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA from
1999 to 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Salesperson
0
0
1
34 69 88
2
1
195
Advertisement
24 14 14 30 24 13
6
2
127
Others
2
1
9
3
17
0
0
0
32
Source: OFTA

62

Chapter 5 Analysis of Complaint Cases
With the support of these two figures here, cases which have complained against the
salesperson contribute most of the complaint cases is around 55% and those about
advertisement is the second most, which is around 36%. While complaints in others
category such as about the rates and terms, are not many, which is around 9%. Cases
complained about salesperson concentrate from 2002 to 2004 and cases complained
about advertisement concentrate from 2000 to 2004 with year 2002 and 2003 being the
most.

Salesperson and advertisement are the two important channels for delivering information
to the consumers. Salesperson would be the most important channels since in telecom
sector, information is way too complicated and hard to understand, and consumers will
need a salesperson who is perceived as a professional staff and be able to explain all the
information (including terms and conditions about the service) to the consumers.
Therefore, with such a huge number of complaints towards the salesperson, it shows that
there may be some misleading or deceptive conducts done by the salesperson and it
definitely has harmed the consumer benefits.

(D) Breakdown of the Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints into
Different Service Markets

Table 5.6
Breakdown of the Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from 1999 to 2006
Fixed Line Mobile Phone
IDD Service
Internet Service
Others
Total
Service
Service
1999
1
7
15
3
0
26
2000
2
1
9
3
0
15
2001
3
4
11
4
2
27
2002
8
3
19
37
0
67
2003
73
3
18
16
3
112
2004
26
2
6
67
0
101
2005
1
4
1
2
0
8
2006
1
1
1
0
0
3
Total
115
25
80
132
5
359
Source: OFTA
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With reference to Table 5.6, this shows the breakdown of the completed misleading and
deceptive conduct complaint cases by different telecommunications markets. The
Internet service market is the largest category of the complaints; most cases concentrate
from 2002 to 2004 and 2004 is the peak. For the fixed services market, there is a
concentration in 2003 and 2004 of which 2003 is the peak. It is the second largest
category. For the mobile service market, most misleading and deceptive conduct
complaints are in 1999 and compared to other markets, the number of complaints is
relatively small and has no dramatic changes throughout the years from 1999 to 2006.
For the IDD service market, it does not have so many cases, which concentrate from
2000 to 2003 and 2002 is the peak. Internet and fixed line markets get the most
complaint cases about misleading or deceptive conduct, which are around 38% and 32%
respectively, while compared to other two markets, IDD and mobile markets are only
22% and 7% respectively.

The table above shows that more complaints about misleading and deceptive conduct for
fixed line and Internet markets. This is consistent with the key message I have drawn
from the Consumer Council that fixed line and Internet markets are the two markets
which need more in-depth analysis.

(E) Nature of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints by Breakdown into
Different Services Markets

Table 5.7
Nature of the Total Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
between 1999 and 2006
Fixed Line Service Mobile Phone Service
IDD Service
Internet Service
Salesperson
Advertisement
Others
Total

82%
15%
3%
100%

4%
92%
4%
100%

Source: OFTA

64

1%
89%
10%
100%

75%
12%
13%
100%
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Table 5.7 shows the breakdown of the main nature categories of complaints by different
service markets and some remarkable points are noticeable. First, the misleading
conduct from the salesperson dominates in Internet and fixed line markets, which are
around 75% and 82% respectively. The misleading information from the advertisement
has dominated in the IDD and mobile services markets, which are 89% and 92%
respectively. The salesperson’s misleading conduct concentrates most in Internet and
fixed line markets.

There is something unique about the Internet and fixed line services markets, as it is
rather easier for salesperson to have cheated consumers since the two service markets
here entail complicated information and fast technology change while more competition
has been introduced in these markets.

On the other hand, advertisement is the main promotional strategy in IDD and mobile
services markets. And penetrations rates are high, especially in mobile service market
which the penetration rate is over 100%.

4

Also, services need less complicated

information to comprehend since there are not so many changes in these two markets
when compared to Internet and fixed line services markets, in terms of popularity and
technology.

Therefore, examining the reasons of the high number of complaints and concentration of
complaints in particular years in Internet and fixed line markets are the main focus of my
study. Detailed discussion will be in the section 5.4 of this chapter.

(F) Outcome of Complaint of Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Complaints

For the outcome of misleading or deceptive conduct, with reference to the 7M
Ordinance and the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Guideline issued by OFTA on May
21 2003, it can be divided into three main categories.5 Case that is considered as breach

4
5

Key Telecommunications Statistics on OFTA Website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
7M Telecommunications Ordinance, Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Guideline, May 21, 2003, OFTA
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means it has breached the 7M Ordinance; that considered as no breach means there is
either not enough evidence to prove it has breached the Ordinance or it has enough
evidence but OFTA consider it has not breached the 7M Ordinance. For case resolved, it
means it is the established case which OFTA has decided to resolve and will work with
the concerned operator towards which the complainant complain to handle the
complainant.

General Picture
Table 5.8
Outcome of the Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from 1999 to 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002
2003
2004 2005 2006
Total
No Breach
7
6
16
37
8
9
6
2
91
Breach
19
9
18
53
37
5
2
1
144
Case Resolved
0
0
0
0
65
87
0
0
152
Source: OFTA

Table 5.8 illustrates the outcome of completed misleading or deceptive conduct
complaint cases from 1999 to 2006. Most of the breach cases are in 2002, and from 2000
to 2002, there is an increasing number of cases; and there is a huge drop after 2003.
More Resolved Cases concentrate in 2003 and 2004.

The outcome of total completed misleading or deceptive conduct complaints between
1999 and 2006; most of the cases are resolved cases which is about 39% among all the
cases. These cases are decided to be resolved by the complainants and the concerned
operators. 24% of all complaints are no breach cases, which do not absolutely mean
those operators which were complained against did not have misleading or deceptive
conduct that may have harmed the consumer benefit; it may just shows that it is hard for
the third party to find the evidences. However, for the 37% of Breach cases among all
the misleading and deceptive conduct complaints mean that they are the “real” cases
which investigations have been done by OFTA and considered to be breach of the
Ordinance of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct. Therefore, it is worth looking into these
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breach cases under different dimensions in order to have a better understanding of these
breach complaints and how consumers have been harmed in terms of their benefits.

Analysis of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints

For the 37% breach complaints of total misleading or deceptive conduct complaint cases
between 1999 and 2006, different dimensions will be examined in order to have a better
understanding of the level of consumer protection in the telecommunications sector.

(1) By Type of Complainant of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
Complaints

Table 5.9
Type of Complainant of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from 1999 to 2006
Consumer
Operator
OFTA

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

10

7

12

45

19

0

1

1

95

2
7

2
0

0
0

7
1

15
3

4
1

1
0

0
0

31
12

Source: OFTA

With reference to Table 5.9, for the 144 breach complaints about the misleading or
deceptive conduct between 1999 and 2006, most breach complaints were lodged by
consumers. Consumers lodged most complaints in 2002 and for operators; they lodged
most complaints in 2003 and OFTA lodged most in 1999. More complaints are
considered as breach and were lodged by consumers mean there is consumer protection
issue and if they were lodged by operators, that means it is the competition-related issue.
Since these two issues are correlated, consumers will be harmed by competition-related
issue, and operators (competitors) will be harmed by consumer-related issue, therefore,
as accessing the level of consumer protection under the competition policy in the
telecommunications sector, it is important to exam the reason behind the high breach
complaints in those particular years. Detailed discussion will be in section 5.4 in this
chapter.
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(2) By Nature of Complaints of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
Complaints

Table 5.10
Nature of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA from
1999 to 2006
Salesperson
Advertisement
Others

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

0

0

0

33

0

0

1

0

34

19
0

9
0

15
3

18
2

21
16

5
0

1
0

1
0

89
21

Source: OFTA

Table 5.10 shows that more breach complaints are concerned with the misleading or
deceptive advertisement during the years between 1999 and 2006, except for year 2002
where more breach complaints are about the misleading or deceptive conduct from
salesperson. And overall, around 61% of breach complaints are on the misleading or
deceptive advertisement.

Table 5.11
Outcome of the Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from 1999 to 2006
Salesperson
Advertisement
No Breach
83%
37%

Breach

17%

63%

Total

100%

100%

Source: OFTA

With reference to Table 5.10, more breach complaints are concerned with the misleading
or deceptive advertisement than salesperson during the years between 1999 and 2006,
except for year 2002 and 2005 where more breach complaints are on the misleading or
deceptive conduct from salesperson in 2002. Table 5.11 shows among the overall
complaints about advertisement, 63% are breach cases, and for the salesperson conduct
which alleged to be misleading or deceptive, 83% of them are no breach and only 17%
of them are decided to be breach. It could be the reason that it is comparatively easier to
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get the evidence in the alleged misleading conduct about the advertisement, since most
of the information is found on hard copies.

The reason behind of these findings maybe that it is harder to get the evidences from the
salesperson. The salespersons always quit right after the incident and it is hard for OFTA
to investigate and collect information, especially that there is no record of any format
during the sales process and consumers are hard to be protected due to these reasons.

(3) By Telecommunications Markets of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive
Conduct Complaints

Table 5.12
Breakdown of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA from
1999 to 2006
Fixed Line
Mobile Phone
IDD Service Internet Service Others Total
Service
Service
1999
0
6
11
2
0
19
2000
1
1
5
2
0
9
2001
0
2
6
7
0
15
2002
8
2
8
35
0
53
2003
4
2
15
16
3
40
2004
1
0
4
0
0
5
2005
0
1
1
0
0
2
2006
0
1
0
0
0
1
Total
14
15
50
62
3
144
Source: OFTA

With reference to Table 5.12 which shows the breakdown of breach misleading or
deceptive conduct complaints from 1999 to 2006 into different telecommunications
markets. It is apparent that most breach cases are in Internet service market, and it has
43% share compared to other telecommunications markets among all the breach
complaints. As highlighted earlier, Internet and fixed line services markets are the two
main service markets which have the most complaints among all the misleading and
deceptive conduct complaints from 1999 to 2006. Internet service market, one of the
most complaint markets, still dominates other telecommunications services markets in
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terms of breach complaints. However, fixed line service market, being the second largest
complaint market, has only 10% share of all breach complaints; whereas IDD and
mobile services have share more of breach complaints than its, with 35% and 10%
respectively. Therefore, it is interesting to examine why there are so many complaints in
fixed line service market yet only a few are regarded as breach cases.
Table 5.13
Outcome of the Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from 1999 to 2006
Fixed Line Service Mobile Phone Service
IDD Service
Internet Service
88%
40%
38%
38%
No Breach
12%
60%
63%
63%
Breach
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
Source: OFTA

To better understand the successful breach cases among all complaints in different
services markets, Table 5.13 has shown that mobile and IDD service markets, 60% and
63% respectively are breach complaints, however, for Internet and fixed line service
markets, the breach complaints out of the total complaints are only 47% and 12%
respectively. With a huge number of complaints in these two markets but in which a few
number are breach complaints, it is interesting to find out the reason in order to assess
the level of consumer protection since a lot of consumers have shown their
dissatisfaction about the services in these two markets but only a few are considered
breach. The reason may be that it is harder to get the “evidence” from these two markets
as earlier discussion mentions that with the complaints on salesperson’s conduct in
Internet and fixed line service markets, it is hard for the third party to find the evidence
since the salespersons keep changing working places, and they are mostly hired through
other agents. This is the reason why the same misleading and deceptive conduct kept
happening and the consumers keep suffering. On the other hand, in IDD and mobile
service market, the cases which considered as breach cases and no breach are equally
distributed. It may be that it is easier to get the “evidence” from these markets, since the
misleading conducts are mostly from the advertisement, which, there are more “solid” or
“tangible” evidences, like leaflets, website, etc.
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Therefore, we can see that it is hard to prove the misleading or deceptive conduct from
salesperson in Internet and fixed line service markets but more consumers are suffered
from the misleading or deceptive conducts of salesperson in these two markets. This
leads to a question of how consumers are being protected from salesperson’s trick in the
real situation. Further discussion will be in section 5.4 of this chapter.

(G) Remedies of Complaints of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints

For those which are considered as breaching the 7M Misleading or Deceptive Ordinance,
there are various penalties which OFTA may impose on a licensee following a finding
that the licensee has breached section 7M. There are cases which no further action has
been taken, there are cases where there is some written warning, and for some more
serious cases, there are actually financial penalty imposed and they are ranged from
$25,000 to $100,000 for the breach complaints between 1999 and 2006.6 There are also
some cases which are decided to have breached the Advertising Code, which is the Code
OFTA start to adopt in January 1996.

It is with reference to the malpractices in

advertising which can do serious harm to the industry and mislead consumers. The Code
has been replaced by the guideline of 7M in 2003. The Code and the Guideline are both
adopted by OFTA under the misleading or deceptive conduct complaint cases.7

6

Under section 36C of the Ordinance, the TA may impose a financial penalty on the licensee for failure to
comply with section 7M. On the first occasion the penalty is imposed, the penalty may be up to and
including $200,000, on the second occasion, up to and including $500,000 and, on any subsequent
occasions, the penalty may be up to and including $1,000,000.
7
Advertising Code, OFTA, January 1996, OFTA Website
http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/code/practice/ta960124.html
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Table 5.14
Remedy of the Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA from
1999 to 2006
No
Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial
Further Written
Penalty Penalty Penalty Penalty Penalty Penalty Advertising
Action Warning $25,000 $30,000 $50,000 $70,000 $80,000 $100,000 Code

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

0
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
4

0
0
4
50
31
3
1
0
89

0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

19
9
11
2
0
0
0
0
41

Source: OFTA

With reference to Table 5.14, the outcome of the breach cases of misleading and
deceptive conduct complaints from 1999 to 2006 are mainly written warning and
Advertising Code. There are more breach cases having breached the Advertising Code in
1999. Advertising Code has been used before year 2003 and in 2003, it has been
replaced by the Guideline of 7M, and therefore, after year 2003, there is no breach of
Advertising Code. Most written warning has been issued in 2002 and 2003 and for
financial penalty imposed after year 2003, after the Telecommunications Ordinance was
amended in 2003 and the most severe case is the most recent one in Dec 2006.8.

Within the breach cases, written warning shares more than 62% of all the breach
complaints and financial penalty shares only 7%. While Advertising Code has been
adopted throughout 1999 to 2002, it shares about 28% of all the breach complaints.
Those 7% of financial penalty complaints, which is 10 complaints among all the
misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, reflect that there are some serious conducts
done by the operators and therefore OFTA impose penalty financially. It is important to
have a deeper look at those complaints, and examine them in different dimensions in
order to see how seriously the misleading and deceptive conducts have harmed the
consumers.

8

SmarTone Vodafone Case in December 2006 Case Reference T66/06
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Financial Penalty of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints

For the 7% of financial penalty complaints among the total breach of misleading or
deceptive conduct complaints between 1999 and 2006, different dimensions will be
examined in order to have a better understanding of the level of consumer protection in
the telecommunications sector.

(1) By Type of Complainants of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints
which are under Financial Penalty

Table 5.15
Type of Complainant of the Financial Penalty Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases
Handled by OFTA from 1998 to 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total
Consumer
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
Operator
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
0
5
OFTA
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
2
Total
0
0
0
0
6
2
1
1
10
Source: OFTA

Table 5.15 breakdowns the type of complainants of all misleading or deceptive conduct
complaints which are under financial penalty, from 1999 to 2006, and all financial
penalties have imposed after 2003. Operators have lodged most of the complaints which
financial penalty has been imposed in 2003. With reference to the Table, 50% of the
financial penalty complaints are lodged by operators, and only 30% by consumers and
20% by OFTA. More financial penalty complaints have been lodged by operators mean
more serious complaints are competition-related issue since the misleading and
deceptive conducts by other operators would definitely hurt their competitors too, apart
from consumers themselves.
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(2) By Nature of Complaints of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints
which are under Financial Penalty

Most misleading or deceptive conduct complaints which are on financial penalty are
complaints about advertisement; it shares 90% of the total financial penalty complaints.
Even though about salesperson, it only shares 10% among the total. However, it could
also mean that it is hard for the third party to get the evidence to prove the misleading or
deceptive conducts from salesperson. Further discussion will be in section 5.4 of this
chapter.

(3) By Telecommunications Markets of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
Complaints which are under Financial Penalty

Table 5.16
Breakdown of the Financial Penalty Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from 1999 to 2006
Fixed Line
Mobile Phone
IDD Service
Internet Service
Total
Service
Service
1999
0
0
0
0
0
2000
0
0
0
0
0
2001
0
0
0
0
0
2002
0
0
0
0
0
2003
2
0
4
0
6
2004
1
0
1
0
2
2005
0
1
0
0
1
2006
0
1
0
0
1
Total
3
2
0
5
10
Source: OFTA

With reference to Table 5.16, it is observed that the misleading or deceptive conduct
complaints which are under financial penalty have happened mostly in year 2003, and
mostly in other markets, which is the prepaid phone cards market. Fixed line and mobile
markets share 27% and 18% respectively among all the misleading or deceptive conduct
complaints which are under financial penalty. For IDD and Internet markets, they are
46% and 0% respectively. Even though not so many complaints with financial penalty
imposed in the fixed line services market and even none in Internet service market, it
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could also be due to the difficulty to get evidence to prove the misleading or deceptive
conduct, since most of the complaints in these two service markets are from salespersons,
making it even harder to get solid evidence to prove their frauds. And even they are not
considered as breach cases by OFTA, it does not mean that consumers are not being
harmed by their conducts. As my study is to access the level of consumer protection in
the telecommunications sector under the competition policy, breach cases definitely
have shown some frauds conducts from operators which have exploited consumers’
benefits. However, those no breach complaints sharing a large number in Internet and
fixed line Service markets should not be neglected since it is a fact that many consumers
have already shown their dissatisfaction explicitly.

5.4 Discussions of the Findings and the Significant Problems in the
Telecommunications Sector

Key Messages from the Findings

(A) From the Consumer Council Data

(1) Consumers have shown Far more of their Dissatisfaction in the
Telecommunications Service Sector than in All Other Sectors

There is an increasing trend of consumer complaint cases in the telecommunications
sector, and the consumer complaint cases in the telecommunications sectors has topped
for 6 years among all other different sectors. Also, in terms of the number of consumer
complaint cases, it is way more than the second most sector, the broadcasting sector. For
just 6 years from 2000 to 2006, the consumer complaint cases have increased about
300% but for the overall consumer complaints cases, it is only about 100% increase.
This also supports why the consumer complaints situation is more serious in the
telecommunications sector. The fact the popularity or penetration of the market does not
seem to account for the observation here: as other common services sector, such as,
financial service sector, medical service sector does not record such trend. Therefore,
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the large number of the consumer complaints in the telecommunications sector is not
simply because of the large number of consumers is consuming the service, there is
something special about this sector which makes more and more consumers are
dissatisfied about the services they consume.

(2) Consumers have shown their Dissatisfaction mostly in the Internet and Fixed Line
Service Markets within the Telecommunications Service Sector and they both have
Increasing Trends.

Within the telecommunications service sector, the consumers complain most in the fixed
line service market and Internet market, and there are obvious increasing trends in these
markets compared to other two main markets, that is mobile service market and IDD
service market. Most people may think most of the consumer complaint cases should
come from mobile market since its penetration rate is highest among all other markets
throughout the years.

9

Therefore, most consumer complaints about the services in

Internet and fixed line services market should not just have the reason of more
consumers consuming the services.

(B) From the OFTA Data

(1) The Most Consumer-Related Complaints Received and Handled by OFTA are the
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints

Among all the consumer-related cases received by OFTA, complaints about misleading
or deceptive conducts contribute the most, which is about 65%. And among all the
misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, consumers have lodged around 80% of
them. The most frequent misleading conduct complaints are about the salesperson and
advertisement, which contribute about 55% and 36% respectively. Salesperson and
advertisement are the most serious types of complaints among all. It shows that their
misleading and deceptive conduct would hurt consumers’ benefits as correct and reliable
9

Key Telecommunications Statistics on OFTA Website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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information is important for consumers consuming services in this sector, which is full
of complicated and fast changing information. Salesperson and advertisement got the
most complaint cases because these two are the important channels for delivering the
information to the consumers. But due to the nature of telecom industry, often
complicated and detailed information is released through advertisement and salespersons.
Salesperson

is

the

most

important

marketing

and

sales

channels

in

the

telecommunications sector; the information is way too complicated and hard to
understand, at best we need a salesperson, who is able to explain all the necessary
information (including terms and conditions about the service) to the consumers.

(2) Most of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints happened in the Internet
and Fixed Line Service Markets

Internet and fixed line service markets are the two service markets which get the most
complaints between 1999 and 2006, contributing about 38% and 32% respectively
among the total misleading or deceptive conduct complaints. This is consistent with the
key message I have drawn from the Consumer Council that fixed line and Internet
markets are two markets which we need to focus on. The misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints in fixed line service market concentrate most in 2003 and 2004;
while most complaints happen in year 2002 and 2004 in Internet service market. For the
Internet service market, due to the rapid development in technology within these years,
alongside with the dial-up connection migrating to broadband Internet, more advanced
technology has allowed consumers faster transmission speed.

However, fast

development in technology also brings complicated information for the consumers,
which are hard for them to understand, and under fierce competition in Internet service
market, consumers may be easier to get tricked by advertisement or salesperson due to
asymmetric information. Consumers often do not have much technical sense about the
technological issues regarding the service in Internet service market.
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(3) Complicated and Asymmetric Information Problem with Consumers Lack of
Awareness of Further Liberalization and Competition in the Telecommunications
Sector may Trigger Most of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints in
Internet and Fixed Line Service Markets

For the fixed line service market, there are huge numbers of misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints in 2003 and 2004, which can be explained by the further
liberalization and competition which have been introduced in the market and that
government has implemented the type II interconnection policy in January 2003. All
these trigger most misleading and deceptive conduct complaints in year 2003 and 2004.
More competition in the market definitely would bring lower prices and more choices
for the consumers. However, since under the Type II interconnection policy, more
competitors are providing services at the same time and consumers do not know that
there are more competitors providing services in the market (since Hong Kong Telecom
was the monopoly which provides the fixed line service for a long time). The new
comers, in order to attract more consumers, may use some fraud statements to attract the
consumers and slamming behaviors have emerged in order to attract the consumers to
switch their existing service contract to the new competitors’.

(4) Most Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints are in Relation to the
Salesperson’s Conducts

On the other hand, among the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints in fixed line
and Internet service markets, most of the complaints are related to the salespersons,
contributing 82% and 75% respectively. The salespersons’ misleading conducts are
usually found in Internet and fixed line markets since these two markets are in fierce
competition and the technology and service plan information are relatively new and
more complicated. To complicate the picture, there are some new innovation and
bundling packages which bundled with broadband telephone or broadband TV as well.
They are newly introduced in the market. The consumers might not be able to digest the
information good enough before they enter into the contract. However, obviously it is
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the operators’ responsibility to deliver all the important information to the consumers
which would affect their decision marking. If they cannot do so, the consumers may be
tricked or even suffer the financial loss. And also, those information in these two
markets are usually better to be delivered by the salesperson because the information are
way too complicated to understand. The salespersons, however, take advantage of that
and mislead the consumers in certain ways. Also the fierce competition within these two
markets has further intensified salespersons’ misleading conduct in order to get
consumers switching the operators. The misleading information in the advertisement is
the second largest misleading conduct in the sector, and mostly in IDD and card markets.
These two markets do not contain much complicated service plan, new innovation and
knowledge, as well as technical information, and therefore need not be explained as
much as the Internet and fixed line market.

(5) Most of the Outcome of the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints is Caseresolved, which OFTA Do Not Impose Any Penalty to These Resolved Cases.

Among all the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, most of the complaints are
resolved cases, contributing 39%; while 37% are breach cases, and 24% are cases
decided as not breach. Most of the resolved cases come from similar cases, which
happen in fixed and Internet service markets. OFTA has decided to resolve the cases and
no penalty have even been imposed on any of the particular operators. Detailed
discussion will be in Chapter 7, the mis-selling cases.

(6) The Out-sourcing Scheme of Hiring Salesperson in the Telecommunications
Sector Makes it Harder for Consumers to Provide Solid Evidence when the
Salesperson Does Commit the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct.

Among 37% of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints breach cases, 61% of them
complain about the misleading or deceptive advertisement and only 24% of them are
about salespersons. However, as earlier discussed, salesperson contributes most of the
total misleading or deceptive conduct complaint cases; however, among all the
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misleading or deceptive conduct complaints about the salespersons, only 17% of them
are breach. The reason for large number of the complaints are not breached, but
breached for the cases in advertisement may be due to the difficulty to prove the
misleading or deceptive conducts of salesperson in Internet and fixed line service
markets where actually more consumers are suffering from the misleading or deceptive
conducts of salespersons. This leads to a question of how consumers are being protected
by salespersons’ tricks. As mentioned earlier on, the fact that salespersons quit the job
right after the complaint incident and the fact that there is no recording or proof of sales
process details leaves very slim chance for the case to be investigated. Further
discussion will be in Chapter 6, the mis-selling cases.

(7) The Reason of Complicated and Asymmetric Information Problems and Outsourcing Hiring Salesperson Scheme may Contribute a Reason to Only a Small
Percentage of Complaints are Found to be Breach in the Fixed Line and Internet
Service Markets.

Also, among all the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints breach cases, 43% are
from Internet service market and 35% from IDD service market. However, only 10%
are in fixed line service markets. As discussed earlier of all the misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints, 32% are from fixed line service market. However, only a small
percentage of breach cases are from fixed line service market, which could be explained
by most of the complaints are the resolved cases, where OFTA has decided no remedies
on any of the operators. Further discussion will be in chapter 7.

(8) Most Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints with Financial Penalty have
been Lodged by Operators but Not Consumers. It could be Due to the Difficulty in
Finding Evidence by Consumers Themselves, as well as the Complicated and
Asymmetric Information Problem in the Sector.

For the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints which are breach cases between
1999 and 2006, most remedies OFTA have imposed are written warning, contributing
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62% among all, and only 7% of the breach complaints financial penalty has been
imposed the. And within these 7% of financial penalty imposed breach cases, operators
have lodged 50% of them, while consumers have only lodged 30%.It shows consumers
have even lodged most of the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, however,
only a small percentage of them are with financial penalty imposed. This could be a
reason of asymmetric information. Since for the operators (the competitors), they have
more knowledge and information about how the other competitors have committed the
misleading or deceptive conducts, and they can provide more sophisticated information
to OFTA. While for or ordinary consumers, it is hard for them to collect the evidence or
point out the misleading or deceptive conduct as they might not have much information
as the operators do.

(9) Recent Newspaper States that Consumers may Suffer from the Misleading
Statements Made by the Operators in the Internet Service Market and Consumers may
not Even Realize it Due to the Asymmetric and Complicated Information Problem.

Due to the asymmetric information problem, consumers may not be able to get the solid
evidence or even realize they are being tricked. Recent newspaper supports this
argument in the Internet service market.10 As my study is to access the level of consumer
protection in the telecommunications sector under the competition policy, breach cases
definitely shown some frauds conducts from operators which exploit consumers’
benefits. However, those no breach complaints have shared a large number in Internet
and fixed line service markets. This should not be neglected since it is a fact that more
consumers had shown their dissatisfaction explicitly but not having received effective
treatment.

10

SingTao Newspaper article “Misleading Telecommunications Services, Three Hundred Cases in Kwai
Ching District” on November 27, 2006
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Chapter 6
Study of Selected Cases

6.1 Detail Discussion of Top Six Most Complained about Operators
In this section, I will focus on the top six telecommunications operators which were the
subject of the most complaints in regards to suspected misleading or deceptive conduct
according to the OFTA. I will examine the complaints on different dimensions with a
special focus on repeated misleading or deceptive conduct. Repeated offenses may
suggest that enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough to deter misleading or
deceptive conduct by telecommunications operators, perpetuating the harm done to
consumers. Therefore, it is important to examine the breach cases in order to see
whether any of these operators have repeatedly misled or deceived consumers on
multiple occasions.
General Picture of Top Six Most Complained about Operators
Of all the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints received and handled by OFTA,
six operators have a seemingly larger share of complaints compared to all other
telecommunications operators. These six operators have been selected for further
examination in order to see the factors which undermine the protection for consumers.

Table 6.1
Top Six Operators which have the Most Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled
by OFTA between 1999 and 2006
i-CABLE
WebServe
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Limited
Total No. of Complaints
94
57
46
37
34
32
Source: OFTA
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Table 6.2
Breakdown of the Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from 1999 to 2006
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
1999

0

3

4

7

1

5

2000

0

1

6

1

3

0

2001

0

3

3

6

3

1

2002

14

1

26

11

2

1

2003

15

43

4

8

2

24

2004

65

4

2

2

23

1

2005

0

1

0

3

0

0

2006

0

1

1

0

0

0

Source: OFTA

Breakdown of Complaints by Telecommunications Markets

Table 6.3
Breakdown of the Total Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from between 1999 and 2006 by Service Markets
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Fixed

0

45

5

11

30

24

Mobile

0

6

0

3

0

0

IDD

0

2

15

16

5

7

Internet

94

3

23

10

0

0

Source: OFTA

Breakdown of Complaints by Type of Complainants

Table 6.4
Percentage Share of the Total Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled
by OFTA from between 1999 and 2006 by Type of Complainants
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Consumer

100%

93%

80%

66%

86%

91%

Operator

0%

5%

17%

24%

14%

6%

OFTA

0%

2%

2%

11%

0%

3%

Source: OFTA
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Breakdown of Complaints by Nature of the Complaints

Table 6.5
Percentage Share of the Total Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from between 1999 and 2006 by Type of Complaints
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Salesperson

82%

75%

48%

13%

66%

91%

Advertisement

2%

25%

50%

79%

23%

9%

Others

16%

0%

2%

8%

11%

0%

Source: OFTA

Breakdown of Complaints by Outcome of Complaints

Table 6.6
Percentage Share of the Total Completed Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from between 1999 and 2006 by Outcome of Complaints
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
No Breach

69%

86%

30%

160%

83%

75%

Breach

31%

14%

70%

40%

17%

25%

Source: OFTA

Outcome of Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases

Table 6.7
Outcome of Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA from
between 1999 and 2006
i-CABLE WebServe
HGC
HKBN&CTI
PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Limited
Advertising Code
6
0
8
5
3
6
Notice
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
26
10
2
1
29
Written Warning
Financial Penalty

0

0

Source: OFTA
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Table 6.8
Breakdown of the Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from between 1999 and 2006 by Service Markets
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Fixed

0

1

2

7

3

1

Mobile

0

3

0

5

2

1

IDD

0

0

8

11

2

Internet

29

3

23

6

2

6
0

Source: OFTA

Table 6.9
Nature of the Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by OFTA
from between 1999 and 2006
i-CABLE WebServe
HGC
HKBN&CTI
PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Limited
Salesperson
13%
41%
57%
0%
0%
0%
Advertisement
7%
88%
43%
100%
100%
100%
Others

52%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Source: OFTA

Table 6.10
Percentage Share of the Total Breach Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint Cases Handled by
OFTA from between 1999 and 2006 by Type of Complainants
i-CABLE WebServe Limited
HGC
HKBN&CTI PCCW
Wharf
NWT
Consumer

100%

88%

80%

44%

33%

963%

Operator

0%

0%

20%

31%

67%

25%

OFTA

0%

13%

0%

25%

0%

13%

Source: OFTA

Background information and a brief description of the services provided by the six
operators which received the most misleading or deceptive conduct complaints is
provided in the following section.
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Top 1: i-cable WebServe

(A) Background Information of the Operator
i-CABLE WebServe Limited is involved in the telecommunications sector through its
subsidiary i-CABLE Communications Limited, which provides Internet service. It
acquired the Internet service provider license in October 1990. In January 2000, it
received FTNS license and has been allowed to provide local fixed line service in Hong
Kong. In March 2000, broadband Service was formally launched using cable modem
technology. i-CABLE Communications Limited owns and operates one of two near
universal broadband telecommunications networks in the territory.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
There is a concentration of suspected misleading and deceptive conduct complaints
against i-Cable WebServe Limited from 2002 to 2004. Consumers have lodged all of the
complaints about the misleading or deceptive conducts about salesperson, advertisement,
and reduced speed without notice. A total of 97 complaints have been lodged between
2002 and 2004. There is an increasing trend and there has been a big jump from 2003 to
2004 in the total number of complaints. In 2003, it is mainly the complaints about the
advertisement misleading the upload speed, which they have claimed to be 30 times
faster than others. They have the most complaints in 2004, which are the cases
complaining the salesperson (door-to-door) selling the bundling service, which the
salesperson has claimed to use a marketing excuse: “giving special offer only to the
loyalty customers of cable TV such as more channels, free internet and free IDD etc.”
And afterwards the salesperson asks the customers to sign the contract without telling
them the full terms and conditions. Eventually they end up having two contracts with icable WebServe and Cable TV at the same time. While some salesperson are just selling
broadband Internet service by offering “special offer”, which are bundled with Cable TV
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service. Also, they have asked the consumers to sign the contracts without explaining the
terms and conditions of them.
(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6 – Table 6.10)
Among all the suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, 69% of the
complaints have occurred in 2002 and 2003 and they have been found to be breach, and
written warning has been issued. When the operator first found to have 2 suspected
misleading or deceptive conduct complaints in 2002, OFTA decided the particular
conduct has breached the 7M Ordinance and written warning has been issued. However,
suspected misleading or deceptive conduct has been found again in 2003 where there are
12 complaints about the salesperson, and 15 complaints about the reduced speed without
notice. Both of them are found to breach 7M Ordinance, however, no serious penalty has
been imposed; only written warning is issued. In 2004, similar suspected misleading or
deceptive conducts again have been lodged by 65 Consumers, complaining about the
misleading or deceptive slamming conducts by the Salespersons, however, OFTA has
decided to resolve the case and the case is considered as “mis-selling” without any
imposition of penalty on i-Cable WebServe, with the reason that compliance program
has been launched by i-CABLE after the conduct. Detailed discussion will be in the later
section Case Study: Mis-selling Case.

(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive (M/D) behavior has happened in1

Internet service market:
2002(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning)
2002(Salesperson, breach of 7M, written warning)
2003(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2004(Salesperson, case resolved)

1

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
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Top 2: Hutchison Telecommunications Group (HGC)

(A) Background Information of the Operator
Hutchison Telecommunications (Hong Kong) Limited is one of the mobile service
operators in Hong Kong. The Company is also a provider of fixed line service market
through its fixed line arm Hutchison Global Communications Limited (HGC). The
group has started to launch its residential and business telephone line service in January
1997. Besides, the group also provides Internet and IDD services in the sector.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
There are 57 suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints against HGC
throughout the years from 1999 to 2006 and among which, 93% of the total complaints
have been lodged by consumers. The operator has the most complaints in 2003 and most
of them have happened in fixed line service market. In 2003, there are 43 complaints
complaining about the salesperson (door-to-door) who have the “slamming” act, tricking
the consumers to acquire telecom service they would not otherwise choose to acquire, ie
switched to HGC from PCCW-HKT. The salesperson usually use similar tricks, for
example, by saying “HGC has cooperated (merged) with PCCW-HKT and HGC would
be in charge of the administration work”, fabricating the relationship between the two
companies; or saying “PCCW-HKT has ceased to operate and that HGC has tendered for
its business”, but they emphasize that they are the same operator. Some cases just use
the price reduction as an excuse to ask the consumers to sign the contracts without
telling them that it is a switch in fact. They try to offer a cheaper plan and convince the
consumers to join their service. Some of them are elderly people and the illiterate.

(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6 – Table 6.10)
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For Hutchison Group, only 14% of the suspected misleading or deceptive complaints are
found to be breach. Most of the no breach complaints are those happening in 2003,
lodged by 42 consumers, complaining about the misleading or deceptive slamming
conduct by the salesperson. However, OFTA has decided to resolve the case and the
case is considered as “mis-selling” case without any imposition of penalty on i-Cable
WebServe, with the reason that compliance program has been launched by i-CABLE
after the conduct. Detailed discussion will be in the chapter Case Study: Mis-selling
Case.

(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive behavior has happened in 2

Fixed line service market:
2002 (Salesperson, breach of 7M, written warning)
2003 (Salesperson, case resolved) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)

Mobile service market:
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2000(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2005 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)

IDD service market:
1999(Advertisement, no breach of Advertising Code)
2006(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
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Top 3: HKBN/CTI

(A) Background Information of the Operator
City Telecom (HK) Limited (CTI) has launched its IDD300 Calling Service in January
1997, and in March 2000, CTI’s wholly-owned subsidiary; Hong Kong Broadband
Network Limited (HKBN) has started to launch its Broadband Internet Service. In April
2002, HKBN has upgraded to become a wireline-based FTNS licensee and officially
launches local telephony service in Hong Kong.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
A total of 46 suspected complaints have been received by OFTA complaining against
CTI/HKBN throughout the years of 1999 to 2006 and consumers have lodged 80% of
them. The Group gets most complaints in 2002, which are complaining about the
misleading conduct from the salesperson. Most of the complaints have happened in
Internet service market, which contribute about 49% among all the misleading or
deceptive complaints.

(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6 – Table 6.10)
Among all the misleading or deceptive complaints against CTI/HKBN, 70% of them
have found to be breach, which is the highest breach ratio among all the top six
companies.
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(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive behavior has happened in 3

Fixed line service market:
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
2003 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)
2003 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, HK$50,000 financial penalty imposed)
→ Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2005 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2006 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)

IDD service market:
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2000 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2000(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2000(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2000(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2001(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2003(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2004(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct

Internet service market:
2000 (Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
2002 (Advertisement, No breach of 7M)
3

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
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2002 (Salesperson, breach of 7M, written warning)
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
Top 4: PCCW-HKT

(A) Background Information of the Operator
In August 2000, PCCW has acquired Cable & Wireless HKT (originally The Hong
Kong Telephone Company, formed in 1925) and the Group has acquired SUNDAY
Communications Ltd in June 2005. The Group provides fixed line, mobile, IDD, and
Internet services in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
The Group has 38 suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints in total
throughout the years of 1999 to 2006 and 66% of them have been lodged by consumers.
The Group has the most cases in 2002 and most cases have happened in IDD service
market and 79% of total misleading or deceptive conduct complaints have been
complaining about the advertisement.

(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6– Table 6.10)
15 complaint cases, which is 40% among the total misleading or deceptive conduct
complaints have been found to be breach, and for most of them only written warning is
issued while no financial penalty has ever been imposed on PCCW. All the breach
misleading or deceptive conduct complaints are about the advertisement.
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(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive behavior has happened in 4

Fixed line service market:
2001 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning)
2003 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2003 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)
2003 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2005 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)

Mobile service market:
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
1999(Advertisement, no breach of Advertising Code)
2001(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2001(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, no further action) → Repeated Breach M/D
Conduct
IDD service market: 5
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
1999(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
1999(Advertisement, no breach of Advertising Code)
1999(Advertisement, no breach of Advertising Code)
2001(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct

4
5

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
Complaints before 2000 are complained against Hong Kong Telecom (HKT) instead of PCCW.
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2001(Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2002(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2003(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2003(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2003(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct

Internet service market:
2000 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning)
2002 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2004 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)
2005 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)

Top 5: Wharf T&T

(A) Background Information of the Operator
Wharf T&T is a member of The Wharf Group of companies which also owns i-CABLE
Communications Limited. The Group has launched its IDD007 services in May 1996 in
Hong Kong and has begun its residential fixed line services in December 1996.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
The Group has 34 suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints from 1999 to
2006, and 86% of them have been lodged by consumers. 23 of the suspected misleading
or deceptive conduct complaints have concentrated in 2004 and these complaints are
about the slamming activities, which are similar to the cases against Hutchison Group.
The salesperson lied about the relationship with PCCW-HKT, such as saying that he/she
has been appointed as the agent of PCCW-HKT to provide the services, or saying that
he/she is the subtenant as principal tenant is PCCW-HKT, or saying that they have been
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contracted to provide telephone service for particular buildings. They try to use cheaper
plan to attract the consumers. The consumers have thought that they have no choice but
to switch. The consumers have suffered by paying two companies for the service they
consume.

(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6 – Table 6.10)
83% among all the suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints have been
found to be no breach. And all of the breach misleading or deceptive conduct complaints
have been complaints about advertisement.

(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive behavior has happened in 6

Fixed line service market:
2000 (Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
2001 (Salesperson, no breach of 7M)
2003 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct
2004 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2004 (Salesperson, case resolved)

IDD service market:
2000 (Advertisement, breach of Advertising Code)
2001(Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002 (Advertisement, no breach of 7M)
2002(Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct

6

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
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Top 6: New World Telecommunications Limited

(A) Background Information of the Operator
New World Telecommunications Limited (NWT) is a member of New World
Development Company Ltd. The group provides its fixed line services in July 1995 and
IDD services in the telecommunications sector. New World Mobility provides its mobile
services in August 1997.
(B) Complaint Cases (Table 6.1 – Table 6.5)
The Group has 32 suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints throughout the
years 1999 to 2006 and 91% of them have been lodged by consumers. The Group gets
the most complaints in 2003 which are all about the slamming activities, similar to the
complaints against Hutchison and Wharf. The salesperson from NWT has lied about the
fact that PCCW-HKT and NWT have been merged or PCCW-HKT has given all the
lines of the building to NWT to operate and make the consumers believe that they have
no choice but to switch. It has been claimed that there is a reduction in telephone
services charge if they present their bills and sign the documents. Some of the
consumers are elderly and the illiterate.

(C) Outcome of the Complaints (Table 6.6 – Table 6.10)
72% of the total suspected misleading or deceptive conduct complaints have been
decided to no breach, where 9 cases have been found breach. All of them are complained
about the misleading or deceptive advertisement.
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(D) Repeated Behavior
Repeated similar misleading or deceptive behavior has happened in 7

Fixed line service market:
2003 (Salesperson, case resolved)
2004 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, HK$30, 000 financial penalty was imposed)

IDD service market:
1999 (Advertisement, breach of the Advertising Code)
1999 (Advertisement, breach of the Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D
Conduct
1999 (Advertisement, no breach of the Advertising Code)
1999 (Advertisement, breach of the Advertising Code) → Repeated Breach M/D
Conduct
2003 (Advertisement, breach of 7M, written warning) → Repeated Breach M/D Conduct

Key Messages from Analyzing the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints
Repeated misleading or deceptive behavior has been found in all these top six operators,
and some of them have even repeated the breach misleading or deceptive behavior.
These repeated behaviors may have been due to weak remedies mechanisms. For the
repeated misleading or deceptive behavior, which OFTA has decided the complaints to
be breach; some of the complaints have not been imposed heavier penalty, but just the
same written warning, or even less. This definitely will hurt consumers’ welfare due to
the companies have repeated the same misleading or deceptive behavior and consumers
have been misled again. This possibly shows there is an inadequate level of consumer
protection.
7

Year (Nature of Complaint, Outcome of Complaint, Remedy of Complaint)
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6. 2 Case study: “Slamming” Cases about NWT, Hutchison, Wharf and i-Cable
Introduction of competition would definitely bring benefits to consumers with lower
prices and more choices. However, if some operators start to provide services into a
competitive basic in the sector, and would like to attract customers in a misleading or
deceptive way, such as “slamming” act, which broadly describes conduct that “tricks”
consumers into acquiring telecommunications services they would not otherwise choose
to acquire, this definitely would harm consumers benefit.
There are different kinds of government policies which help further liberalize and
introduce competition in the market in order to benefit the social welfare. Type II
interconnection is one of them, which is a regulator measure requiring a fixed carrier,
normally an incumbent who has enjoyed a monopolistic position before market
liberalization, to open up its copper-based customer access network to its competitors.
The policy has been first introduced in 1995 when the local fixed carrier market is first
liberalized. Its objective is to promote the telecommunications sector, encourage
investment in network, facilitate effective competition in the telecommunications
markets, and enhance consumer choice. The policy has been applied to the three new
entrants at the time, namely Hutchison Global Communications Limited (HGC), Wharf
T&T Limited (Wharf T&T) and New World Telecommunications Limited (NWT), with
the incumbent, PCCW-HKT Telephone Limited (PCCW-HKT) obliged to provide
interconnection.

(A) Background
In year 2003 to 2004, there are 152 consumers having lodged the complaints about the
similar misleading or deceptive conducts against four different companies. Three of the
companies are providing bundling services in fixed line service market and the other is
providing broadband internet services in internet service market. This contributes 43%
of total misleading or deceptive conduct complaints received by OFTA from 1999 to
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2006. Under the Type II interconnection policy, which has been reviewed in January
2003, and the decision is announced in July 2004, three companies are providing local
fixed telecommunication services on a competitive basis with PCCW. However, there
are a lot of suspected misleading or deceptive conducts complaints happening in the
same period of time. Consumers do not know much about the type II interconnection
policy, under which more competitors are providing the services in the market. Under
this lack of knowledge and information situation, they are easier to be tricked by the
salesperson who sell their services with misrepresentation statement, such as their
company is merged with their existing service provider, or there is a price reduction
offer with the same company.
It is often only after the consumer’s original service provider notifies them that their
service is being switched to another operator that the consumers will realize what has
really happened. At this point the consumers have no good choices. Either they may be
required to pay an early contract termination penalty to their original service provider, or
pay their new operator penalty if they try to cancel the contract they have been “tricked”
into entering. Detailed discussion will focus the followings complaint cases.

(1) Complaints about Misleading or Deceptive “Slamming” Conduct by NWT sales
people 8
Since May 2003, OFTA has received 23 complaints from consumers, concerning alleged
misleading or deceptive sales tactics by salesperson carrying out door-to-door sales
activities in relation to NWT’s residential telephone services. Some of the cases have
started at the first place when there is a salesperson, who shows his staff identity card
with a PCCW-HKT logo printed on it, and identifies himself as a representative of
PCCW-HKT Telephone Limited, visits complainant’s home and tells the customer that
PCCW-HKT and NWT have merged and they are presently providing the complainant
an additional choice. The provision of the services changes to NWT in name only, and
does not have any changes in essence, including the telephone service and the telephone
8

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T116/03
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number. However, the monthly fee will be cheaper. The complainant says that the
salesperson has copied her personal particulars on to a document and given her a copy of
that document, which was a customer copy of an application form for NWT’s residential
telephone services. That has been completed using the complainant’s information even
the complainant emphasizes that she does not agree to switch her telephone service to
NWT and she has clearly not signed any contract during her meeting with this
salesperson. During the following two days, the complainant calls PCCW-HKT asking
about the matter of its merging with NWT. PCCW-HKT staff tells her that there is no
such arrangement. The complainant then makes a complaint to NWT immediately and
requests NWT to look into the matter. Despite her actions, the complainant receives a
letter from PCCW-HKT notifying her that her telephone service will be switched to
NWT. She is told by NWT staff that she has entered into a one-year contract with NWT
for the supply of residential telephone services.
Similar conducts have been found in other complaints where the salesperson of NWT
claim PCCW-HKT gave all the lines of this building to NWT to operate, and since the
complainant believes that the telephone lines of his building have been transferred to
NWT to operate, he assumes he has no choice but to switch to NWT. He signs the
document as requested without the salesperson going through the contents of the
document.
Some other cases happen that the complainant, who is a customer of NWT’s IDD009
service.

The salesperson asks the complainant questions relating to the quality of

service of IDD 009 and acquires the complainant’s personal particular information and
claims to be for record purposes only. The complainant has seen the salesperson written
down his identity card number on a document and leaves without giving the complainant
a copy of the document.

And later, the complainant receives a letter from NWT

informing him that his telephone line will be switched from PCCW-HKT to NWT.
Similar conducts have been found in other complaints where the salesperson claims to
have reduction in telephone service charges, if the complainant could provide the
telephone bill to him and signature is required in order to enjoy the reduction in charges.
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However, the complainant has later found out that she has entered into a new contract
with another operator without the salesperson mentioning anything about such or
explaining anything to the complainant. Some of the complaints are more than 70 years
old or illiterate.

(2) Complaints about Misleading or Deceptive “Slamming” Conduct by HGC sales
people 9
During the 12 months from July 2003 to June 2004, OFTA has received 42 complaints
from consumers concerning alleged misleading or deceptive sales tactics by salesperson
carrying out door-to-door sales activities in relation to HGC’s residential telephone
services. These conducts are similar to those NWT sales people, who claim that HGC
cooperates with PCCW-HKT, or, PCCW-HKT and HGC become the same company.
Or, the salesperson uses the charge reduction to lure the consumers to provide their
identify cards so that the salesperson could write down their personal particulars in the
contract and without informing the complaints that by that procedure, they have entered
into a new contract without choices, and salesperson often requests customer’s signature
for record purpose. Also, OFTA reports that some of the complainants are old and have
poor eyesight.

(3) Complaints about Misleading or Deceptive “Slamming” Conduct by Wharf T&T
sales people 10
During the 10 months from September 2003 to June 2004, OFTA has received 22
complaints from consumers concerning alleged misleading or deceptive sales tactics by
salesperson carrying out door-to-door sales activities in relation to Wharf T&T’s
residential telephone services. These conducts are similar to those of NWT and HGC
sales people. The salesperson claims that Wharf T&T has been appointed as the agent
of PCCW-HKT to provide telecommunications services or Wharf T&T has been

9

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T132/03 & T179/03
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T194/03 & T140/04

10
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contracted to provide telecommunications service for that building, leaving the
complainant no choice but to switch to their fixed line telephone services.
(4) Complaints about Misleading or Deceptive “Slamming” Conduct by i-CABLE
sales people 11
During the 8 months from February to September 2004, OFTA has received 65
complaints from consumers alleging misleading or deceptive sales tactics by i-CABLE
salesperson, involved in door-to-door/outdoor sales activities. The salesperson usually
claims that there is a special offer with more TV channels, free internet and free IDD etc,
for loyal Cable TV customers, which is bundled with i-Cable’s broadband internet
service, in order to lure the consumers to enter their contracts. However, it turns out the
some complainants find out that they have entered into a new internet service contract
with i-Cable WebServe. Since these complainants are i-CABLE TV customers, they do
not know the contract they are entering is a new contract for new internet service. Also,
some of the complainants find out the so-called “free new TV channels” are just the
broadband TV via Internet i-CABLE WebServe but not provided by i-CABLE TV.
Some complainants find out that they can not access the so-called “free IDD services”.

(B) Outcome of These “Slamming” Conducts Complaints
After 12 months investigation with all these complaints, OFTA has adopted the same
decision process. OFTA states in the outcome of the complaint cases that the operators
have reviewed their compliance process and made recent improvements to their internal
systems. OFTA is satisfied that the companies have correctly identified the problem area
and addressed the specific concerns that have been raised. All outstanding disputes with
individual complainants have been settled.
Also, these companies have funded a consumer awareness program. The program is
foreshadowed in the TA’s report on mis-selling of fixed line services to Hong Kong

11

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T36/04
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consumers. 12 and OFTA has opted that the companies’ contribution exceeded any
penalty that may have otherwise been imposed on them had the TA reached a concluded
view that the cases listed above constituted a breach of section 7M. At last, the TA does
not consider it necessary to form a conclude view on whether or not there is a breach of
section 7M.

(C) Key message

(1) More than 150 Consumers have Suffered from the Slamming Conduct by the
Operators but No Penalty Was Imposed on Any of These Operators
There are more than 150 consumers who have been involved with these slamming
conduct complaints, and there may even have more consumers who have also suffered
from these slamming conducts but have not complained to OFTA. However, OFTA
decides to resolve the case with the reason that compliance program is reviewed and
funding has been provided by these particular operators to the consumer awareness
program. This shows that the consumers’ welfare has not been fully protected, due to the
fact that consumers are harmed in the first place and the companies still enjoy the fact
that they do not breach any of the Ordinances. With reference to the 7M Guideline
which is published by OFTA, these conducts are under the section of misrepresentations
which states that “misrepresentations are incorrect or false statements and can be either
oral or written or a combination of the two. There are many possible types of
misrepresentation. In some cases, a misrepresentation may come about as a result of a
statement or information which leaves out important facts or creates a false
impression.” 13 According to the conducts of these operators discussed above, those
statements made by the salespersons are misrepresentations where they have claimed
their companies to be either merged or cooperated with PCCW-HKT, or they belong to

12

Office of Telecommunications Authority (2005) “Mis-selling of Fixed-line Telecommunications
Services in Hong Kong”, Telecommunications Authority Report
13
“Guidelines on Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets, OFTA,
May 21 2003
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the same operator, which makes the consumers believe so and hence they are misled to
enter into the contract.
However, there is clear statement from the Guideline under the section of the unlawful
churn and slamming, states that, “it will be misleading or deceptive to misrepresent the
nature of a particular transaction so, for example, a suggestion by a salesperson that a
signature is required to “prove” the salesperson’s attendance is misleading or deceptive
when in fact the signature authorizes the transfer of services” Also, there is a UK
example which is stated under the section of unlawful churn and slamming in the
Guideline, “for instance, in the UK a service provider seeking to persuade customers to
switch telephony providers was found to have made misleading statements about its
relationship with another service provider causing customers to switch providers.”14 Due
to the Guideline is just voluntarily in nature, which lacks of effectiveness.
Also, the Guideline states that “Slamming” is the practice of changing a consumer’s
telephone service without permission. To avoid misleading or deceiving consumers in
this sway, licensees should obtain clear authorization from a consumer regarding any
change of service provider. The authorization should be in writing or promptly
confirmed in written. It is also important that consumers are told that they are being
switched from one network to another. Licensees who do not inform consumers they are
being switched to their network are engaging in slamming, conduct which the TA
considers to be misleading or deceptive under section 7M”.

15

The Guideline clearly

states what would be considered as misleading or deceptive conduct under the section
7M, however, similar conducts are found in these “slamming” cases discussed above.
OFTA states under the section of decision of TA: “TA does not consider it necessary to
form a concluded view on whether or not a breach of section 7M can be established in
individual cases noted here.”

14

“Guidelines on Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets, OFTA,
May 21 2003
15
“Guidelines on Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Hong Kong Telecommunications Markets, OFTA,
May 21 2003
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Under the consideration of OFTA, those particular companies have funded a consumer
awareness program and the funding could have exceeded any penalty that may have
otherwise been imposed. The conducts are then not considered as breach. The operator
could have found that they have not officially breached the Ordinance and OFTA’s
decision may imply that paying money could have settled their wrong-doing, which is
not fair to consumers and other competitors. Only some complainants which have solid
evidence could have been compensated. For those consumers, who have also suffered by
misleading or deceptive conducts, they would not have a chance to be compensated and
their welfare is not protected due to the difficulty to collect solid evidence.

(2) Consumers Lack Awareness of the Changes about the Structure and Policy in the
Telecommunications Sector.
Type II interconnection has been reviewed and consulted in January 2003, however, due
to the long history of HKT being the monopoly in the sector, consumers do not know
about the local fixed carrier market has been liberalized and market is opened up for new
competitors. Therefore, under the lack of awareness and knowledge situation, consumers
may believe the words from the salespersons easily and fall into the tricks, especially for
ordinary consumers who do know much about the network issue in the sector.

(3) Salesperson Out-sourcing Scheme
All of these slamming activities are found involved with salespersons, which have been
hired by an independent agency, some of the workers may work for different companies
at the same time, under the commission scheme. In order to get more consumers into the
contracts, these out-sourced salespersons may use false statements to lure the consumers
entering into the new contracts, hence earning more commission. The companies would
like to use this out-sourcing scheme to save expenses without providing the salespersons
the official staff benefits and welfare. As long as the salespersons could get more
customers for them, they may not concern much about their conducts. And consumers,

105

Chapter 6 Study of Selected Cases
who are lacking knowledge and information about the sector, would rely on the
salespersons and believe what they are told, and have fallen into their tricks at last.
(4) Similar Case has happened in HKBN and Written Warning has been issued.16
From May 2002 to December 2002, OFTA has received 20 complaints about the
misleading or deceptive conducts of HKBN salespersons, which are similar to those of
NWT, HGC, Wharf T&T and i-CABLE, that the salesperson claims that HKBN has
replaced other existing operators for providing broadband internet service to the
particular building in collaboration with Housing Department, or the existing service by
PCCW would merge with HKBN very soon, therefore the complainant has to register
again and change to HKBN’s service plan, or, PCCW-HKT has surrendered its
monopoly and the telephone system of the whole of the complainant’s building has been
changed to HKBN. The salesperson states that everything remains unchanged but the
charge would be lower in order to lure the consumers to enter the contracts. OFTA has
decided that the conduct is in breach of section 7M, however, due to the reason of the
conduct has happened before the 7M Guideline is issued and HKBN has taken remedial
measures to rectify the breach of section 7M of the Ordinance. Therefore, only written
warning to HKBN is appropriate to address the breach.
Almost exactly the same conducts and the same statements have been made by different
companies, however, OFTA has made a decision that the case complaint against HKBN
as breach and written warning is issued. However, the “slamming” cases of other
companies, with more than 150 consumers have suffered, and they happened after the
7M Guideline is issued, OFTA decides it is not necessary to decide the conduct is breach
or not. More consumers have suffered from other cases; however, not even warning has
been issued to any of those companies. This not only shows the level of consumer
protection is inadequate, but also, remedies mechanism is very inconsistent.

(5) The Effectiveness of the Voluntary Guideline
16

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T181/02
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The 7M Guideline has been issued on May 21 2003, and all these incidents have
happened after the Guideline is issued. Since the guideline is voluntary in nature, these
slamming cases prove that the effectiveness of this voluntary guideline is minimal.
Obviously, the operators do not stick to the Guideline since it is voluntary in nature, and
even the Guideline has stated every conduct in details and specifically, eventually, the
operators still commit the misleading or deceptive conducts again.
6.3 Case study: Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint about SmarTone 17

(A) Background
In August 2006, TA has received a complaint in relation to a billboard advertisement
posted by SmarTone-Vodafone, a mobile phone operator, at some fourteen separate
locations in Hong Kong. The locations include the departure hall at Hong Kong
International Airport, various Kowloon-Canton Railway (“KCRC”) stations and the
pedestrian subway on Chater Road. The advertisement has carried SmarTone-Vodafone
branding and depicted a simulation of an airport flight information board with the same
rate of “$3.8” alongside five overseas destinations, named in English. In some locations
the accompanying written messages were in English, and in others, they are in Chinese
(the “billboard advertisement”).
The complainant has also referred to a SmarTone-Vodafone advertisement published in
the Oriental Daily News on August 4, 2006. This advertisement is basically the same as
the billboard advertisement in appearance and layout. However, the one in the
newspaper contains a reference, in Chinese, to a “Traveler” service with a roaming rate
of $3.8 per minute from the five destinations, available for a monthly subscription fee of
$38 (the “newspaper advertisement”). The complainant has alleged that the billboard
advertisement has been misleading or deceptive by virtue of the omission of any
reference to the requirement of a $38 monthly subscription fee.
17

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints, case reference T66/06
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(B) Outcome
OFTA has decided that the posting of the billboard advertisement without reference in it
to the material terms and conditions which actually attach to the roaming rate of $3.8 per
minute, constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of section 7M of the
Ordinance and that accordingly SmarTone-Vodafone should receive a financial penalty
of HK100, 000 even the operator has taken the corrective actions by removing all the
misleading or deceptive advertisement upon the complaint.

(C) Key message

Other Operators have Similar Behavior before but Less or No Penalty has been
Imposed
(1) T156/04 R7 HUT3G 18
A complaint from a consumer concerning a radio commercial broadcast on the
Commercial Radio promoting, marketing and advertising HUT3G’s 3G handset and
service. The complaint has alleged that HUT3G do not include material terms and
conditions of its offer in the radio commercial. OFTA has quoted the 7M Guideline
section 3.11 “a licensee’s silence or non-disclosure may amount to misleading or
deceptive conduct where it is necessary to reveal relevant facts to prevent consumers
from being misled” and section 3.12 “a licensee should, for example, disclose all
material terms and conditions, including price, particularly in the case where a term or
condition is stringent or the consumers might have made a different choice had he
known about the term or condition.” In this case, the TA is of the view that the
requirement to sign on a 12-month HK$183 monthly plan contract and the additional
18

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints, case reference T156/04
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upfront payment is material and could affect the decision of the consumers. It is thus
important for the licensee to bring potential customer’s attention to the fact that there are
attached terms and conditions to the purchase. However, OFTA accepts that HUT3G has
attempted to bring to potential customers’ attention to the terms and conditions by
providing a sales hotline number to serve the same purpose and has decided that it is a
marginal case. TA considers that the Radio Commercial is not misleading and hence not
in breach of section 7M of the Ordinance.
(2) PCCW-HKT19
A complaint has received and handled by OFTA, the complainant has alleged that the
leaflet by PCCW-HKT on its business telephone voice service, have not clearly spelt out
and made available all the material terms of the promotion to the consumers. The TA
has concluded that the leaflets are not in compliance with section 7M of the Ordinance
and PCCW-HKT is deemed to have engaged in conduct in breach of section 7M of the
Ordinance. Due to the fact that the operator has taken corrective actions in the case, only
written warning is issued.

19

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaints, case reference T141/03
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Chapter 7
Level of Consumer Protection under the Competition Enforcement Mechanism

7.1 My Model: SCP Paradigm

My Model as discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrates that in order to assess the level of
consumer protection in the telecommunications sector, the: structure, conduct,
institutions, government policy, enforcement and appeal mechanism should all be
examined as all of these factors ultimately directly and indirectly affect consumers
interests. Therefore, in this section, I will discuss the general level of consumer
protection in different telecommunications markets, including: fixed lined, mobile, IDD
and Internet services markets. And for each market, I will generate the reasons which
may trigger the high number of complaints situation mentioned earlier.

Figure 7.1
Structure-Conduct-Performance-Paradigm
Consumer Behavior
(Qualitative: Analysis of Consumer Complaints)
↑
Structure → Conduct → Performance
(Quantitative: Econometric Study of the Attributes to
Misleading or Deceptive Conducts)
↑
Institution
(Policy Implications and Recommendations)
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7.2 Level of Consumer Protection in the Hong Kong Telecommunications Sector

(A) Fixed Line Market

Accessing Consumer Protection Level from Consumer Behavior in the Fixed Line
Service Market

With reference to Appendix I, further liberalization and introduction of competition in
2000 and 2003 brought more service operators who provided even more services.
Consumers benefited from lower monthly subscription fees and more innovative
technology through the rapidly developing market within these years. Consumers also
benefited from the implementation of number portability; consumers were free to switch
their service operators while keeping their existing number.

Figure 7.2
Monthly subscription fee for residential telephone service from 1998 to 2005
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However, with reference to the analysis of consumer protection cases from the
Consumer Council in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5, more and more consumer complaints were
against the fixed line service market compared with other service markets. Complaints in
the fixed line service market nearly tripled in the year 2003. And with reference to the
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complaints received by OFTA in Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 in Chapter 5,
consumers have lodged the most complaints about the misleading or deceptive conducts
by salespersons in year 2003 and 2004 in fixed line service market. Most troubling is
that complaints seem to center around a small subset of service operators. With
reference to the case study of mis-selling cases earlier in this chapter, most of the
suspected misleading or deceptive conducts happened in fixed line market, when the
time the type II interconnection policy was implemented in the market in January 2003.
The new competitors at that time contributed to the suspected misleading or deceptive
conducts and more than 150 consumers suffered as a result. However, OFTA did not
establish a breach or not breach decision. This is because future compliance programs
were adopted by those particular operators, who also funded consumer awareness
programs afterwards.

Multiple factors have made it easier for operators to commit more misleading or
deceptive conducts in fixed line service market, including: the implementation of Type
II interconnection policy in the market, more competitors providing services with further
liberalization and competition in the market, advanced technology with bundling
services, and the fact that consumers lack awareness of the changes in the market. Such
rapid changes lead to increased consumers complaints about misleading or deceptive
conduct during the same time period.

But even though consumers lodged their

complaints, it is hard for them to collect the solid evidence due to the salesperson and
information problem (discussed in detail in the slamming conduct case study earlier in
this chapter). These factors combined with the (1) complicated and asymmetric
information problem, (2) changes of the structure and technology in the market, and (3)
consumers lacking awareness of these changes have lead to more consumer
dissatisfaction as indicated with the high number of misleading or deceptive conduct
complaints in the market. Consumers may not have enough human resources to
complain successfully against operators who have professional staff with expert
knowledge and skills. The existing remedy mechanism does not seem strong enough to
deter operators from repeatedly committing the same misleading or deceptive conducts
over and over again. Repeated behaviors have been found in the fixed line service
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markets proved by the analysis of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints of the
telecommunications operators discussed above while consumer protection from the
misleading or deceptive conducts seems to be far from adequate.

Recent newspaper reports show that misleading or deceptive conducts by salespersons
are still happening in the sector. In the SingTao newspaper on November 27, 2006, more
than 300 consumers in Kwan Ching District complained about salespersons from PCCW
delivering misleading information about the merger between Hutchison and PCCW to
lure consumers with a price reduction offer (conduct similar to the case study of
slamming conducts from other operators). When these consumers attempted to contact
the salesperson after finding out they have been misled, they found that the salesperson
has already disappeared.1

(B) Internet Market

Accessing Consumer Protection Level from Consumer Behavior in the Internet
Service Market

With reference to Appendix I, under the liberalization of the Internet service market,
consumers have been enjoying the advanced technology change of faster connection and
transmission speeds. With introducing the broadband internet technology, the dial-up
connection has been phasing out while the number of registered accounts for broadband
access has been increasing dramatically from 2000 to 2006.

1

SingTao Newspaper article “Misleading Telecommunications Services, Three Hundred Cases in Kwai
Ching District” on November 27, 2006
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No. of Registered Customer Account

Figure 7.3
Number of Registered Customer Accounts from 1999 to 2006
3000000

2500000

2000000

Dial-up Access
Broadband Access
Total

1500000

1000000

500000

0
1999
Source* OFTA

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Year

Similar to the situation in fixed line service market, with reference to Table 5.2 and
Table 5.6, consumer complaints in Internet service market has been increasing
dramatically and it is the market with the most complaints among all other markets in
the telecommunications sector. And with reference to the complaints received by OFTA
(Table 5.4 and Table 5.5), most of the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints
happened in Internet service market, making up around 38% of all complaints, mostly
against conduct from sales personnel. Most complaints were lodged against a particular
operator, discussed earlier in the slamming activities case study section. With reference
to slamming conduct case study, most of the suspected misleading or deceptive conducts
happened in Internet service market when type II interconnection policy was
implemented in the market in January 2003 alongside advancing technology introduced
in the market and its subsequent bundling services. Consumers have not yet gained the
sophistication to comprehend the complicated information in the market. These factors
have contributed to the suspected misleading or deceptive conducts and more than 60
consumers have suffered. However, OFTA has yet to establish a breach or not breach
decision because future compliance programs have been adopted by those particular
operators. Those particular operators have also funded consumer awareness program
afterwards.
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On Feb 26, 2007, a MingPao newspaper reported that the transmission speed (uploading
and downloading) through broadband internet claimed by the service operators is often
misleading. The newspaper’s investigation revealed that the actual speed is no more than
30% of the claimed speed. Despite the large number of broadband users nowadays
approximately 1.7 millions registered users), due to technical difficulties, few methods
exist for consumers to gather evidence showing that advertised transmission spends do
meet provided transmission speeds.2 Given that most Internet service contracts are longterm, consumers have a right to know the true nature of the service provided prior to
entering into any kind of contract. Prices for internet service may range from around
$129 to $228 for monthly plan subscription, but the research done by MingPao states
that price and speed are not positively related as operators claim. Consumers who
demand high speed may tend to enter into the most expensive contracts (mainly because
service providers’ claim that the most expensive service plans offer the fastest
connection speeds) may not always get what they are paying for. It is hard to protect
consumers if OFTA does not disclose reliable information to the consumers concerning
their Internet service provider, especially since consumers cannot testify to the actual
speed with their limited knowledge and resources. Even though research has been done
by OFTA, it refuses to disclose the information to the public because it fears that any
disclosure of information may distort the competition in the market. This stance
obviously does not prioritize consumer protection. Without this vital piece of
information, consumers cannot truly make an informed decision, especially in the
complicated, information centric, telecommunications sector. Three out of four main
Internet operators do not make any promises to the transmission speed they claim
(HKBN is the only exception). Although speed test have been conducted by an
independent company for HKBN, it must be pointed out that the independent company
was appointed by HKBN herself. As long as there is no truly independent research
providing information to consumers, there is no protection for consumers about the
information that Internet service providers disclose to the consumers. This lack of

2

Mingpao News Article “Shortcomings of Internet Services, Need for Consumer Protection” on February
26, 2007
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information in turn affects the decisions making ability of consumers entering into longterm contracts. Therefore, in terms of information disclosure, consumers do not get
adequate protection in Internet Service market.

(C) Mobile Market

Accessing Consumer Protection Level from Consumer Behavior in the Mobile
Service Market

According to the structure of the telecommunications sector in mobile market in
Appendix I, implementation of the number portability plan allowed consumers to freely
switch their service providers while keeping their existing numbers. Fierce competition
generate lower subscription fee in mobile service market which benefited consumers.
With reference to Figure 7.4, he mobile number portability plan was implemented on
March 1 1999 in the mobile service market.
Figure 7.4
Statistics on Mobile Number Porting from 1999 to 2006
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However, most misleading or deceptive conducts happened in the mobile service market
in year 1999 due to the very same fierce competition. Operators committed different
kinds of misleading or deceptive conducts in advertisements. Consumers lodged most of
the complaints in the same time period with reference to Table 5.4; while the fierce
competition may also have generated the cartel case in 2000. Also, repeated misleading
behaviors have been found in the market, mostly in connection with the advertisements.
The remedy mechanism does not adequately prevent operators from repeatedly
committing the same misleading or deceptive conducts over and over again. Ultimately,
consumers are the ones who suffer because of this behavior because the level of
consumer protection is inadequate.

(D) IDD Market

Accessing Consumer Protection Level from Consumer Behavior in the IDD Service
Market

With reference to Appendix, consumers enjoy the low fees of IDD calls through fierce
competition allowing more consumers to enjoy the IDD service in Hong Kong.
Figure 7.5
Total Outgoing IDD Traffic Volume from 1998 to 2006
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However, due to the fierce competition, misleading or deceptive conducts have also
occurred in IDD service market throughout the years according to Table 5.6. Operators
have committed different kinds of misleading or deceptive conducts in advertisements.
Also, repeated behaviors have been found in IDD service market, mostly in connection
with the advertisements. Due to the fact that the remedies mechanism do not prevent the
operators from repeatedly committing the same misleading or deceptive conducts,
consumers have suffered by the repeated behaviors of the particular operators because
the level of consumer protection is inadequate.

7.3 Reasons behind the Inadequate Level of Consumer Protection

The role of competition policy in the supply of telecommunication services is to bring
consumer benefits. An increase in the number of service providers in the
telecommunications market results in a wider range of choices for consumers to choose
from. Competition among services providers also results in lower prices for highdemand services. If the competitive system is to serve the needs of consumers, then it
can be argued that the consumers need to be protected from deception or injury while
being provided with adequate price and performance information. Consumer Protection
is therefore an important ingredient of an effective overall approach to competition.

Inadequate Level of Consumer Protection due to the several Reasons:

1) Information Problem: Asymmetric and Complicated Information in the
Telecommunications Sector

In analyzing the consumer protection cases, most complaints received by OFTA are
related to consumer interests, mainly on the misleading or deceptive conducts of the
operators in fixed line and Internet service markets. Misleading or deceptive information
is delivered by either salespersons or the operator’s promotional advertisements. As in
most cases, consumers bring forth complaints which occurred prior to entering into new
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contracts, for example inadequate information provided by the salesperson, omission of
material terms and misrepresentation statements are made by the salespersons.

In order to establish a misleading or deceptive conduct complaint case for OFTA to
investigate, complaints must also be accompanied by adequate evidence. Due to the
difficulty of technical and information problem, consumers very often are not able to
provide such evidence even if have been misled. The telecommunications sector is
unique because it has become a basic utility service that most people consume. It is also
a sector full of complicated information with fast changing technology, which is hard for
consumers to digest prior to entering into service contracts. Also, most contracts in the
telecommunications service sector are on a long-term basis without a “cooling-off”
period scheme in Hong Kong. Once the consumers have been misled by the information
from the advertisement or salesperson, they are bound to have long-term suffering.
Therefore, correct and reliable information is of the utmost importance for consumers in
the telecommunications sector and the best preventative measure to protect consumers
from misleading or deceptive conducts.

However, due to the asymmetric and complicated information problem in the
telecommunications sector, consumers wishing to lodge a complaint to OFTA may not
be able to provide solid evidence. Or sometimes, those misled consumers may not even
realize they have been misled by the operators’ advertising or salespersons’ conduct. A
newspaper in Hong Kong recently reported that the actual transmission speed is much
slower than the claimed transmission speed in the Internet service market. However,
there is no way for consumers to provide solid evidence to make a successful complaint.
Consumers lack the technical know-how and/or human resources to gather such
evidence. Consumer protection may be quite inadequate in terms of information
accessibly and reliability.

Similar complaints were found on July 2, 2002. One complaint states that a door-to-door
salesperson from HKBN promotes broadband Internet service to the complainant and
emphasizes that HKBN could provide dedicated 10Mbps broadband internet service.
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Upon installation, the speed was unreasonably slow, even slower than a 56kbps dial-up
access. The complainant then calls HKBN service hotline to check the speed problem
and is told that the circuit is not a dedicated line, rather it is a shared one. The contract is
18-month long and includes bylines for an early termination fee to cover the installation
charge. However, TA found that there was insufficient evidence showing that the
information provided by the salesperson concerned was misleading and therefore the
complaint could not be established. 3

With these consumer complaint cases, we can see that the level of consumer protection
is relatively low while the amount of inadequate and fraudulent information delivered to
the affected consumers remains unacceptably high. With the absence of class action,
consumers do not have enough resources to make fair complaints against the operators.
The asymmetric power between the operators and leaves the individual consumer with a
huge disadvantage when considering the long and hard suing process. To make matters
worse, consumers must also rely on OFTA to decide whether the complaint is in breach
of the Ordinance or not.

2) Consumers Lack Awareness of the Changes in Government Policy, the Advanced
Technology and the Structure of the Telecommunications Sector

With reference to the huge number of consumer complaints about the slamming
conducts during 2003 and 2004, consumers were found to lack awareness of the
structural changes in the sector. Very often, consumers are clueless about the the
monopoly providing residence services in the fixed line market, the implementation of
the Type II interconnection policy, and the new bundling package through the advanced
technology. This ignorance makes the consumer more vulnerable to misleading or
deceptive conduct of salespersons.

3

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T181/02
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3) Lack of Effectiveness of the 7M Guideline with its Voluntary in Nature in Practice

Most of the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints lodged by consumers are about
the slamming conducts of particular operators in fixed line and Internet service markets.
All these happened after OFTA issued the 7M guideline on May 21, 2003. The
Guideline detailed what specific kinds of conducts were considered misleading or
deceptive and advised operators not to engage in such practices. However, the 7M
Guideline is only voluntary. With reference to the complaint cases received by OFTA,
operators continue to commit misleading or deceptive offences with or without the
guideline. The 7M Guideline alone does not protect the consumers in the least bit.

According to a recent newspaper article, the same slamming conducts were used by
another operator in the sector in November 2006, with more than 300 consumer
complaints altogether. The repeated behavior shows the effectiveness of the voluntary in
nature 7M Guideline was relatively ineffective. The guideline calls for operator funded
consumer awareness programs and publication of “mis-selling” reports. It outlines 9
Best Practice Indicators for a good salesperson and details kind of conduct should be
avoided by the salesperson. However, since the 7M Guideline lacks any legal power, it
did little to prevent misleading or deceptive conducts. Consumers were still harmed in
the end.4

The spirit of the Statement of How Complaints Related to Sections 7K to 7N of the
Telecommunications Ordinance uses an “ordinary reasonable” person’s behavior as a
benchmark5. When considering if any case is in breach, the ordinance asks whether a
reasonable person in the same situation would be hurt or harmed under the suspected
misleading or deceptive conduct. Here, definition of a “reasonable person” becomes all
the more important when deciding whether the complaint is in breach or not. However,
none of these terms - “reasonable person” or “ordinary consumers” - have ever been
4

SingTao Newspaper article “Misleading Telecommunications Services, Three Hundred Cases in Kwai
Ching District” on November 27, 2006
5
“How Complaints Related to Sections 7K to 7N of the Telecommunications Ordinance are Handled by
OFTA, OFTA, December 28, 2005
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clearly defined in the Guideline. 6 Despite this, still uses this guideline to handle
complaints and in deciding whether or not a case has breached.

When investigating the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, OFTA would form
an opinion as to whether a “reasonable person” would be misled or deceived by the
licenses’ conduct. Section 2.15 of the Guideline states that “a licensee’s conduct need
not be proven to have actually misled or deceived anyone for that licensee to be in
breach of section 7M.” The TA does not require evidence that someone has actually
been misled or deceived to find a licensee in breach of section 7M; although such
evidence will often be a persuasive factor in considering whether a “reasonable person”
would have been misled. With this, evidence may not be necessary in order to decide a
complaint to be breach. However, in practice, evidence seems to be a crucial factor in
order to establish the breach cases. Often complainants may not be able to provide
evidence due to information and technical difficulties, and OFTA has concluded these
cases as not breach cases due to insufficient evidence. Obviously, OFTA has not
applied the stated principles when they investigate those complaints.

Another unique situation aroused when complaints were brought to OFTA by two
competitors in the market, not consumers. Competitors lodge complaints due to
misleading or deceptive conducts by other competitors which may distort the levelplaying field. One such complaint argued that service operators should disclose
information for both download and upload speed, not just the traditional download speed.
This is because consumers may also want data on upload bandwidth when making a
decision. However, OFTA claimed that “in the absence of strong evidence that ordinary

6

“Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Guideline”, OFTA, May 21, 2003, section 2.11 “A “reasonable
person” is an ordinary member of the target audience of the conduct; that is a person at whom the conduct
is directed. If, for example, a licensee runs an advertising campaign in the local newspaper, the target
audience (and, accordingly, the care required of the licensee to ensure the” reasonable person” in the target
audience is not misled or deceived) may be different from the target audience and the care which is
required of a licensee when offering a service to large corporate customers. In other words, the level of
comprehension expected, and therefore the stand of care required by the licensee, will differ depending on
the target audience.”, and “Ordinary consumers can usually be taken to have some knowledge of the
product or service they are buying and to be able to read simple terms and conditions. However, if
products are new or complex, knowledge cannot be assumed and consumers will most likely require more
or clearer information about the product or service.”
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consumers view broadband upload speed as a critical or even important issue in their
choice of a broadband service, the case does not accept”.

OFTA seems to protect consumers only in a passive manner. In the complaint mentioned
above, OFTA decided that the complaints were not established because “the
complainant’s claims are essentially technical and in terms of genuine consumer interest
ring hollow in the absence of actual consumers’ complaints.”

7

But because such

complaints have not harmed consumers directly, OFTA places a lower priority on such
cases because it assumes such a complaint does not reflect consumer interest.
Consumers often lack access to vital information in the markets and often may not even
realize a problem exists. Listening to the complaints lodged from one service provider
against another is one way to bridge the information gap of consumers. However, the
lack of attention on competitor versus competitor cases makes improving the situation
nearly hopeless.

OFTA should play a pro-active role in protecting consumers. This stance will allow
OFTA to realize that the telecommunications sector is full of complicated information
and technical difficulties. Consumers often may not be able to personally lodge the
complaints due to many reasons. OFTA can protect consumer interests proactively, by
addressing the problems before consumers even complain about them. OFTA’s current
light-handed regulatory policy may not be able to protect the consumers from
misleading or deceptive conducts.

With reference to the most serious financial penalty complaints discussed in the case
study above, similar misleading or deceptive conducts may generate different kinds of
outcomes and remedies. With no clear definition of “reasonable person” and “ordinary
consumers” and no clear principle adopted in practice to decide breach or no breach of
the 7M Ordinance, it is easier for operators to play with the unclear principles at the cost
of consumer welfare.

7

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T73(b)/05
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4) Remedies Mechanism may not be Strong Enough in Practice

With reference to the analysis of consumer protection cases, most complaint outcomes
only resulted in a written warning or advice requiring the particular operators to correct
their wrong-doing. Such remedy mechanisms do not seem strong enough as repeated
behaviors have been found in all of the service markets in the telecommunications sector.
This practice could perpetuate due to the lenient remedy mechanisms. Recent news
articles show that the same slamming conducts of salespersons, which represent most of
the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints in fixed line and internet service
markets from 2003 to 2004, is still happening in the telecommunications sector from
other operator, this time more than 300 consumer complaints have been received by
Kwai Ching District Union. This shows that the remedies in the slamming conducts
cases are not strong enough. The same misleading conduct simply happens again year
after year. 8

In the internet service market, internet service providers always use the statement of
“exclusively enjoy 10Mbps broadband service” to attract the consumers. However, one
of the complaints points out that such a claim is actually a misleading statement and
OFTA decided this is a breach of section 7M of the Ordinance and a written warning
was issued. The warning explicitly stated that in the future, operators should be aware of
this kind of statement in their advertising.9 However, the recent newspaper article shows
that until this day, internet service providers still use these kinds of misleading
statements to advertise their transmission speed.

With reference to the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints in fixed line and
internet service markets, most of the complaints in these two service markets resulted in
no penalty imposed on any of the particular operators. Instead, “correcting mechanisms”
were adopted by the operators after the offense and they have funded consumer
8

SingTao Newspaper article “Misleading Telecommunications Services, Three Hundred Cases in Kwai
Ching District” on November 27, 2006
9
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T125/03
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awareness programs in the future. This may imply paying money to fund the future
program to settle the wrong doing by the operator. This practice does not seem to make
consumer protection a first priority. Meanwhile, consumers continue to be the first ones
harmed.

OFTA considers the future compliance program to be a mediating factor of the penalty.
However, with reference to the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints against
PCCW, OFTA claims that whether a case is breach or not does not depend on the
subsequent “correcting mechanism” to be done by the operator. Eventually, written
warning was issued to PCCW regarding the misleading or deceptive conduct in a leaflet
advertisement by its sales agency.10 Also, in another case, OFTA claims that “TA has
never accepted that misleading representation made in one medium or at one time can be
remedied by information provided in other media or at other times, this reflects the
general view that initial misleading or deceptive representations cannot be cured or
corrected for section 7M purposes by subsequent acts or mechanism.”11

Since many misleading or deceptive conduct complaints are made in connection to
salespersons, OFTA has considered whether it is the responsibility of the consumers or
salesperson to proactively read and understand the information about the statement of
the advertisement or claims the salesperson has made. In one of the cases, OFTA claims
that “even though the salesperson might not have clearly explained about this orally, a
reasonable person in the complaint position would have made particular reference to the
printed information and sought explanation from the salesperson of its meaning”.12

However, in the SmarTone case (with reference to the 7M Guideline), OFTA stated that
“a licensee should, for example, disclose all material terms and conditions, including
prices; this is particularly the case where a term or condition is particularly stringent or
the consumers might have made a different choice had he or she known about the term
or condition”. In another other case, OFTA claimed that “in the telecom industry,
10

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T141/03
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T7/05
12
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T31/06
11
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however, free offers of various kinds are relatively commonplace. Moreover, it is not for
consumers to double check the viability of such offers from the service providers’
perspective-only that they understand the implications of accepting such offers on their
own circumstance”.13

In yet another case, OFTA stated that “in any case, being the handling person of the
subscription, the salesperson must be taken to have full notice of the information written
on the form.” 14 Sometimes, even the consumers have been repeatedly assured or
confirmed about the material and terms that under their conception while in other cases
salesperson did not mentioned about the material terms at all. 15 Also, whenever the
complaint becomes a marginal case, the benefit always fall into the operator side. This is
because that particular operator has exposed the deficiencies or future compliance
program has been reviewed.16

17

In the telecommunications sector, full of complicated

information, is a fast changing sector in terms of technology improvement. However,
consumers have few methods to access this information. Consumers can only rely on
themselves. Consumers should be protected by an institution which safeguards them
against misleading or deceptive conducts of operators.

5) Salesperson Problem

With reference to the analysis of consumer protection cases, most of the misleading or
deceptive conduct complaints have been against salespersons. Only a small percentage
of them have been found to be breach. One of the reasons may be due to the outsourcing scheme, which makes it harder for consumers to find evidence against the
salespersons. Sales personnel are under the commission basis, and in order to make more
transactions, they may commit misleading conducts or skip the explanation of the
material terms or conditions to the consumers. However, after the complaint has been
lodged with OFTA, the particular salesperson may be difficult to find because they were
13

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T130/05
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T31/06
15
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Complaint, case reference T31/06
16
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Compliant, case reference T31/06
17
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Compliant, case reference T156/04
14

126

Chapter 7 Level of Consumer Protection under the Competition Enforcement Mechanism

hired by an independent salesperson agency and not a contracted employee of the
telecommunications operators. These salespersons are transient and often leave their
current job. Without the salesperson in question appearing before trial, OFTA claims
that not enough evidence can be collected to find the salesperson’s conduct to be breach.
Under this situation, there is no way to protect consumers from the misleading conducts
of the salespersons.

With reference to the slamming conducts case studies in the section earlier, OFTA has
decided not to establish the complaints breaching the Ordinance because operators have
reviewed their compliance program and funded the consumer awareness program. The
result of the program has been recorded in the “mis-selling” report on March 29, 2005,
listing the 9 Best Practice Indicators of the salesperson and what kind of misleading or
deceptive conducts should the salesperson avoid. However, repeated misleading or
deceptive conducts from the salesperson have still been found in the telecommunications
sector with reference to the news article. It shows that the light-handed approach of
OFTA and the voluntary nature of the Guideline may not be enough to protect
consumers or prevent repeated consumer suffering from the same misleading or
deceptive conducts. 18

18

SingTao Newspaper article “Misleading Telecommunications Services, Three Hundred Cases in Kwai
Ching District” on November 27, 2006
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Chapter 8
Explaining the Frequency of Complaints: A Regression Study

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter of the paper, I present a simple econometric model in an attempt to
examine the effect of the structure, conduct and performance of the operators in the
telecommunications sector in Hong Kong, on the frequency of misleading or deceptive
conduct complaint received and handled by OFTA.

8.2 Data Source

The data about the structure, conduct, performance of the operators in the
telecommunications sector in Hong Kong are collected from the annual report and the
financial presentation from different service providers in fixed line, mobile, International
Direct Dialing (IDD) and Internet service markets from 1999 to 2006.

8.3 Empirical Model

I present the function as:
y = f ( x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 ),

(8.1)

where
y = Complaint Ratio
x1 = Number of Competitiors in the Market i in Year t
x2 = Number of Subscribers of Service Operator j in Market i in Year t
x3 = Market Share of Service Operator j in Market i in Year t
x4 = Number of Months which Service Operator j has been Providing Service in Market i in Year t
x5 = A Dummy Variable of Main Business Market of the Operator j in Year t
and Interact it with the Competition Measure
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For operator j in market i in year t and the equation is:

Complaint Ratio jit =

Number of Complaints about Operator j in Market i Recevied in Year t
,
Number of Subscribers of Operator j in Market i in Year t

(8.2)

where Complaint Ratio is a measure of the frequency of complaints received and
handled by OFTA.

The dependent variable y in my model is the ratio of complaint measured by the number
of misleading or deceptive complaints received and handled by OFTA against operator j
in market i over the number of subscribers of operator j in market i, and by equation
with log-linear specification is: 1

ln(Complaint Ratio jit ) = β 0 + β1 ln(Level of Competition it )
+ β 2 ln(Operator Size jit )
+ β 4 ln(Operator Age jit ) + T + u jit

(8.3)

The first independent variable is competition, which is measured by number of
competitors in market i in year t. Operator size is measured either by number of
subscribers or market share for operator j in market i in year t. The last independent
variable is operator age, which is measured by the months of operator j providing
services in market i in year t. The independent variable T is the time trend effect, which
appears to be non-linear, so I use three different ways to input the time trend effect into
the model, for the first way, only the time trend linear variable would be input into the
model. Second is input the time trend linear variable with a policy dummy, where
1

Log-linear specification allows for non-linear relationship between the original variables.
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dummy=1 before the apparent turning point and =0 after the turning point.2 The last way
is to use the year dummy instead of the time trend linear variable.

ln(Complaint Ratio jit ) = β 0 + β1 ln(Level of Competition it )
+ β 2 ln(Operator Size jit )
+ β 4 ln(Operator Age jit ) + T + InteractionTerm jit + u jit

(8.4)

InteractionTerm jit = Main Business of Operator j in Year t * ln(Level of Competition it )

(8.5)

Another regression model is also considered in order to explore more about the effect of
competition on service quality in the main business market. Regression model 8.4
basically is the same as the regression model 8.3, as the three different ways of
considering the time trend effect are also inputting into the model. However, regression
model 8.4 shows whether there is an additional incentive or disincentive to mislead
consumers in an operator‘s main line of business, as opposed to not-so-important market,
due to the reputation effect or “too much to lose” consideration. Therefore, the
regression model 8.4 includes an interaction term, which is a dummy variable of main
business market of the operator j among all the business markets operator j is providing
services in, and interact it with the competition measure, which is the number of
competitors in market i in year t.

3

Summarized descriptive statistics are presented in

Table 8.3.1 and Table 8.3.2.

2

Since OFTA has streamlined its complaints handling procedures, for most of the complaints, they would
just refer to the particular operators, which may be the reason of decreasing number of misleading or
deceptive conduct complaints after 2003.
3
The main business dummy is equal to unity if the service is the operator’s main line of business;
otherwise, it is equal to zero.
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Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics4
Independent
Variables

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

lncomplaintratio

120

0.01423

0.0543

0.0000

0.4855

lncompetition

120

3.6259

1.7232

1.3863

5.5490

lnsubscribers

120

13.0368

1.1725

7.3778

15.0683

lnmarketshare

120

0.1459

0.1124

0.0006

0.5631

lnoperatorage

120

4.0416

0.6375

2.0794

5.1120

Main Market

120

0.5833

0.4951

0.0000

1.0000

Interaction Term

120

1.9686

2.1394

0

5.5491

Table 8.2 Correlation Matrix
Independent
Variables

ln

ln

ln

ln

Main

competition subscribers marketshare operatorage Market

lncompetition

1.0000

lnsubscribers

-0.1438

1.0000

lnmarketshare

0.1404

0.7455

1.0000

lnoperatorage

-0.1898

0.4341

0.0722

1.0000

Main Market

-0.1732

0.5251

0.3546

0.0360

1.0000

0.3491

0.3105

0.3424

-0.1051

0.7810

Interaction
Term

Interaction
Term

4

1.0000

Ln(complaintratio) and ln(marketshare) are calculated as ln(complaintratio+1) and ln(marketshare+1)
respectively.
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8.4 Results

Estimation (8.3) is by ordinary least squares multiple log linear regression model and the
results are shown in the following tables. Results of regression model with the time trend
linear variable are shown in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4. Different robust methods have
been used in the model. For instance, using different measures of operators’ size, this
shows in both Table 8.3 and Table 8.4, putting either number of subscribers or market
share in the model as the measures of operators’ size. 5 Besides, another robust method
is taking or not taking cluster company effect, which shows in Table 8.3, is without
taking cluster company effect in the regression model, and Table 8.4 is with taking
cluster company effect in the model.6 Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 show the result of the
regression model with both the time trend linear variable and the policy dummy variable.
Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 show the result of the regression model with using the year
dummy in the model. The result in Table 8.5 and Table 8.6, and Table 8.7 and Table 8.8
are different, as Table 8.5 and Table 8.7 are without taking cluster company effect and
Table 8.6 and Table 8.8 are taking cluster company effect.

5

Two different measures of operator’s size would not be included in the same regression model, since
there appears to be a high degree of multcollinearity between two of the explanatory variables, with the
correlation between these two variables is r=0.75 with reference to the Table 8.2 Correlation Matrix.
6
Taking cluster company effect into account means one company may provide service in more than one
market, single company may be correlated as it appears in different markets, cluster company effects
means taking this effect into account.
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Table 8.3 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect 7
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0732

0.0618

0.0791

0.5873

(2.49)**

(1.90)*

(2.88)***

(1.95)*

-0.0278

-0.0272

(-5.51)***

(-5.51)***

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.0897

-0.9085

(-2.03)**

(-2.07)**

-0.0087

-0.0195

-0.0056

-0.0212

(-0.95)

(-1.97)*

(-0.75)

(-2.79)***

0.0018

-0.0009

(0.59)

(-0.26)

-0.0447

-0.0045

-0.0438

-0.0045

(-2.57)**

(-0.26)

(-2.53)**

(-0.27)

-0.2665

-0.2151

-0.2863

-0.2047

(-2.56)**

(-1.88)*

(-2.92)***

(-1.91)*

-0.2703

-0.1905

-0.2874

-0.1812

(-2.58)**

(-1.66)

(-2.86)***

(-1.66)*

0.2821

-0.0109

0.2575

-0.0016

(3.45)***

(-0.16)

(3.68)***

(-0.03)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.3408

0.1919

0.3387

0.1914

Trend

M18

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

7

Due to the data limitations, the sample size in the regression model is 120, which is different from the
total number of 354 misleading or deceptive conduct complaint cases OFTA have handled from 1999 to
2006.
8
M1 means fixed line service market, M2 means IDD service market, M3, means Internet service market,
and Con means the mobile service market.
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Table 8.4 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect9
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0732

0.0618

0.0791

0.5873

(2.39)**

(1.91)*

(2.74)**

(2.24)**

-0.0278

-0.0272

(-2.17)*

(-2.08)*

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.0897

-0.9085

(-2.38)**

(-2.42)**

-0.0087

-0.0195

-0.0056

-0.0212

(-1.41)

(-1.37)*

(-0.82)

(-1.28)

0.0018

-0.0009

(1.57)

(-0.43)

-0.0447

-0.0045

-0.0438

-0.0045

(-1.38)

(-0.27)

(-1.37)

(-0.27)

-0.2665

-0.2151

-0.2863

-0.2047

(-2.41)**

(-1.90)*

(-2.72)**

(-2.21)*

-0.2703

-0.1905

-0.2874

-0.1812

(-2.21)*

(-1.68)

(-2.43)**

(-1.89)*

0.2821

-0.0109

0.2575

-0.0016

(1.81)

(-0.22)

(1.62)

(-0.03)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.3408

0.1919

0.3387

0.1914

Trend

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

9

The R-square may seem to be relatively lower, however, after including the year dummy; the R-square
improves a lot.
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Table 8.5 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0660

0.0547

(2.20)**

(1.64)

-0.0278
(-2.14)***

Market Share

-0.0900
(-2.03)**

Operator Age

-0.0099

-0.0208

(-1.08)

(-2.08)**

0.0042

0.0016

(1.12)

(0.39)

-0.0159

-0.0158

(-1..07)

(-0.96)

-0.0434

-0.0031

(-2.48)**

(-0.18)

-0.2421

-0.1909

(-2.28)**

(-1.62)

-0.2462

-0.1666

(-2.29)**

(-1.41)

0.2928

-0.0005

(3.56)***

(-0.01)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3474

0.1985

Trend

Policy Dummy

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.6 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0660

0.0547

(1.83)*

(1.44)

-0.0278
(-2.14)*

Market Share

-0.0900
(-2.44)**

Operator Age

-0.0099

-0.0208

(-1.66)

(-1.55)

0.0042

0.0016

(1.31)

(0.43)

-0.0159

-0.0158

(-1.12)

(-1.12)

-0.0434

-0.0031

(-1.29)

(-0.18)

-0.2421

-0.1909

(-1.88)*

(-1.44)

-0.2462

-0.1666

(-1.75)

(-1.25)

0.2928

-0.0005

(1.90)*

(-0.01)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3474

0.1985

Trend

Policy Dummy

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

136

Chapter 8 Explaining the Frequency of Complaints: A Regression Study
Table 8.7 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0698

0.0552

(2.14)**

(1.52)

-0.0279
(-5.44)***

Market Share

-0.0905
(-2.00)**

Operator Age

-0.0083

-0.0189

(-0.989)

(-1.85)*

-0.0436

-0.0021

(-2.39)**

(-0.12)

-0.2544

-0.1917

(-2.21)**

(-1.50)

-0.2574

-0.1665

(-2.22)**

(-1.63)

-0.0026

0.0095

(-0.09)

(0.31)

0.0124

0.0288

(0.48)

(1.01)

-0.0117

-0.0006

(-0.50)

(-0.02)

0.0059

0.0152

(0.26)

(0.61)

0.0154

0.0209

(0.71)

(0.86)

0.0169

0.0183

(0.77)

(0.75)

0.0063

0.0057

(0.29)

(0.23)

0.2893

-0.0185

(2.90)***

(-0.20)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3663

0.2192

M1

M2

M3

Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.8 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0698

0.0552

(2.03)*

(1.61)

-0.0279
(-2.15)*

Market Share

-0.0905
(-2.32)**

Operator Age

-0.0083

-0.0189

(-1.38)

(-1.65)

-0.0436

-0.0021

(-1.33)

(-0.13)

-0.2544

-0.1917

(-2.08)*

(-1.60)

-0.2574

-0.1665

(-1.91)*

(-1.40)

-0.0026

0.0095

(-0.25)

(0.82)

0.0124

0.0288

(0.61)

(1.07)

-0.0117

-0.0006

(-1.02)

(-0.06)

0.0059

0.0152

(0.48)

(1.39)

0.0154

0.0209

(1.69)

(1.79)

0.0169

0.0183

(1.09)

(1.22)

0.0063

0.0057

(0.73)

(0.87)

0.2893

-0.0185

(2.02)*

(-0.36)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3663

0.2192

M1

M2

M3

Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Estimation (8.4) is by ordinary least squares multiple log linear regression model and the
results are shown in the following tables. Different robust methods have also been used
in the model, which is the same as the estimation (8.3). With inputting the interaction
term variable into the regression model, results are shown from Table 8. 9 and Table
8.10, with the time trend linear variable is input into the regression model. Table 8.11
and Table 8.12 show the results of using both the time trend linear variable and policy
dummy in the regression model. Table 8.13 and Table 8.14 are the regressions result
with using the year dummy in the model. Each pair of tables are different with each
other as the former one is without taking the cluster company effect and the later one is
taking the cluster company effect.
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Table 8.9 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0732

0.0618

0.0787

0.5871

(2.49)**

(1.90)*

(2.86)***

(1.94)*

-0.0278

-0.0283

(-5.51)***

(-5.56)***

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.9115

(-1.99)**

(-2.02)**

-0.0087

-0.0194

-0.0041

-0.0211

(-0.95)

(-1.91)*

(-0.53)

(-2.74)***

0.0002

0.0022

0.0001

(0.06)

(0.87)

(0.03)

Interaction Term

Trend

-0.0903

0.0018

-0.0009

(0.59)

(-0.27)

-0.0447

-0.0042

-0.0418

-0.0044

(-2.57)**

(-0.24)

(-2.39)**

(-0.25)

-0.2665

-0.2156

-0.2894

-0.2048

(-2.56)**

(-1.87)*

(-2.95)**

(-1.90)*

-0.2703

-0.1906

-0.2865

-0.1810

(-2.58)**

(-1.65)

(-2.85)***

(-1.65)

0.2821

-0.0117

0.2619

-0.0019

(3.45)***

(-0.17)

(3.73)***

(-0.03)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.3408

0.1919

0.3431

0.1914

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.10 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0732

0.0618

0.0787

0.5871

(2.49)**

(1.92)*

(2.71)**

(2.20)*

-0.0278

-0.0283

(-5.51)***

(-2.14)*

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.9115

(-2.52)**

(-2.59)**

-0.0087

-0.0194

-0.0041

-0.0211

(-0.95)

(-1.25)*

(-0.57)

(-1.22)

0.0002

0.0022

0.0001

(0.08)

(2.43)**

(0.04)

Interaction Term

Trend

-0.0903

0.0018

-0.0009

(0.59)

(-0.50)

-0.0447

-0.0042

-0.0418

-0.0044

(-2.57)**

(-0.22)

(-1.30)

(-0.23)

-0.2665

-0.2156

-0.2894

-0.2048

(-2.56)**

(-1.94)*

(-2.72)**

(-2.22)*

-0.2703

-0.1906

-0.2865

-0.1810

(-2.58)**

(-1.68)

(-2.43)**

(-1.66)*

0.2821

-0.0117

0.2619

-0.0019

(3.45)***

(-0.21)

(1.62)

(-0.03)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.3408

0.1919

0.3431

0.1914

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.11 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.066

0.0548

(2.20)**

(1.64)

-0.0288
(-5.57)***

Market Share

-0.0910
(-2.00)**

Operator Age

-0.0080

-0.0206

(-0.84)

(-2.01)**

0.0022

0.0003

(0.87)

(0.11)

0.0041

0.0016

(1.08)

(0.38)

-0.0166

-0.0159

(-1.11)

(-0.96)

-0.0412

-0.0026

(-2.33)**

(-0.15)

-0.2472

-0.1915

(-2.32)**

(-1.62)

-0.2467

-0.1665

(-2.30)**

(-1.41)

0.2941

-0.0017

(3.57)***

(-0.02)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3519

0.1986

Interaction Term

Trend

Policy Dummy

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.12 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.066

0.0548

(1.84)*

(1.44)

-0.0288
(-2.16)**

Market Share

-0.0910
(-2.64)**

Operator Age

-0.0080

-0.0206

(-1.24)

(-1.39)

0.0022

0.0003

(2.34)**

(0.15)

0.0041

0.0016

(1.30)

(0.44)

-0.0166

-0.0159

(-1.16)

(-1.10)

-0.0412

-0.0026

(-1.23)**

(-0.13)

-0.2472

-0.1915

(-1.91)**

(-1.46)

-0.2467

-0.1665

(-1.77)**

(-1.25)

0.2941

-0.0017

(1.84)*

(-0.03)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3519

0.1986

Interaction Term

Trend

Policy Dummy

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.13 Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0704

0.0553

(2.16)**

(1.52)

-0.0290
(-5.51)***

Market Share

-0.0924
(-1.99)**

Operator Age

-0.0061

-0.0186

(-0.63)

(-177)

0.0025

0.0005

(0.97)

(0.19)

-0.0412

-0.0013

(-2.24)**

(-0.07)

-0.2617

-0.1931

(-2.26)**

(-1.51)

-0.2594

-0.1666

(-2.23)**

(-1.30)

0.0001

0.0104

(0.03)

(0.34)

0.0150

0.0295

(0.58)

(1.02)

-0.0096

-0.0001

(-0.41)

(-0.00)

0.0079

0.0158

(0.35)

(0.63)

0.0181

0.0215

(0.82)

(0.88)

0.0191

0.0188

(0.87)

(0.77)

0.0078

0.0061

(0.35)

(0.25)

0.2875

-0.0216

(2.88)***

(-0.23)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3720

0.2195

Interaction Term

M1

M2

M3

Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 8.14 Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect
Independent Variables
Competition

Subscribers

0.0704

0.0553

(2.05)*

(1.30)

-0.0290
(-2.18)*

Market Share

-0.0924
(-2.49)**

Operator Age

-0.0061

-0.0186

(-0.98)

(-1.43)

0.0025

0.0005

(2.39)**

(0.24)

-0.0412

-0.0013

(-1.26)

(-0.07)

-0.2617

-0.1931

(-2.13)*

(-1.64)

-0.2594

-0.1666

(-1.96)*

(-1.40)

0.0001

0.0104

(0.08)

(0.94)

0.0150

0.0295

(0.79)

(1.22)

-0.0096

-0.0001

(-0.75)

(-0.00)

0.0079

0.0158

(0.64)

(1.65)

0.0181

0.0215

(1.70)

(1.66)

0.0191

0.0188

(1.18)

(1.21)

0.0078

0.0061

(0.84)

(0.88)

0.2875

-0.0216

(1.90)*

(-0.40)

Observations

120

120

R-square

0.3720

0.2195

Interaction Term

M1

M2

M3

Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market.

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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I estimate the complaint ratio to the structure, conduct and performance of the operators
in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. I summarize here some of my key
findings.

For the log linear regression model, it is generated that:

i)

More competition, which in terms of more competitors has a positive effect on
the frequency of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints and the effect, is
statistically significant.

ii)

Number of the service subscribers in particular service market has a negative
effect on the frequency of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints and the
effect is statistically significant. Thus, small operators tend to receive more
complaints about misleading or deceptive conduct.

iii)

The period of particular service operator providing services in corresponding
market, has a negative effect on the frequency of misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints and the effect is statistically significant. Newer operators
tend to receive more misleading or deceptive conduct complaints.

8.5 Conclusion

With the simple regression model, it has showed that, more competition in the market is
more likely to trigger misleading or deceptive conducts resulting in increased complaints,
also, smaller operators with smaller number of subscribers or lower market share, are
more likely to generate consumer complaint regarding misleading or deceptive conducts.
Besides, newer operators are more likely to commit misleading or deceptive conducts.
Also, with taking the interaction term into the regression model, results are shown that
more misleading or deceptive conduct happened in the main business market of the
operator than the sub business markets under the over-competitive environment, which
can be explained that the operators care more about subscribers number in their main
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business in order to maintain its reputation in their main business market and to trade off
the service quality. Since there is a lack of econometric analysis on complaint cases in
the telecommunications sector, therefore, my econometric study could provide an insight,
which is to generate a pattern of structure, conduct and performance, on the misleading
or deceptive conduct complaints.
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Chapter 9
Policy Implications and Recommendations

According to the findings from analyzing the consumer protection cases in the
telecommunications sector, most consumer complaints are in relation to misleading or
deceptive conducts. Misleading or deceptive conducts can have serious economic
consequences, especially when directed towards large audiences or when they take place
over a long period of time. They can affect both competitors who are engaging in honest
promotional efforts as well as consumers who use their services. Therefore, consumers
need additional protection against misleading or deceptive conducts of operators in the
telecommunications sector. However, consumers are unable to make use of their rights
due to the lack of awareness and/or ignorance. In order to remedy this helpless position,
it is necessary to adopt measures to safeguard the interest of consumers. The following
are possible solutions I propose to address the perceived problems discussed in chapter 7.
These measures may be best suited for the unique situation in the telecommunications
sector in Hong Kong, a highly competitive sector where operators are often looking for
new and innovative ways to market their services to consumers.

9.1 Policy Implications and Recommendations

Behavioral Problem

A) Enhance Information Accessibility, Availability, and Validity

From analyzing the consumer protection cases, most consumer interests’ complaints
received by OFTA related to misleading or deceptive conducts of the operators in fixed
line and Internet service markets. Most often, misleading or deceptive information was
delivered by either the salesperson or the operator’s own promotional advertisements.
Also in many cases, consumers already have complaints prior to entering into new
contracts. These complaints include inadequate information, omission of material terms
and misrepresentation statements made by the salesperson.

148

Chapter 9 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Also, asymmetric information problem is found in such a complicated and fast changing
telecommunications sector. Therefore, information disclosure becomes the key
consumer protection mechanism, especially as the telecommunications sector become
increasingly complex and diverse. Consumers also have difficulties lodging complaints
because they lack or cannot provide the evidence necessary to successfully contest a
complaint case.

One way to protect consumers from the misleading or deceptive conducts of operators is
to enhance information validity. This can empower consumers and prevent consumers
from being misled. Government could require that operators disclose certain information
beyond the traditional material terms and conditions. The additional information might
include information about the service provider itself or the services they provide, etc.
Knowing these facts beforehand could affect consumers’ decision-making.

Analyzing the complaint cases also revealed that less educated and busy consumers are
more likely to be misled. This may due to the high information costs and low incentives
problem. Less-educated consumers may have a more difficult time understanding the
complicated information within contract terms while well-educated consumers may have
low incentives to fully understand the contact terms. OFTA should pay special
consideration to this high information cost problem. For instance, OFTA could provide
easier information for less educated consumers. Also, immediate and quick tips should
be provided for busy consumers in order to address the high information cost and low
incentive problem.

Given the strong level of information asymmetry, OFTA and the Consumer Council
have played an important role in providing information to consumers, helping
consumers make the right personal decision. However, unlike the Consumer Council,
OFTA usually delivers information on internet, a strategy whose effectiveness seems to
be relatively low. 1 Therefore, OFTA should complement the Consumer Council by

1

The reason for relatively low effectiveness is that not so many people would check out OFTA website
very often due to the high information cost and low incentive problems mentioned above.
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publishing more information for consumers and delivering it in different ways. For
example, they could distribute handy pamphlets and information guides to consumers, or
report the information via news channel on television and radio.

For professional people with resources, OFTA could be an agency to help consumers to
disclose technical and complicated information. One example is publishing the actual
transmission speed of Internet service from each Internet service provider; information
which consumers would not be able to obtain themselves. OFTA could perform an
important role to enhance information availability in this sense. All the information
should be easily accessible to consumers through different channels such as newspaper
and TV media. Flyers could also be distributed to the residential areas in order to
enhance the information accessibility. Government should be more proactive in
promoting efficient regulation in order to protect consumers. Besides empowering
consumers by allowing them to obtain more information about the services they
consume, they could become a proactive medium checkers to keep track of misleading
or deceptive conduct by operators.

B) Consumer Education and Increase Consumers Awareness of the Changes in the
Sector

From the consumer protection cases analyzed, most consumers have suffered from
misrepresentation statements made by the salesperson (such as the fabricated mergers or
cooperation news about the operators) or the particular new competitor being the only
service provider the consumers can use at their buildings (forcing consumers to switch
service providers if they move into a new residence). Theses conducts became more
commonplace when new competitors starts providing residential services to consumers.
Consumers are misled easily, often because consumers are not familiar with the changes
of the telecommunication sectors, including the change of technology, structure and the
government

polices

in

the

telecommunications

sectors.

Information

in

the

telecommunications is also not open and transparent enough; consumers therefore know
less about the sector and are then easily misled.
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Therefore, increasing consumers’ awareness of all these changes is important in the
prevention of operator malpractices. Consumers could obtain this kind of information
through education. OFTA should provide more education programs to consumers. Even
though the Consumer Council has been trying to educate consumers, without the help of
OFTA, the sophisticated and detailed information would not be delivered to consumers
in an effective fashion.

Consumer education is important. Government is responsible for checking the
information that operators deliver, but with educated consumers, a second deterrent
exists to prevent malpractices from operators. Consumers have a right be educated and a
right to be heard. Consumers should know their rights and have the ability to excise
them. They should not depend on the good sense of businessmen; they should attend
trainings arranged by OFTA or the Consumer Council. Due to the reasons that most
consumers may not have time to attain the training program, volunteers could play an
important role here. By allocating volunteers to attend the education program and
promote the information to the consumers. Consumer activists should be invited to speak
to the volunteers on consumer rights and explain the remedies available under the
ordinances to protect them. This is also a good way to make use of the volunteers who
would like to devote their time and effort to the community.

The competition approach does not simply require the market to be competitive, but also
calls on notions of transparency to make the market truly sensitive to consumer demands.
This requires information to be provided to consumers and consumers to be educated in
order to enable them to utilize this information.

C) Announce to Public on a Regular Basis about the Number of Consumer
Complaints

In 2003, OFTA had received a relatively large number of complaints. To mitigate this
problem, OFTA decided to refer the complaints back to the particular operators. This
practice may have come about because OFTA is a regulator, and handling complaints
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may not be their primary function or concern. Since 2003, OFTA’s practice of back
referral of complaints to operators has left consumers without an independent
association to represent their interest with legal power and lodge complaints to the
operators. An independent body with legal power and a strong stance backing consumer
interests is needed. Even though the Consumer Council has done a lot for consumers,
due to the lack of legal and investigative power, it is no more than a mediator between
the consumer and the operator. The Consumer Council and OFTA are not statutory
disputes authority. Under the existing system, consumers lodge their complaints
individually; there is no class action in Hong Kong. Also, when consumers raise their
complaints, they may not have enough information or resources to challenge the service
providers. An effective regulator of the markets, equipped with the resources and proper
enforcement powers, lawsuit funds, and access to decision-markers, is required to ensure
that consumers are protected and their concerns are timorously addressed. Therefore, in
order to enhance the level of consumer protection, an independent body, which is
empowered to represent the consumers to lodge complaints and have professional
knowledge about the telecommunications sector, is very much needed.

On the other hand, consumers should have the right to know more about the sector.
OFTA should publicize the number of complaints about misleading or deceptive
conducts of each of the operators on a regular basis on their website or even in
newspaper or media channels so consumers can know more about which operators are
engaging in misleading or deceptive conducts in the markets. Under publicity scheme,
not only consumers will be benefited by knowing more about the sector, the competitors
in the sector, who always play fair with the rules, could benefit as well. This scheme
would deter the malpractices from the “bad” operators. The ‘name and shame’ policy
currently employed by the OFTA is effective as OFTA simply publishes the statement
and does not widely inform the public.
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D) Salesperson Training and Enhance the Operators’ Responsibility of the
Salesperson

Through analyzing the detailed complaint cases, complaints against the salespersons
dominated most of the complaints, possibly reflecting the principal agent problem.
Under such a cut-throat competitive environment, sales recruitment policy is the most
efficient and effective way to compete with other operators. Some operators may want to
be “honest” to the consumers, however, due to the lower cost of hiring salespersons
from agencies rather than employing them directly, they would choose to maintain the
out-sourcing scheme in order to lower their operating cost. This could account for the
reason that operators do not attempt to hire only “honest” salespersons to gain
competitive an advantage over others.

Operators should be responsible for their salespersons’ conducts even they are hired by
independent agencies. The salespersons are helping the operator with their business,
therefore salesperson conduct is related to them. Operators cannot just walk away from
the responsibility for the salespersons’ behaviors and conducts.

Also, there is a lack of staff training for the salespersons employed by the independent
agency. More training programs should be provided for these salespersons; even they are
hired under commission scheme. There should be a balance policy that once they
commit any form of misleading or deceptive conducts, their commission would be taken
back, in order to maintain a well-behaved atmosphere.

Besides, a new section should be added to the contract to officially outline in black and
white the promises the salesperson makes and promotional special offers they provide to
the consumer. The new section in the contract should require both salesperson and
consumer signatures. This suggestion could enhance the confidence of consumers in
trusting the salesperson. Also, if any side has future disagreements or arguments, this
section of the contract helps to provide the solid evidence.
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The suggestion to provide more training to salespersons requires that such training
programs explain, in detail, what kind of conduct should be avoided doing during the
selling process. The program should also clearly state the consequences for committing
such offenses. OFTA should require all salespersons follow the guidelines, or else they
will receive a penalty from OFTA as well. But due to the voluntary nature of such
training programs, the effectiveness is relatively low and the misleading or deceptive
conduct of salespersons continue to occur. Therefore, the most effective way is to
empower the training guideline is to make the training mandatory to in order to prevent
the same malicious conduct from repeatedly occurring.

E) Cooling-off Period should be Introduced in the Telecommunications Sector

The Telecommunications sector is unique since it is a widely used service that most
Hong Kong residents consume. However, the sector is full of complicated information
with fast changing technology. Consumers often have difficulty digesting the
information prior to entering a service contract. And without adequate information,
consumers are easily misled. Since most telecommunications service contracts are longterm without a “cooling-off” period scheme in, once consumers are misled by the
information from the advertisement or salesperson, they are subject to long-term
suffering as well. Therefore, correct, reliable, and easily digestible information is
important for consumers in the telecommunications sector in order to protect consumers
from misleading or deceptive conducts.

“Cooling-off period” is designed to protect consumers from high-pressure sales
techniques, provide a time period for consumers to reflect upon the agreement, eliminate
any contracts closed under forced, unclear or even misleading circumstances.
Consumers should have the right to ‘free to dissolve’ the contract when unfair treatment
was used in the selling process or a valid reason exist for contract termination. Another
factor which affects long-term contracts is that by the time the contract period ends, the
service charge may be much higher under the old versus the new contract terms. This is
because of some operators’ policy when a consumer’s contract ends, instead of cutting
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the services, operators charge the “original” price of the services without notifying the
consumers. In this case, many consumers may need to pay a much higher fee eventually.

In Australia, the Victorian Fair Trading Act provides a 10-day cooling-off period for
both door-to-door and telemarketing contracts. With door-to-door sales, the 10-day
period commences from, and includes, the day on which the agreement is made. With
telemarketing contracts, the time for the cooling-off period is from, and includes, the day
on which the consumer receives the agreement document. Within this period, the
contract can be rescinded by mutual consent and the contract deemed void.

2

Also, in

2005, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) registered three
industry codes that will bring about the introduction of “cooling off” periods for sales of
certain telecommunications services. The new cooling-off rules will apply underlining
the fact that both providers and their consumers have a vested interest in maintaining
fairness in their dealings with one another. 3

Therefore, the cooling-off period could give consumers more time to consider their
purchasing decisions. If the consumer is not satisfied with the services offered by their
new provider, they have the option of having their old services restored without penalty
during the cooling-off period.

F) Strengthen the Enforcement Mechanism in Practice, treating Misleading or
Deceptive Conducts as part of the Competition Policy and Empower it as a Law

With consumer protection cases analyzed, enforcement mechanism may not be strong
enough to deter the misleading or deceptive conducts from the telecommunications
service operators. Most consumer complaints cases concerning the slamming conducts
of the operators happen after the 7M Guideline was issued (detailing what kinds of
conducts operators should avoid) and the consumer awareness program (funded by the
particular operators). Repeated behaviors are found after all the guideline or programs
2

Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (2005) “State Laws must be heeded”, TIO Talks Issue 35
3 Australian Communications Industry Forum (2004), “Working to Ensure Fair Trading” Australian
Communications Industry Forum Webpage http://www.acif.org.au
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have been issued and adopted in the sector, proving the ineffectiveness of the Guideline
and the program. This could be the reason that the Guideline and the code of practice
issued by OFTA are all voluntary in nature, with no legal power. Therefore, the
Guideline should be empowered, with clear principles stated and adopted, and
implemented while handling complaints.

Also, making misleading or deceptive conducts a legal provision should be considered.
Setting fair game rules is not distorting the market but ensuring the playing field is level
for consumers as well as competitors. Whilst not devaluing the role competition policy
plays in providing consumer benefits, some countries have gone as far as explicitly
recognizing the importance of regulation in ensuring consumer protection in a
liberalized telecommunications markets.

Therefore, the existing competition policy in the telecommunications sector should
include the provision on misleading or deceptive conducts, including the slamming
conducts. Involving provision for the misleading or deceptive conducts into a legal law
is one of the methods to improve quality and accuracy of marketplace information and
discourage deceptive marketing practices.

In Australia, slamming in the telecommunications sector, which refers to the practice of
switching consumers to another carrier without their permissions, is illegal. While high
pressures selling tactics, especially when used on vulnerable or disadvantaged
consumers, place operators at risk of breaching the Trade Practices Act 4

In Canada, competition is enforced by an independent law enforcement agency. The
Competition Bureau contains provisions addressing false or misleading representations
and deceptive marketing practices in promoting the supply or use of a product or any
business interest. All representations, in any form, that are false or misleading in a

4

“The Fair Call Guide For Consumers”, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Australia
2004
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material respect are subject to the Act. If a representation influences a consumer to buy
or use the product or service advertised, it is material.

The Act contains both civil and criminal “misleading advertising” provisions. The civil
provision prohibits representations to the public for the purpose of promoting products
or business interest that are false or misleading in a material respect. The criminal
provision, which is substantially similar, provides that a misleading representation may
be criminal if made intentionally (i.e. “knowingly or recklessly”)5.

A court or the Competition Tribunal may order a person engaged in misleading
advertising to cease the conduct, and/or publish a corrective notice and/or pay an
“administrative monetary penalty” of up to $50,000 ($100,000 for corporations).
Criminal penalties include unlimited fines (in the discretion of the court) and/or
imprisonment.6

On the part of government, consumer protection is a responsibility to be undertaken in
the general interest of society. Enforcement of various laws and amending existing law
to protect consumer interests should be considered a fundamental government function.
Representations of consumer groups should also be associated with the policy-making
bodies set up by government. In order to improve the level of consumer protection in the
telecommunications services sector, a comprehensive competition policy and authority
should meet the benchmarks of: independence, openness, accessibility, fairness, public
accountability and effectiveness. These benchmarks have been posited as appropriate
measure of the utility of complaint handling arrangements.

5

Competition Act, paragraph 74.01(1)(a) Under Civil Provisions “False or misleading representations”,
Competition Bureau, Canada http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca
6
Competition Act, section 52 Under Criminal Provisions of “False or misleading representations”
Competition Bureau, Canada http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca
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Structural Problem

As illustrated in the regression study, more competition in the market generates more
misleading or deceptive conducts in the telecommunications sector. An overly
competitive market can trigger operators into mislead consumers in order to survive;
smaller operators and newer operators are more likely to have misleading behavior as
well. Therefore, ensuring the number of competitors in the market are at an optimal level
could help prevent over-competition in the market, and hence to increase the level of
consumer protection. However, it may be hard for the Government to determine the
optimal number of competitors in the telecommunications sector while provoking a
controversial argument at the same time.7 Therefore, through protecting consumers from
the misleading or deceptive conducts of the operators, the level of competition could be
maintained at a more efficient level. Adequate consumer protection can drive out
inefficient competitors, ensuring healthy and fair competition between well-behaved
competitors. Introducing competition and liberalizing the markets alone in the
telecommunications sector may not be enough to protect consumers. Strengthening
consumer protection regulation along with liberalization could constitute a safeguard
against the misleading or deceptive conduct of operators; hence ensuring vigorously and
effective competition in the telecommunications sector.

9.2 Conclusion

All the suggestions and recommendation proposed in this Chapter are beneficial to
society. They complement each other and cannot be ranked in order of importance.
Effectiveness may be further enhanced as they are all implemented. Some of the
proposed solutions could also be implemented in other sector of similar nature and with
similar sales policy, i.e. such as the broadcasting sector. As paid television has become
more popular nowadays and the service nature is similar to the telecommunications
7

Conceptually, competition could maintain an optimal level when operators are operated at the minimum
efficiency scale given the market demand. However, optimal number of licenses is hard to be determined
in practice in my regression model. I have tried to apply another regression model in order to find out the
optimal number of competitors in the market. But due to data limitation, the results do not show that it is
statistically significant. Detailed results are attached in Appendix II
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service, the proposed recommendations may help prevent the consumers against the
malpractices generated from the service providers.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion

10.1 Concluding Remarks

Introduction of competition in the telecommunication sector will benefit consumers;
however, fierce competition may actually harms consumers. Due to fierce competition,
competitors may undertake certain misleading or deceptive conducts in order to lure
consumers to consume their services. This contradictory relationship not only harms
consumers, it also negatively impacts well-behaved competitors. Hence the social
welfare is distorted because some competitors chose not to play by the rules.

In order to ensure an effective and efficient competition policy, consumer protection
should also be considered. The competition policy in the telecommunications sector in
Hong Kong has thus far been effective as measured by its highly competitive and highly
liberalized nature. However, a highly competitive and liberalized marketplace alone may
not provide adequate consumer protection. The objective of competition policy should
also enhance consumer interests. Ensuring that the policy allows both benefits and
protections for consumers to coexist will generate a more effective competition policy.
Therefore, a comprehensive review is needed in order to see whether there is sufficient
protection for consumers. This is also why examining the consumer protection level in
the telecommunications policy under the existing competitive market is so crucial,
especially since Hong Kong is considering the introduction of a general competition law.
Future policy will benefit from the real world lessons learned from the
telecommunications sector.

One of the oddities of competition policy literature is the degree to which it neglects the
aspect of consumer interest. It is true that policies designed to enhance and maintain
competition place consumers benefit into their consideration. Thus one can see
competition as a device for keeping prices down, placing pressure on profit margins and
by stimulating productive efficiency and technological changes. On a greater scale, one
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can also see competition as an ingredient necessary for the achievement of overall
optimum allocation of resources. In these senses, competition does conceive the
consumer as the main ultimate beneficiary. Nevertheless, the assumption in conventional
literature that if the government creates conditions of effective competition through legal
enforcement, then consumers can safely enter the marketplace is inadequate, or at least
incomplete. The truth is, competitive market conditions alone cannot fully protect
consumers, additional policies on top of efficient competition can more completely
protect consumers.

However there are differences of opinion as to how much additional protection the
consumer needs. One extreme sees the consumer as a wretched victim of companies’
marketing manipulations, constantly bombarded with largely persuasive advertising
messages, which are sometimes misleading or even untrue. In the telecommunications
sector, most consumer-related complaints fall under misleading or deceptive conduct.
These considerations raise the research question of how the consumer is going to be
protected under the existing mechanism and whether or not there is adequate protection
for consumers in the telecommunications sector.

In Hong Kong, the number of consumer complaints in the telecommunications sector
today has dramatically increased threefold since 2000, higher than any other sector in
Hong Kong. According to the consumer-related complaints received and handled by
OFTA, most of the complaints pertained to misleading or deceptive conduct. The high
level of consumer complaints in the telecommunications sector may indicate that there is
a high level of consumer dissatisfaction within the telecommunications sector. In order
to assess whether the level of consumer protection and consumer welfare under the
competitive market in the telecommunications sector is adequate or not, consumer
complaints were examined to identify the problem areas in the sector. Lessons can be
learned from past mistakes so that future legislation governing this area will be better
adapted to cope with the needs of the consumers.
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From the Structure-Conduct-Performance model used in my study, through examining
the structure, conduct, and consumer behavior in each of the markets in the
telecommunications sector, the level of consumer protection in the telecommunications
sector is seen to be relatively low. Complaints of misled consumers in the
telecommunications sector are so widespread that it is the largest single cause of
complaints. Slamming conducts of salespersons in the telecommunications sector is the
usual problem and bundling services are also found in the markets. In order to enhance
consumer protections, training for the salesperson is a must, especially those hired under
an independent agency. Operators are still responsible for the salesperson conduct even
though they are employed under an out-sourcing scheme.

Policies should be put in place to deter operators from committing repeated offenses,
such as publishing the number of consumer complaints of the operators on a regular
basis. An independent body should be empowered to represent consumers and aid in
matters such as lodging complaints against operators. This independent body should also
make it easier for the active and well-equipped consumer to make an informed decision
by providing information and ensuring operator transparency. Although the removal of
barriers to a single market in the telecommunications services is now more or less
complete, information provision is one of the areas seen by consumers to be deficient.
More concern should be placed on remedying situations when consumers lack
information, professional advice or have difficulties comparing various services and
products. Lack of information hampers competition, an area of particular concern when
addressing consumer misgivings. Consumer education is an important key step to
enhance consumer awareness in the fast changing telecommunications sector in Hong
Kong.

A “cooling-off” period scheme should be introduced in the telecommunications sector to
give consumers a choice to terminate contracts if they are dissatisfied with the services
or find that they have been misled by the operators. This situation is not uncommon
because it is difficult for the consumers to digest the large amount of information
presented while entering service contracts. The cooling-off period scheme is important
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in the telecommunications sector because telecommunications services rely heavily upon
after-sale services. Once the consumers have been misled, they are stuck in contracts for
a long period of time. Therefore, protecting consumers from misleading or deceptive
conducts upfront should be made a priority.

Empowering the enforcement mechanism and making misleading or deceptive conduct
as one of the provisions in competition policy is the most efficient way to deter
misleading or deceptive conducts. Since the existing Guideline or Codes of Practices are
all voluntary in nature, they do not have any legal power in practice. Also, empowering
the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Ordinance with stronger penalties imposed in
practices will prevent similar misleading or deceptive conduct from happening again.
Moreover, all information delivered to consumers is required to be valid under the
empowered Ordinance. Correct and reliable information is important for consumers in
the telecommunications sector to decrease the chances of consumers being misled.

After examining the misleading or deceptive conduct complaints, it was found that more
competition and allowing new operators into the market both generated more misleading
or deceptive conduct complaints. Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain this
phenomenon. A regression model has been conducted to examine how competition
affects the frequency of misleading or deceptive conduct complaints received and
handled by Office of the Telecommunications Authority in four markets: fixed line
telephone services, mobile phone services, IDD services, and Internet services. The
effects of operator size in terms of service subscribers and market power have also been
analyzed. Results from the regression analysis reveals that more competition in the
market tends to trigger more misleading or deceptive conduct, which in turn leads to
increased complaints. Also, smaller operators, with smaller numbers of subscribers or
lower market share, are more likely to generate consumer complaints regarding
misleading or deceptive conduct. Newer operators are also more like to cause misleading
or deceptive conduct.
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Hong Kong telecommunications sector is highly competitive, however analysis of the
complaint cases and the regression study reveal that an overly-competitive
telecommunications market generated more misleading or deceptive conducts. Operators
compete with one another on price, at the expense of service quality. In order to lure
consumers, operators mislead consumers in order to survive under the cut-throat
competition within the sector. Non-quality competition is widespread in today’s
telecommunications sector. In order to maintain healthy and vigorous competition in the
telecommunications sector, competition policy should address the structural problems,
i.e. to determine the optimal number of licensees in order to maintain the optimal
competition level in the telecommunications sector. Conceptually, in natural monopoly
industries such as telecommunications, the optimal level of competition requires
balancing economies of scale and having sufficient competition. However, it may be
hard to determine an optimal competition level in practice, especially since it is not even
if an optimal level of competition exists or not. Therefore, protecting consumers from
misleading or deceptive conducts could eliminate the inefficient operator, allowing only
efficient and well-behaved operators to survive in the sector. This ensures fair and
effective competition. With the difficulty of determining the optimal number of
licensees in the telecommunications sector, enhancing and setting standards for
sufficient consumer protection in itself can maintain a more efficient level of
competition. Regulating conduct in this manner also drives out less efficient competitors
as a result of market forces. This then justifies the integration of consumer protection
into competition policy.

10.2 Future Study

Ensuring adequate consumer protection is not only important in the telecommunications
sector, it is also crucial to other sectors as well, especially with the possibility of a future
general competition law in Hong Kong. Few systematical studies exist which examine
the level consumer protection in the telecommunications sector. My study gives insight
on the current level of consumer protection under such a competitive market in the
telecommunications sector by examining the complaints in the sector and conducting a
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regression analysis to assess what factors attribute to the misleading or deceptive
complaints (few studies have included such regression analysis before). In particular, the
issue of over-competition is raised. Due to the limitation of the availability of data,
relatively small observations were inputted in my regression model. A more
sophisticated and complicated regression study could be done with more resources and
power to obtain the data from the operators and the Government. With more data and
resources, it may be easier to conduct a regression study to determine an optimal level of
competition in the telecommunications sector. On the other hand, similar studies could
be done in the future, not only in regards to the telecommunications sector, but also for
any other sectors in Hong Kong. Comparative studies among telecommunications
sectors in different countries could also be done to produce more insights.
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Structure in the Telecommunications Sector1

(A) Fixed Line Market

(1) No. of Competitors in the Market Over the years

No. of Licensed Service Provide

Figure 1
No. of Licensed Service Provider from 1999 to 2006
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Prior to 1995, Hong Kong Telephone Company Limited (HKTC) has been the only
telecom operator in Hong Kong providing local and international telephone services. In
June 1995, with the expiry of the local telephone franchise, the Office of
Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) has decided to open up the market and
introduce competition. Three new fixed telecommunications network service operators
(New world telephone limited, New T&T Hong Kong limited and Hutchison
communications limited) start to provide services in competition with the incumbent
operator

in

1995.

Three

more

licenses

have

been

issued

to

Towngas

Telecommunications Fixed Network Limited, Hong Kong Broadband Network Limited,

1

“Telecom Milestones” from OFTA website www.ofta.gov.hk
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and SmarTone Services Limited to provide the service in the market in 2000. In 2003,
CM TEL (HK) Limited, TraxComm Limited and HKC Network Limited have acquired
their licenses to provide fixed line services as well in 2003. In 2005, a license has been
issued to Hong Kong Cable Television Limited as well. And today, ten wireline-based
local fixed telecommunications network services (FTNS) operators and one wirelessbased local FTNS operators are providing local fixed line service in Hong Kong.

(2) Barriers to entry

The local fixed-line telephone market has been deregulated, following the expiry of
franchise of the former Hong Kong Telephone Company limited for local telephone
service. After lengthy negotiation with the Government in March 1998, Hong Kong
Telecom International has surrendered its exclusive license for provision of certain
external telecommunication circuits and services eight years earlier than the scheduled
expiry in 2006 in return for a cash compensation of HK$6.7 billion.

Further liberalization of the telecommunications market has been in 2000 with the award
of licenses to new wireless local FTNS operators, external facilities-based FTNS
operators and a hybrid fiber-coaxial cable based FTNS operator.

In January 2002, the TA has announced details on the implementation of the policy to
fully liberalize the FTNS market from January 1, 2003 with no pre-set limit on the
number of licensees to be issued.

Full liberalization of the telecommunications market has been in 2003 and further
competition is introduced with more fixed telecommunications operators licensed to
provide services from January 2003. 58% of residential fixed-line telephone users have
more than one service operator to choose from, the telecommunications market was fully
liberalized. Further competition is introduced with more fixed telecommunication
operators licensed to provide service from January 2003.
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The government has announced in July 2004 that Type II interconnection obligation at
exchange level would be fully withdrawn by June 30, 2008. In the run up to June 30,
2008, the withdrawal would be implemented on a building-by-building basis and will
apply to buildings already connected to at least two self-built customer access networks.
The number of households covered by at least two self-built customer access networks
has increased to 76% of the total number of households in October 2006.

(3) Change in Technology

Hong Kong's local telephone network has been fully digitalized in 1993 and the first
calling number display service has been introduced in HKTC's fixed network in
December 1996. Full portability of fixed telephone numbers has been achieved using the
database approach in 1997 where users could switch networks without having to change
their numbers; direct exchange line services are available to business and residential
customers from Hutchison Communications in January 1997. In 2002, the development
of competition in this sector has been facilitated through the implementation of local
loop unbundling (LLU or Type II Interconnection in Hong Kong) which is more
advanced in Hong Kong and which has made significant progress in furthering the LLU
process in recent years. LLU has facilitated market entry and helped to increase the level
of competition in the local fixed market in Hong Kong. Also, the local fixed network
operators are required to facilitate fixed number portability, which enables consumers to
switch to another local fixed operator without having to change their telephone numbers.

(4) Institution Affects the Structure in the Fixed Line Service Market

Different government policies would affect the structure of telecommunications sector.
For example, by issuing more licenses in the telecommunications market in 2000 would
further liberalize the market. Implementation of Type II interconnection in 2002 help
more competitors to provide services in the market and let the residential fixed-line
telephone users have more than one service operator to choose from. In order to enhance
the competition in the market, more licenses have been issued in the fixed line service
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sector in 2003. Also, OFTA has announced its decision in Jan 2005 to lift the priorapproval requirement on PCCW-HKT Telephone Limiter’s prices via the issue of a new
Fixed Carrier License, shifting from the ex ante to the ex post regulation approach. The
lifting of the prior-approval requirement has given the company greater flexibility in
responding to market competition.

(5) Performance in the Fixed Line Service Market

As a result of open competition in the local FTNS market and the active network rollout
by new fixed network operators since 1995, there are 71 per cent of residential
households who are able to enjoy an alternative choice of local fixed network operators
at the end of September 2005. It is expected that the future will keep growing as the
operators continue to roll out their networks. As at June 2006, there are over 3.8million
exchanges lines. The telephone density is 92 lines per 100 households or 54.5% by
population, which is among the highest in the world. 2Also, the monthly subscription fee
for residential telephone services has decreased around 20% in 2003 upon full
liberalization in the market. There is some good performance in the market after
liberalization and introduction of competition, with different levels of technology
introduced in the market.

2

Key Telecommunications Statistics from OFTA, OFTA www.ofta.gov.hk
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(B) Internet Market

(1) No. of Competitors in the Market Over the years
Figure 2
Number of Licensed Service Provider in Internet Service Market from 1999 to 2006
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In 1993, the first internet service provider licensed to provide commercial internet
services in Hong Kong. There were 159 licensees to provider internet service in Hong
Kong in 1999 with a rapid increase to 258 in 2001, however, there was a drop of service
providers in 2003 and kept decreasing in the number and today, there is 180 licensed
service providers are providing the service in the Internet service market.

(2) Barriers to entry

In January 2000, the telecommunications market has been fully liberalized after the
liberalization of the external facility-based market. More licenses have been issued in the
market, joining the competition.
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(3) Change in Technology

In 1998, broadband internet access services have been launched in Hong Kong. In 2001,
cable-based external FTNS operator Asia Global Crossing Hong Kong Limited
announces that its submarine cable “east Asia crossing” has landed Hong Kong. In
January 2001, cable-based external FTNS operator China Unicom International Limited
has completed its overland cable between Hong Kong and mainland China and has
launched services in the first quarter. Asia pacific cable network 2 has landed Hong
Kong in February same year, connecting the mainland chain, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, The Philippines. In December, the capacity of external telecommunications
facilities, namely the cable and satellite systems, has recorded a tremendous increase in
the year from 18Gbps to 235Gbps. The increase in bandwidth has been mainly attributed
to the new submarine cable capacity brought in Hong Kong by the cable-based external
FTNS operators. Networks have covered 99% of Hong Kong's residential buildings in
2002. HKBN Ltd has announced a plan in November to launch the high speed
symmetric 100Mbps and 1000 Mbps residential broadband services in 2004.

(4) Institution Affects the Structure in the Internet Service Market

Institution through government policy has affected the structure of the market. A class
licensing regime regulating the resellers of telecommunications services has been
introduced in September (year). The number of households which are covered by at least
two self-built customer access networks have increased to 76% of the total number of
households in October 2006.

(5) Performance in the Internet Service Market

Broadband Internet access services are very popular in Hong Kong. All the local fixed
network operators are allowed under their licenses to provide broadband services. The
data access sector in Hong Kong is competitive, especially in the corporate sector, which
has a large number of broadband service providers. There are currently 180 ISPs in
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Hong Kong, a significant increase from 1 in 1993 to 124 in 1997. Internet traffic
volumes have increased significantly with traffic via broadband networks reaching
approximately 28,000 Terabits in December 2002. There has, however, been a gradual
decline in the amount of data traffic carried via PSTN networks, i.e. narrowband internet
access, with minutes of use reaching 355m in December 2002 from approximately
14.5% and a household penetration rate of 42%. In terms of broadband subscribers, the
residential market share accounts for by the incumbent are approximately 54%. As of
November 2006, more than 1.73 million consumers have been using broadband services
with speed up to 1000 Mbps (Megabits per second), accounting for over 24 per cent of
total population. In the residential market, more than 68 per cent of the households are
using broadband service. Internationally, Hong Kong’s broadband penetration rate is
among the highest in the world. In addition, Hong Kong’s broadband services are very
affordable.3

3

“Report on the Effectiveness of Competition in Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market: An
International Comparison”, OFTA, June 2003, Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2003
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(C) Mobile Market

(1) No. of Competitors in the Market Over the years
Figure 3
Number of Licensed Service Provider in Mobile Service Market from 1999 to 2006
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In 1996, six personal communications services (PCS) licenses for provision of mobile
phone network service have been issued to Hutchison Telephone Company Limited,
Mandarin Communications Limited, New World PCS Limited, Pacific Link
Communications Limited, P Pus Communications Limited and Peoples Telephone
Company Limited. Mobile phone subscribers then have exceeded 1 million. Peoples
Telephone Company Limited has launched its PCS in January 1997. New World and
Hutchison have joined the competition in the PCS market in March same year. P Plus
Communications and Mandarin Communications have launched their PCS services in
June and Pacific Link has launched its PCS service in July same year also. CSL has
acquired Pacific Link Communications and mobile phone subscribers have exceeded 2
million in 1997.
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In March 1998, P Plus Communications Limited, one of the six PCS operators, has been
acquired by SmarTone Telecommunications Holdings Limited. In 2001, licensing for
third generation mobile service has completed in October with the award of licenses to
four successful bidders: HKCSL Limited, Hutchison 3G HK Limited, SmarTone 3G
Limited and Sunday 3G HK Limited. In accordance with the 3G regulatory framework,
the network licenses are required to open up at least 30 percent of their capacity for use
by non-affiliated Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) and/or content and service
providers. Hutchison 3g Hong Kong Limited has launched the first third generation
mobile service in Hong Kong in January 2004. The government has decided in
November to grant the nine incumbents GSM and PCS licenses providing 2G mobile
services. New Mobile Carrier Licenses are for a period of 15 years after the expiry of
their existing licenses between 2005 and 2006. SmarTone 3G Limited and HKCSL Ltd
have launched their 3G services in December 2004.

SUNDAY 3G (Hong Kong)

Limited has launched its 3G services in June while PCCW Ltd has purchased a majority
share of SUNDAY Communications Limited in June 2005. In 2006, a joint venture
company, CSL New World Mobility Limited has been created in April to own two
mobile telephone operators, New World PCS Limited and Hong Kong CSL Limited.

(2) Change in Technology

SM digital mobile phone services have been launched in Hong Kong in 1993. In 1995,
world’s first CDMA public mobile phone service has been launched in Hong Kong, and
mobile penetration rate reaches 10%. Hutchison Telephone has launched its GSM and
CDMA services in June and October in 1995 respectively. Full digitalization of mobile
service has begun fully digitalized in 1998, and analogue mobile phone service has been
completely phased out with implementation of mobile number portability in 1999.
In 2000, inter-operator mobile short messaging services have been launched and Hong
Kong has entered the new era of the third generation (3G) mobile services with the
award of 3G licenses to four successful bidders in 2000. In 2001, Asia's first commercial
mobile multimedia messaging service has been launched in Hong Kong. In December
2001, inter-operator short message service has been launched by all six mobile network

174

Appendix I
operators, allowing customers to send short messages to other customers even they are
in different networks. In 2002, First MMS has been launched in Hong Kong by HKCSL
in April and inter-operator multi-media messaging service has been launched by mobile
network operators in December, allowing customers to send multi-media messages to
customers in different networks.

(3) Institution Affects the Structure in the Mobile Service Market

Mobile service market has been further liberalized when the government decides in
November to grant the nine incumbents GSM and PCS licenses providing 2G mobile
services. New Mobile Carrier Licenses are for a period of 15 years after the expiry of
their existing licenses between 2005 and 2006. SmarTone 3G Limited and HKCSL Ltd
have launched their 3G services in December 2004.

(4) Performance in the Mobile Service Market

With absence of barrier to entry, the Hong Kong Government has sought to encourage a
high level of competition in the Hong Kong mobile sector. In 1984, three licenses for
cellular service provision have been issued with a fourth license subsequently issued in
1992. In 1996, a further six PCS licenses have been issued. Two of the PCS licenses
have been issued to existing mobile licenses, making the total number of mobile
operators to eight. Subsequent consolidation in Hong Kong has taken the number of
mobile network operators to six and in 2001 OFTA has issued four 3G licenses.

Competition in the market, has, however, been further developed through the
development of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (“MVNOs”). There are currently six
MVNOs active in Hong Kong and OFTA has provided a framework for 3G MVNO
access that ensures that 3G network operators must provide at least 30% of their network
capacity to non-affiliated MVNOs. The introduction of mobile number portability
service on March 1, 1999 has further promoted the competition among the mobile
network operators as it allows consumers to retain their telephone numbers when they
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switch to other mobile network operators. This has significantly reduced a barrier that a
subscriber may have faced when switching between mobile service providers.

Given the high level of competition, Hong Kong has a more fragmented sector where no
mobile operator accounts for more than 30% of the market. Also, Hong Kong has by far
the highest mobile penetration rate at the end of 2004. The decline in mobile prices
between 1997 and 2002 was the highest in Hong Kong. With reference to the report on
the Effectiveness of Competition in Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market: An
International Comparison in June 2003, Hong Kong has been also the most affordable
market for mobile calls in 2004. By November 2006, the number of mobile service
subscribers has been boosted to 9.4 million, representing one of the highest penetration
rates in the world at about 134.5 per cent. Among these 9.4 million subscribers, 2.2
million are 3G service consumers.4

Other than basic voice services, data services such as short messaging, mobile internet
services, all sorts of download services, multimedia services, video call services and
mobile TV services are commonly available anywhere, anytime and are increasingly
popular among consumers.

4

Key Telecommunications Statistics from OFTA, OFTA website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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(D) IDD Market

(1) No. of Competitors in the Market Over the years

In 1998, agreement has been reached between the Government and Hong Kong Telecom
on early termination of their exclusive license, paving the way for the introduction of
competition in the external telecommunications services and facilities market in 1999
and 2000 respectively. The number of Licensed Service Providers of external
telecommunications services is 183 in 2000, and it has increased to 210 in 2002 and
today, it reaches 249 licensed service providers in 2006.
Figure 4
Number of Licensed Service Provider in the IDD Service Market from 1998 to 2006
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(2) Barriers to entry

In 1998, agreement has been reached between the Government and Hong Kong Telecom
on early termination of their exclusive license, paving the way for the introduction of
competition in the external telecommunications services and facilities market in 1999
and 2000 respectively. In 1999, with market liberalization of the telecommunications
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services provided by external telecommunications services (ETS) providers, the external
telecommunications services market has been liberalized with effect from Jan 1.

(3) Change in Technology

Following the landing of several submarine and overland cable systems in 2001, the
external connectivity of Hong Kong has significantly enhanced. And in 2002, the
external connectivity of Hong Kong has reached nearly 900 Gbps.

(4) Performance in the IDD Service Market

The use of IDD services in Hong Kong has grown rapidly. On a per capita basis, Hong
Kong has generated the largest amount of IDD traffic in the world in 2004 and
experienced the largest increase in IDD traffic from 1998 to 2004. Hong Kong’s
international services market has been liberalized from January 1, 1999 and the
international facilities market from January 1, 2000. As of January 2007, there are 6
satellite-based External FTNS licensees and 21 cable-based External FTNS licensees. In
addition, there are 251 External Telecommunications Service (ETS) licensees in Hong
Kong. The introduction of competition has been associated with a substantial increase in
the use of international services with the number of outgoing international direct dial
minutes per person, increasing from approximately 290 in 1998 to nearly 520 in 2001.
The new entrants have been able to rapidly gain market share and the market share
accounted for by the incumbent is now less than 30%.5

Competitive pressure has been maintained in Hong Kong’s international services sector.
IDD market concentration has remained stable between 2002 and 2004. Hong Kong has
recorded one of the largest increases in international bandwidth (from 13, 712Mbps to
53, 058Mbps) and bandwidth per capita (from 2.0kbps/captia to 7.6kbps/capita) in the

5

Key Telecommunications Statistics from OFTA, OFTA Website http://www.ofta.gov.hk
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samples from 2002 to 2004. 6 Also, in the year ended June 2006, the volume of outgoing
and incoming traffic for telephone calls has been 6,097 million minutes and 2,161
million minutes respectively. Competition has resulted in a substantial reduction in IDD
call rates and improved quality of services.7

6

“Report on the Effectiveness of Competition in Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market: An
International Comparison”, OFTA, June 2003, Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2003
7
Key Telecommunications Statistics from OFTA, OFTA www.ofta.gov.hk
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Non-linear Estimations

1) Empirical Model

For operator j in market i in year t and the equation is:

Complaint Ratio jit =

Number of Complaints about Operator j in Market i Recevied in Year t
,
Number of Subscribers of Operator j in Market i in Year t

(A. 1)

where Complaint Ratio is a measure of the frequency of complaints received and
handled by OFTA.

The dependent variable y in my model is the ratio of complaint measured by the number
of misleading or deceptive complaints received and handled by OFTA against operator j
in market i over the number of subscribers of operator j in market i, and by equation
with non-linear specification is:

Complaint Ratio jit = β 0 + β1 (Level of Competition it )
+ β1 (Level of Competition it ) 2
+ β 2 (Operator Size jit )
+ β 4 (Operator Age jit ) + T + u jit

(A. 2)

The first independent variable is competition, which is measured by number of
competitors in market i in year t. The following variable is measured by the square of
number of competitors in market i in year t. Operator size is measured either by number
of subscribers or market share for operator j in market i in year t. The last independent
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variable is operator age, which is measured by the months of operator j providing
services in market i in year t. The independent variable T is the time trend effect.

2) Results

Estimation (A.2) is by ordinary least squares multiple log linear regression model and
the results are shown in the following tables. Results of regression model with the time
trend linear variable are shown in Table Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2.
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Appendix Table 1

Regression Result without Cluster Company Effect1

Independent Variables
Competition

Competition Square

Subscribers

0.0041

0.0048

0.0028

0.0032

(1.11)

(1.28)

(0.81)

(0.94)

-8.80e-06

-0.0001

-5.61e-06

-6.87e-06

(-0.98)

(-1.16)

(-0.67)

(-0.82)

-9.81e-09

-1.24e-08

(-0.93)

(-1.22)

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.0702

-0.074076

(-1.61)

(-1.70)*

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0003

-0.0741

(-0.54)

(-0.57)

(-1.46)

(-1.58)

-0.0042

-0.0046

(0.59)

(-1.08)

0.0102

0.0116

0.0066

0.0098

(0.49)

(0.59)

(0.32)

(0.50)

-0.4386

-0.4953

-0.3131

-0.3474

(-1.24)

(-1.39)

(-0.95)

(-1.06)**

-0.3995

-0.4561

-0.2811

-0.3147

(-1.13)

(-1.29)

(-0.85)

(-0.96)**

0.0135

0.0128

0.0186

0.0170

(0.54)

(0.53)

(0.76)

(0.71)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.1328

0.1460

0.1256

0.1370

Trend

M12

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

1

Due to the data limitations, the sample size in the regression model is 120, which is different from the
total number of 354 misleading or deceptive conduct complaint cases OFTA have handled from 1999 to
2006.
2
M1 means fixed line service market, M2 means IDD service market, M3, means Internet service market,
and Con means the mobile service market.
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Appendix Table 2

Regression Result with Cluster Company Effect3

Independent Variables
Competition

Competition Square

Subscribers

0.0041

0.0048

0.0028

0.0032

(1.73)

(1.87)*

(1.79)

(2.12)*

-8.80e-06

-0.0001

-5.61e-06

-6.87e-06

(-1.64)

(-1.84)*

(-1.38)

(-0.73)

-9.81e-09

-1.24e-08

(-1.94)*

(-2.22)*

Market Share

Operator Age

-0.0702

-0.0741

(-2.04)*

(-2.19)*

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0003

-0.0741

(-1.30)

(-1.52)

(-1.15)

(-1.23)

-0.0042

-0.0046

(-0.87)

(-0.92)

0.0102

0.0116

0.0066

0.0098

(1.07)

(1.20)

(0.49)

(0.72)

-0.4386

-0.4953

-0.3131

-0.3474

(-1.76)

(-1.85)*

(-2.13)*

(-2.39)**

-0.3995

-0.4561

-0.2811

-0.3147

(-1.73)

(-1.82)*

(-2.00)*

(-2.27)**

0.0135

0.0128

0.0186

0.0170

(0.73)

(0.67)

(0.81)

(0.74)

Observations

120

120

120

120

R-square

0.1328

0.1460

0.1256

0.1370

Trend

M1

M2

M3

Con

NOTE: The dependent variable are the logarithm of complaint ratio which is calculated by misleading or deceptive
conduct complaints divided by number of subscribers for particular operator in particular market

*, ** and *** indicates t statistics with significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively

3

The R-square may seem to be relatively lower, however, after including the year dummy; the R-square
improves a lot.
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